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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation’s overarching theme is the economics of international trade between
countries of diﬀerent income levels. Average income is one of the the most prominent
measures for the economic success of a country and the variation in average incomes
across countries is a well known - and often deplored - feature of the global economy.
Consider for example the average American’s real income which is 50 times higher than
the income of his peer in the Central African Republic (this corresponds to comparing the
10th richest with the 10th poorest country’s income in a 2007 sample of 188 countries) or
Switzerland’s per capita income which is 33 times higher than Ethopia’s (15th richest vs.
15th poorest country). In the context of international trade this large variation implies
that the typical trade relation is one between two countries with very diﬀerent income
levels. Indeed, if one ranks the trade relations by the ratio of the rich partners’ income
relative to the poor partners’ income one finds that the the median trade relation is one
where the richer country’s income is 4 times larger than the poorer country’s income.
The 25-percentile relation features a ratio of 2 and even in the 10-percentile relation the
average income of the richer country is still 50% higher than the poorer country’s income.
The first two essays in this dissertation investigate how this asymmetry in incomes aﬀects
the pattern of trade.
The first essay starts with the simple observation that the number of diﬀerent goods
that are traded between two countries, henceforth called the extensive margin of bilat-
eral trade, correlates positively with both the exporter’s and the importer’s per capita
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
income. With respect to the exporting country this is reminiscent of a very standard
Ricardian mechanism. If a country has an advanced technology it is competitive in many
industries and therefore tends to export a broad set of diﬀerent goods. At the same time
a good technology implies that the factors are relatively productive and are correspond-
ingly highly remunerated. Thus the positive correlation between the extensive margin
and the exporter’s per capita income. However, such a Ricardian framework leads almost
immediately to the conclusion that the correlation between the importer’s income and
the extensive margin should be negative. After all, having a good technology and there-
fore being competitive in many industries implies that a country only needs to import a
relatively narrow set of goods. I argue in the first essay that this simple model misses a
crucial feature of consumer behavior – richer agents not only consume higher quantities,
but also a broader set of diﬀerent goods. I.e. they adjust their extensive margin of con-
sumption. It may well be that a country with a good technology tends to produce more
goods locally, but this eﬀect can be dominated by this country’s consumers demanding a
broader set of goods. I formalize this intuition by adapting the modern workhorse model
of quantitative trade theory and allowing consumers to adjust the set of goods that they
consume. Quantifying the model allows me to assess the relative importance of the two
channels. I find that the demand side channel, i.e. an expanding extensive margin of con-
sumption, dominates and that the income elasticities of the model are reasonably close
to the empirical elasticities. Together with a number of extensions and robustness checks
I conclude this first essay with two counterfactual experiments that demonstrate that it
is quantitatively important to account for this newly identified demand side channel.
This first essay keeps the supply side very simple for the sake of parsimony. In particu-
lar I assume perfectly competitive goods markets, which ensures tractability of the multi-
country model. In the second essay my co-authors, Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller,
and I analyze the additional eﬀects that arise in the context of a more complex market
structure. We adapt a stylized two country model and document that in the presence of
market power producers find it optimal to price discriminate across markets by setting
high (low) prices in rich (poor) countries. However, the threat of international arbitrage
3in the form of parallel trade leads firms to charge a price in the rich country that is
lower than what they would charge in the absence of the threat of parallel trade. This
opens up the possibility of an alternative strategy – forgoing the relatively small oper-
ating profit that is realized in the poor country and focusing on the rich market only
allows the producers to charge a high price in the rich country without having to fear
arbitrageurs. This strategy’s attractiveness and therewith the set of firms following this
strategy rises in the degree of inequality of the trading partners incomes. The extensive
margin of trade is given by the measure of exporting firms relative to the total measure
of firms. In the presence of market power it is therefore not only the absolute level of
the trading partners’ incomes that is relevant for the extensive margin of trade, but also
the relative incomes of the trading partners. Moreover, we show that this novel channel
biases the gains from trade toward rich countries. We extend our model to more than
two countries; to unequal incomes within countries; and to more general specifications of
non-homothetic preferences. The basic results are robust to these extensions.
The first two essays are concerned with the eﬀect of diﬀerences in per capita incomes
on the pattern of trade. The third essay provides a diﬀerent angle. It asks if the very fact
that countries engage in trade aﬀects the variation in incomes across countries. In order
to investigate this question I use a standard quantitative trade model as a development
accounting tool. I quantify this model combining data on bilateral trade pattern with
country-specific endowment data. I then perform a number of counterfactual experiments
that allow me to disentangle the roles that the diﬀerent elements of the model play in
determining the cross-sectional variation in average incomes. I find that asymmetries in
trade cost – fixed market entry costs and variable transportation costs – may explain
around 20% of the variation in per capita incomes, which is a relatively small number
compared to the eﬀects of asymmetries in endowments. After several robustness checks I
apply the model to Switzerland and attempt at determining the origins of the Swiss gains
from trade. Not surprisingly, I find that most gains are due to the close-by countries
and the US and China. More unexpected are the results of counterfactual experiments
that put a number on the average Swiss consumer’s willingness to pay for trade being
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possible between Switzerland and a particular country. Due to reallocation eﬀects the
thus measured welfare-losses are rather small. I use this result to conclude with a word
of caution about the nature of the experiments performed in modern trade models.
Chapter 2
Per capita incomes and the extensive
margin of bilateral trade
2.1 Introduction
Trade flows greatly vary in the number of diﬀerent goods that are traded between coun-
tries. This “extensive margin of bilateral trade” can be thought of as the manifestation
of an interplay of the exporter’s production technology, the importer’s demand structure,
and bilateral trade costs - it is more likely that two countries trade a given good if the
exporter is particularly strong in producing this good, the importer has a especially high
demand for that good, or bilateral trade barriers are low. Most existing analyses of the
extensive margin of bilateral trade focus on the exporter’s technology and bilateral trade
costs. This chapter provides a complementary perspective by emphasizing the role of the
importing country’s demand structure.
For this purpose I adapt the Ricardian multi-country model by Eaton and Kortum
(2002) (henceforth EK). In the EK framework the production technology is country-
variety specific. Together with trade costs this determines the price at which a supplying
country can oﬀer a variety in a particular destination market. In any given destination
market the producer country oﬀering the lowest price will be the sole supplier of this
variety. However, whether this trade flow then actually materializes depends not only
5
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on the supplier country’s good technology and low bilateral trade costs, but crucially
also on the importing country’s demand structure - particularly if at the price oﬀered
there is actually a positive demand for this variety. With the traditional CES preferences
demand is always positive since the marginal utility is unbounded. In this chapter I relax
this assumption and allow agents to adjust the set of goods they purchase - henceforth
called the “extensive margin of consumption” - with income.1 In choosing their optimal
consumption bundle agents order the varieties along their prices and decide up to which
price it is optimal to consume positive quantities. It therefore is possible that for a given
variety the lowest price oﬀered by the supplier countries is still too high and the agents in
the importing country find it optimal not to consume (and therefore not to import) this
variety. The corresponding model is developed in Section 2.2.
A thus extended model helps to make sense of the empirical behavior of the extensive
margin of trade. It has been documented in several studies that richer countries both
import and export more varieties (see e.g. Hummels and Klenow (2002), Baldwin and
Harrigan (2007), or Sauré (2009)). Table 2.1 summarizes these findings by regressing
the extensive margin of bilateral trade in consumption goods2 on the per capita incomes
and population sizes of the trading partners (controlling for bilateral resistance). The
positive elasticity of exporter per capita income can be understood as a standard Ricardian
mechanism: per capita income is high due to a country’s good technology. But being
technologically advanced implies that this country is competitive in many industries and
therefore tends to export a broad set of varieties. However, at the same time this implies
that the number of varieties that need to be imported is relatively low. Allowing for the
extensive margin of consumption to adjust with income generates a countervailing force.
In order to assess whether this force is strong enough to dominate the negative eﬀect
coming from the supply side I quantify the model in Section 2.3. I use the aggregate
1Jackson (1984) documented the empirical relevance of the “extensive margin of consumption” using
US consumer expenditure data. Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996) provide evidence that richer countries
consume a broader set of goods using the Worldbank’s ICP-data. Other studies documenting positive
correlations between variety and income include Jekanowski and Binkley (2000), Moon, Florkowski,
Beuchat, Resurreccion, Paraskova, Jordanov, and Chinnan (2002), and Thiele and Weiss (2003) for food
consumption and Gronau and Hamermesh (2008) documenting similar eﬀects in time use data.
2I consider consumption goods only since the channel proposed in this chapter aﬀects the patterns of
final demand only.
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Table 2.1: Dependent variable - extensive margin of bilateral trade
variable coeﬃcient
per capita income exporter 0.66∗∗∗
importer 0.47∗∗∗
population size exporter 0.65∗∗∗
importer 0.30∗∗∗
bilateral distance [375, 750) −0.78∗∗∗
[750, 1500) −1.49∗∗∗
[1500, 3000) −2.26∗∗∗
[3000, 6000) −2.50∗∗∗
[6000,∞) −2.88∗∗∗
additional controls shared border 0.45∗∗∗
same language 0.74∗∗∗
N = 16053, R2 = 0.63, ∗∗∗ implies significance at the 1%-level
values of bilateral trade flows to estimate the model’s technologies and trade costs and
data on US consumer expenditure to pin down the preference parameters. I then simulate
the thus calibrated model and consider the behavior of its extensive margin of bilateral
trade. I find that the demand side forces are suﬃciently strong to dominate the negative
eﬀect of a good technology on the extensive margin of imports. Comparing the income
elasticities of the extensive margin of bilateral trade to the data I find that they are of
the right sign and close to the empirical elasticities.
What is the quantitative importance of this new demand side channel? To answer this
question I use the calibrated model to perform two classical counterfactual experiments
- lowering trade costs and the rise of China and India. A traditional model neglecting
the demand side predicts that lower trade costs lead to higher extensive margins of trade
since trade becomes worthwhile for more varieties. This eﬀect is reinforced by the demand
side. Lower trade cost lead to higher real incomes which induces agents to expand their
extensive margins of consumption. This then increases the number of traded varieties.
Quantitatively I find that the predicted increases in the extensive margins of bilateral trade
flows are at least twice as high when allowing for the extensive margin of consumption
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to adjust. The second experiment considers the eﬀect of technological progress in China
and India. Better local technologies imply that these countries will tend to produce
more varieties locally since they become more competitive. However, the rising incomes
will lead consumers to expand the measure of varieties that they consume. This eﬀect
dominates and therefore the model with non-homothetic preferences predicts that the
extensive margin of imports is rising, whereas a model neglecting demand side eﬀects
would actually predict falling extensive margins.
In this chapter I use the EK framework since it is parsimonious in the context of my
objective - it allows me to develop my argument in a very intuitive way and nevertheless
provides me with a model that is general enough to be directly quantified. The message of
the demand side being an important determinant of the extensive margin of trade however
is more general. In Section 2.4 I discuss how the demand side eﬀects would play in a model
of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms and what additional eﬀects and
complications may emerge. Remaining in the Ricardian framework Section 2.5 discusses
a number of extensions. First, I show that accounting for trade in intermediates does
not significantly change the quantitative predictions of the model. Second, I consider the
implications of allowing for within-country inequality, and third I show that the results are
not driven by the particular functional form of the utility function. Section 2.6 concludes.
This chapter contributes to two strands of the trade literature. First, by highlighting
the role of the importer’s demand structure it contributes to the broad literature inves-
tigating the extensive margin of trade. Second, on a more theoretical side it contributes
to the growing literature that recognizes the potential importance of non-homothetic
consumer behavior for understanding diﬀerent aspects of trade pattern. The focus of
previous contributions was on how non-homothetic consumer behaviour help us to un-
derstand variations in the aggregate values of trade flows and diﬀerences in unit prices3,
whereas this study focuses on the extensive margin of trade. As for the aggregate values
of trade flows Fieler (2010) argues that non-homothetic preferences help to explain the
higher trade share of rich countries. She extends the EK model to two industries with
3For a more complete overview of the literature of non-homothetic preferences and trade see Markusen
(2010).
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diﬀering demand elasticities. Richer countries then relatively concentrate their expendi-
tures in the high-elasticity industries. If the variability in productivities across countries
is relatively high in these industries, their share of traded output will be high. Together
with the demand pattern this implies that rich countries’ trade shares are higher. With
respect to the extensive margin of trade however, her model’s predictions are similar to
EK (a negative correlation of per capita income and the extensive margin of imports) since
agents do not adjust their extensive margin of consumption. Another aspect of trade pat-
tern where non-homotheticity is potentially relevant is the variation in unit-prices across
importing countries. Simonovska (2010) argues that diﬀerences in unit prices reflect dif-
fering markups due to demand elasticities that change with income. Choi, Hummels,
and Xiang (2009) and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009) on the other hand
understand diﬀerences in unit-prices as reflecting quality diﬀerences due to a increasing
taste for quality with rising income. Concerning the extensive margin of trade Sauré
(2009) argues that richer countries have more trading partners (county level extensive
margin) due to non-homothetic preferences and Foellmi, Hepenstrick, and Zweimüller
(2010) show that non-homothetic preferences can generate incentives for parallel trade
and influence the extensive margin of trade via this channel. This chapter’s contribution
is a multi-country model of trade where the importing country’s consumers decide about
their extensive margin of consumption. This decision then determines together with the
exporters technologies and the structure of trade costs the extensive margins of bilateral
trade flows.
2.2 A model of per capita incomes and the extensive
margin
The world economy consists of N countries. Country i’s population is denoted by Li.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor that is inelastically supplied on the domestic
market. There is one industry producing diﬀerentiated consumption goods. The measure
of varieties is exogenous and normalized to one.
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2.2.1 Consumer behavior
Agents maximize the same symmetric additively separable utility function
U =
ˆ 1
0
v (x (j)) dj
subject to their budget constraints E ≥ ´ 10 p (j) x (j) dj and the non-negativity constraints
x (j) ≥ 0 ∀ j. E denotes an agent’s income. The sub-utility function v (x) is concave,
v￿ (x) > 0 and v￿￿ (x) < 0, and the marginal utility is bounded from above, v￿ (0) < ∞.
With bounded marginal utility the non-negativity constraints are potentially binding and
the corresponding first order conditions for a variety j are
v￿ (x (j)) = λp (j) for x (j) > 0
v￿ (0) < λp (j) for x (j) = 0
(2.2.1)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Intuitively, an agent compares for every available
variety j the marginal utility from starting to consume this variety v￿ (0) with her utility
costs λp (j) associated with buying a marginal unit of this variety. If the marginal costs
are higher than the marginal utility the optimal quantity is zero - the non-negativity
constraint binds. For all other varieties the optimal quantities are positive and are chosen
such that the marginal rates of substitution equal relative prices. Figure 2.1 depicts the
demand function for a particular variety j. Note that there is a finite price v￿ (0) /λ above
which the optimal quantity is zero.
As the varieties enter the utility function symmetrically, agents simply order the vari-
eties in their prices (think of reindexing the varieties such that the prices rise in the index
j) and then choose up to which price they still want to consume positive quantities. I
denote the index of this marginal variety byM . Its price follows from rearranging the first
order condition (2.2.1) when the non-negativity constraint just binds, p (M) = v￿ (0) /λ.
As the indices are increasing in prices, M also denotes the measure of varieties that are
consumed in positive quantities and thus represents the extensive margin of consumption
in this model. Because the goods spectrum is normalized to one the extensive margin
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Figure 2.1: Demand function
of consumption simultaneously represents the share of available varieties consumed in
positive quantities.
Assuming that the price distribution can be represented by a continuous cdf G (p) -
this will be the case in the general equilibrium - the share of consumed varieties (and
therefore also the extensive margin of consumption) is
M = G (v￿ (0) /λ) . (2.2.2)
For varieties j < M the Marshallian demand follows from rearranging the first or-
der condition, x (λp) = v￿−1 (λp). Inserting the Marshallian demand into the budget
constraint and making the change of variable p = G−1 (j) yields
E =
ˆ v￿(0)/λ
0
px (λp) g (p) dp (2.2.3)
implicitely determining the marginal utility of income λ for a given price distribution G (p)
and income E. In the equilibrium we will know the price distribution and the income and
thus be able to solve for the multiplier λ. Using (2.2.2) one then solves for the extensive
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margin of consumption and (2.2.1) determines the optimal quantities for varieties j < M .
The potentially binding non-negativity constraints contrast with previous EK models
(see for example EK and Fieler, 2010) that assumed CES preferences.4 The unbounded
marginal utility of CES preferences implies that in this class of models agents always
consume all varieties, M = 1, independent of the price distribution and income.
2.2.2 Production technology and market structure
The supply side of the model is similar to the basic EK framework: The production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale and uses one input5, which I call labor.
Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile within countries, but immobile across countries,
so that in equilibrium there will be one wage rate wi per country. zi (j) denotes country
i’s productivity in producing variety j. Assuming perfect competition and iceberg trade
costs6 - dni units need to be shipped in i for one unit to arrive at the destination n -
implies that the price at which country i oﬀers variety j in country n is
pni (j) =
widni
zi (j)
. (2.2.4)
The country-variety specific productivity zi (j) is the realization of a Fréchet distributed
random variable Zi (j)
Pr [Zi (j) ≤ z] = exp
￿−Tiz−θ￿ ,
where Ti is country specific and governs the expected productivity draw. I will therefore
refer to Ti as country i’s technology (a higher Ti implies a higher expected productivity
and therefore represents a better technology in country i). θ is common to all countries
4Fieler (2010) models two industries with diﬀering elasticities of substitution. Agents therefore adjust
their relative expenditures across industries with income and thus exhibit non-homothetic consumption
pattern. However, since the marginal utility is unbounded the agents do not adjust the sets from which
they consume, i.e. all agents always consume in both industries all varieties.
5For parsimony I abstain from modeling multiple inputs. This will imply that in the calibration
diﬀerences in non-tradable endowments (e.g. human and physical capital) and diﬀering price-indices for
tradable intermediates are absorbed into the calibrated technology. For non-tradable endowments and in
the context of the counterfactuals this is admissible. For tradable intermediate inputs I will show in the
robustness-section how the results change when allowing for them.
6I normalize trade costs within countries to one, dnn = 1 for all n, and assume that the triangle
inequality, dni ≤ dkidnk holds for all i, k, and n.
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and controls the variation in the productivities (the lower θ the more variation there is in
productivity draws). I will show later on that θ also governs the elasticity of trade volumes
with respect to trade cost, which is why I sometimes will call θ the trade elasticity.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
All countries i are in principle able to produce each variety j. However, consumers will
source each variety from only one producing country - the country oﬀering the lowest
price. International trade thus emerges if this country with the lowest price is a foreign
country. In the appendix I show that the lowest prices on oﬀer in country n can be
represented by a cdf
Gn (p) = 1− exp
￿−Φnpθ￿ , (2.2.5)
where
Φn =
N￿
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ .
I.e. Gn (p) represents the share of varieties in country n with a price (weakly) below p. As
all agents are endowed with one unit of labor the income of a country n agent is simply
the wage rate, wn (to be endogenously determined). For a given wage rate the budget
restriction (2.2.3) together with the price distribution therefore determines the marginal
utility in country n, λn. The extensive margin of consumption in n follows immediately,
Mn = 1− exp
￿
−Φn (v￿ (0) /λn)θ
￿
. (2.2.6)
In the appendix I derive the probability πni that a producer country i is the cheapest
supplier in the importing country n for a particular variety,
πni =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
Since there is a continuum of goods, πni is also the share of varieties for which country
i is the cheapest supplier in n. Because the probability is the same for all goods πni is
not only the share of the total goods spectrum, but also the share for any sub-spectrum;
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in particular also for an importing country’s extensive margin of consumption. But this
implies that the extensive margin of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, which I denote by
mni, is simply the importing country’s extensive margin of consumption, Mn, multiplied
by the share of varieties for which the exporter i is the cheapest producer, πni,
mni = πniMn. (2.2.7)
The source of the remarkable simplicity of this result is worth discussing: The distri-
butional assumption of the EK framework implies that conditional on entering a market
n prices have the same distribution across supplier countries (the appendix provides the
corresponding derivations).7 Therefore the prices of the goods that the importer n actu-
ally buys bear no information about the likely source of these goods, so that πni is the
share of varieties of any subinterval of the variety space for which the supplier i oﬀers the
cheapest price in n - in particular also for the subintervalMn representing theMn percent
cheapest varieties.
Since the distribution of prices of goods that are actually sold in n is the same across
supplier countries i, average sales do not vary by source neither. In particular, average
sales in n are given by total expenditures wnLn divided by the extensive margin of con-
sumption, wnLn/Mn. The aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, Xni is
given by average sales multiplied by the the measure of varieties for which i is the cheap-
est supplier in n and which are actually consumed in positive quantities - the extensive
margin of trade, mni - which yields
Xni = πniwnLn. (2.2.8)
Note that taking the derivative of the log of volumes with respect to the log of trade
costs yields θ (neglecting general equilibrium eﬀects on the wage rates) which is why θ is
7Eaton and Kortum (forthcoming) call this feature “neutrality”. Note that neutrality is not unique
to the Ricardian framework. E.g. in the monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and
market entry costs neutrality follows if market entry costs are only destination specific and productivities
are drawn from Pareto distributions. Costinot and Komunjer (2007) provide a discussion of general
productivity distributions in the Ricardian multi-country framework.
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sometimes called the trade elasticity.
To close the model and determine the equilibrium wage vector I use the labor market
clearing conditions8
wiLi =
N￿
n=1
Ti (widni)
−θ￿N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θwnLn for i = 1, ..., N. (2.2.9)
In summary, the structure of the global economy is characterized by the countries’
technologies, Ti, and populations, Li, the matrix of bilateral trade costs, dni, the trade
elasticity, θ, and the shape of the utility function, v (·). In the general equilibrium produc-
ers price according to (2.2.4) and consumers choose their optimal quantities and extensive
margins (2.2.6) as implied by (2.2.1). Market clearing (2.2.9) pins down the set of equi-
librium wage rates and bilateral trade pattern are characterized by their aggregate value
(2.2.8) and their extensive margin (2.2.7).9
2.2.4 The role of per capita incomes
In this section I discuss how per capita incomes aﬀect trade pattern and contrast the re-
sults to the standard model with homothetic preferences.10 In the context of this chapter
the role of non-homothetic preferences is to endogenize the extensive margin of consump-
tion. Figure 2.2 illustrates this by depicting equation (2.2.6). The price of the marginal
variety is v￿ (0) /λn. Using the country specific price distribution Gn (p) one gets the share
of varieties with prices lower than this marginal price and thus the share (and measure)
8The labor market clearing condition follows for example from imposing balanced trade,
￿
k ￿=iXik =￿
n ￿=iXni, and adding the domestically sourced consumption, Xii, on both sides to get
￿N
k=1Xik =￿N
n=1Xni. Total expenditures in i are wiLi =
￿N
k=1Xik. Substituting for Xni and πni on the right hand
side then yields the labor market clearing condition as stated in the text.
9The general equilibrium exists and is unique. To see this note that the labor market clearing con-
ditions can be rewritten as excess demands for labor. It is straight forward to show that the resulting
system of excess demands satisfies the suﬃcient properties for existence and uniqueness (see for example
Propositions 17.B.2 and 17.F.3 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). The extensive margins and
the optimal quantities are unique as they follow from maximizing a concave object over a convex con-
straint. As wages and extensive margins fully summarize the general equilibrium this implies that the
general equilibrium is unique.
10With homothetic preferences expenditure shares are constant. One can show that a linear trans-
formation of the widely used CES-preferences is indeed the most general form of additively separable
homothetic preferences. Note that homotheticity (for additive preferences) requires v￿ (0) =∞ as other-
wise suﬃciently poor agents do not buy an expensive variety, i.e. their expenditure share is zero, whereas
the expenditure share of suﬃciently rich agents is positive, which contradicts homotheticity.
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Figure 2.2: Extensive margin of consumption
of varieties that are consumed in positive quantities - the extensive margin of consump-
tion. An increase in per capita income lowers the marginal utility of income λn and thus
increases the extensive margin of consumption - richer countries consume a broader set
of varieties. A first order stochastic dominance shift in the price distribution increases
the extensive margin of consumption as well - countries that are better integrated and
have therefore lower prices will consume broader sets of varieties. Note finally that for
v￿ (0) → ∞ the extensive margin goes towards one and agents would not adjust their
extensive margins with income.
In the Ricardian model, a country’s per capita income depends on that country’s
technology - the better technology, the higher the wage rate and thus per capita income.
In the model there are two channels of how an importing country n’s technology aﬀects
the extensive margin of trade. The first channel is the standard supply side channel. A
better technology implies better productivity draws for more varieties so that the share
of varieties πnn for which local producers oﬀer the best prices rises. But this implies that
the share of varieties that are imported, (1− πnn), and therewith the extensive margin
of bilateral trade tends to fall. On the other hand the non-homothetic model exhibits a
second channel. Better technology leads to higher wages and agents therefore extend their
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extensive margin of consumption, which tends to increase the extensive margin of trade.
In the calibrated version of model it will turn out that the latter eﬀect dominates so that
the extensive margin of bilateral trade is positively correlated with per capita incomes.
In the homothetic model on the other hand only the first eﬀect is present (all countries’
extensive margins of consumption are one) and the correlation between extensive margin
of trade and importer income is unambiguously negative. Note also that in the non-
homothetic model the decomposition of aggregate gdp into population size and per capita
income matters - a rich, but small country has a high extensive margin of consumption
and thus also tends to import broad sets of varieties, whereas the opposite is true for a
poor, but large country although the two countries may have the same aggregate gdp.
Whereas the non-homothetic and the homothetic model can have opposing predictions
for the extensive margin of bilateral trade, they exhibit the same pattern for the aggregate
volumes. This feature will be very useful when calibrating the model and comparing its
performance to the the homothetic model. Note also that with respect to aggregate
volumes both models do not have separate roles for diﬀerences in per capita incomes that
are induced by diﬀering technologies.11
2.3 Quantifying the model
In this section I quantify the model to assess whether my theory is able to explain the
behavior of the extensive margin of trade. I calibrate the model parameters using data
on aggregate trade volumes and US consumer behavior. I then simulate the parametrized
model and compare the behavior of its extensive margin of bilateral trade with the data.
2.3.1 Parametrization of the utility function
I have shown above that the eﬀects discussed emerge for a broad class of sub-utility
functions v (x). The central property is a bounded marginal utility, v￿ (x) < ∞. To
11In the data richer countries tend to trade more. One potential explanation is brought forward by
Waugh (2010) who argues that richer countries have systematically lower trade costs. I will capture this
in the calibration by following Waugh (2010)’s approach to modeling trade costs.
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quantify the model I need to choose a parametric form for v (x) . I will use the Stone-
Geary form
v (x) = log (x¯+ x) ,
where x¯ ≥ 0, as the thus parametrized model nests the standard homothetic model with
x¯ = 0.12 The preference parameter x¯ represents the degree of non-homotheticity. In the
context of this chapter it is particularly important that it governs the marginal utility of
starting to consume an additional variety, v￿ (0) = 1/x¯. The closer the non-homotheticity
parameter x¯ gets to zero the larger the marginal utility of consuming new varieties and
thus the weaker the demand side eﬀects on the extensive margin of trade. For x¯ = 0 the
marginal utility approaches infinity and agents find it optimal to consume all available
varieties no matter how expensive they are.
In the robustness section I will show that the results remain unchanged for alternative
preferences specifications with bounded marginal utility such as quadratic preferences and
CARA preferences.
2.3.2 Calibration strategy
The theoretical model’s bilateral trade pattern are characterized by two moments - the
extensive margins and aggregate volumes. Volumes are governed by
Xni = πniwnLn
and the extensive margins are
mni = πniMn.
Labor market clearing wiLi =
￿N
n=1Xni determines the equilibrium wage rates and the
equilibrium extensive margins of consumption follow from the budget restriction (2.2.3).
In the appendix I show that with Stone-Geary preferences the budget restriction can be
12For x¯ = 0 the preferences become CES preferences with an elasticity of substitution of one. Since
the quantitative behavior of the homothetic model is independent of the elasticity of substitution (see
Alvarez and Lucas (2007)) the results represent the general CES model.
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written as
wn = x¯ (Φn)
− 1θ
￿
Mn (− log (1−Mn))
1
θ − γ
￿
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−Mn)
￿￿
, (2.3.1)
where γ (z, t¯) =
´ t¯
0 t
z−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma function.
The model parameters are the countries technologies’ Ti and populations Li, the bi-
lateral trade costs dni, the non-homotheticity parameter x¯, and the trade elasticity θ.
Whereas the populations can be taken from the data, I need to calibrate the remaining
parameters. In the following I describe how I calibrate these parameters. The data used
for the calibration is discussed en passant with a more complete description in the ap-
pendix. I start with the calibration strategy for the non-homotheticity parameter as this
is the most novel part of the model. I then discuss the trade elasticity, trade costs, and
technologies in turn.
2.3.2.1 Non-homotheticity parameter
To calibrate the non-homotheticity parameter I use data of the US Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) of the year 2003. The advantage of using this source is its independence
from the trade data. Based on this database I construct the expenditures of around 3000
households for 107 diﬀerent categories of tradable goods such as “Encyclopedia and other
sets of reference books”, “Wigs, hairpieces, or toupees “, and “Winter sports equipment”.
Details can be found in the appendix. Counting the categories with positive expenditure
gives me a measure for the extensive margin of consumption of a household. Table 2.2
reports the elasticity of this measure of the extensive margin with respect to total expen-
ditures controlling for demographic variables such as household size, age of the reference
person, and geography, i.e. rural/urban and region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West).
Table 2.2 also reports the elasticities for a more liberal expenditure classification that
comprises 186 categories.13 Clearly, the positive elasticity is robust across specifications
lying between 0.4 and 0.5. For the calibration I will target the elasticity associated with
13The main diﬀerence lies in the treatment of housing- and gender-related categories. The conservative
classification excludes these categories, whereas the liberal classification aggregates over categories that
represent the same item but diﬀerentiate by renter and owner or women, men, girls, and boys.
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Table 2.2: Dependent variable - extensive margin of consumption
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the conservative classification and the specification including all controls, 0.41.
To understand the details of the calibration, first note that for trade volumes only
the relative technologies matter, which implies that we cannot identify the absolute level
of the technologies using aggregate trade volumes. In the budget constraint (2.3.1) on
the other hand the absolute level of technologies is relevant since it determines the level
of Φn. Moreover note that scaling all technologies by a constant has the same eﬀect as
scaling the non-homotheticity parameter. Therefore I can normalize either the level of
technologies or the preference parameter. It is convenient to choose to normalize the
level of the technologies such that the US-aggregator, ΦUS, equals one. Then the budget
constraint of a US-agent h with income wh is
wUS,h = x¯
￿
MUS,h (− log (1−MUS,h))
1
θ − γ
￿
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−MUS,h)
￿￿
.
Setting θ = 4.5 (see next section) and for a given non-homotheticity parameter x I can feed
all the CEX households’ incomes into the budget constraint and calculate corresponding
extensive margins of consumption. I then choose the preference parameter such that the
resulting elasticity of the extensive margin of consumption matches the empirical CEX
elasticity.14,15
2.3.2.2 Trade elasticity
For the trade elasticity I take the value estimated by Simonovska and Waugh (2010),
θ = 4.5. In general, one cannot separately identify the trade elasticity and the level of
trade costs by estimating a gravity equation - the trade elasticity may be high and trade
costs low or conversely, the elasticity low and trade costs high. To tackle this problem
14The resulting value is x = 3.14. In contrast to for example the elasticity of substitution of CES-
preferences this parameter does not have a standalone interpretation (beyond the fact that it is not zero)
since measures such as the demand elasticity or elasticity of substitution change with income and prices.
Therefore x is only meaningful when income and price distribution are known or as in the case here,
when a model giving rise to income and prices is parametrically specified.
15On a first sight the fact that I use within country inequality to calibrate a model where countries
are populated by representative agents may seem surprising. I address this objection in the robustness
section, where I consider the potential role of within-country inequality. Also I refer to the well-established
practice in the macro literature using microeconomically estimated elasticities to calibrate macro models
populated by representative agents.
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EK argue that one can use disagregated price data from the Worldbank’s International
Comparison Project (ICP) and take the maximal (or second highest) within good price
diﬀerence as an estimate for bilateral trade costs. As the resulting value for trade costs
has been obtained independently from trade volumes one then can solve for the trade
elasticity that is implied by a gravity type regression. Simonovska and Waugh (2010)
extend this approach. They provide a more elaborate estimation strategy that controls
for an aggregation bias arising from the fact that due to the small number of goods
categories in the ICP (around 80) it is very unlikely that the highest price diﬀerence
represents actually the trade costs. They also use a broader set of countries (123) and
are thus able to check if the trade elasticity systematically varies with development level,
which they find is not the case. The structural framework for their estimation is the EK
model. Since my model behaves similar to the EK model with respect to volumes and
prices I can directly adapt the Simonovska and Waugh (2010) baseline estimate of θ = 4.5.
2.3.2.3 Trade costs
I calibrate the trade costs using aggregate bilateral trade volumes of the year 2003. In
particular I follow Waugh (2010) in modeling unobserved trade costs as a function of
observed proxies and an exporter fixed eﬀect
dni = exp {δk + b+ l + exi + εni} ,
where I suppressed the associated dummy variables for expositional simplicity. δk (k =
1, ..., 6) is the eﬀect of the bilateral distance between countries i and n lying in in the kth
distance interval. The intervals are (in miles): [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000),
[3000, 6000), and [6000,∞). b is the eﬀect of sharing a border, and l the eﬀect of having
the same language. exi is an exporter fixed eﬀect that allows for asymmetry in bilateral
trade costs and εni captures all other trade barriers and is assumed to be orthogonal to
the exporter fixed eﬀects, distance, border, language, and membership in the same trade
agreement.
Normalizing the volume of the bilateral trade flow from i to n (equation (2.2.8)) with
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Table 2.3: Estimated trade costs
estimated coeﬃcients
variable coeﬃcient %-eﬀect
[375, 750) −0.53∗∗∗ 13%
[750, 1500) −1.52∗∗∗ 40%
[1500, 3000) −1.97∗∗∗ 55%
[3000, 6000) −2.84∗∗∗ 88%
[6000,∞) −3.33∗∗∗ 110%
shared border 0.77∗∗∗ -16%
same language 0.82∗∗∗ -17%
estimated trade costs (dni)
countries mean∗∗∗ median
OECD 2.01∗∗∗ 1.89
non-OECD 4.27∗∗∗ 3.53
all countries 3.91∗∗∗ 3.14
the importer’s home sales Xnn yields
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
, (2.3.2)
where Si = Ti (wi)−θ is a country fixed eﬀect. The value of the bilateral trade flow Xni
is observed, whereas - in the context of the model - Xnn is simply a country’s aggregate
gdp less its total imports.16 Imposing above trade cost function yields a Gravity-type
equation that I estimate using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator proposed
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Table 2.3 reports the resulting estimates for the trade cost
parameters together with the associated eﬀects on trade costs and some summary statistics
on the estimated trade costs.
16It is important to mention two potential caveats related to the way the model is mapped to the data.
First, I use aggregate trade volume, which includes also non-consumption goods such as intermediates.
Second, whereas trade is measured in gross values gdp is measured as value added, which again in the
context of intermediates may be of importance. I address both caveats in the robustness section where
I extend the model to allow for intermediates. It turns out that the main results remain basically the
same. The reason for this may be that the share of consumption goods in trade flows is unrelated to per
capita gdp and aggregate gdp, so that no systematic bias emerges.
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The average and median trade costs among OECD countries are 2.01 and 1.89 respec-
tively, which is slightly higher than often cited 1.7 suggested by Anderson and Van Win-
coop (2004) and very much in line with Waugh (2010). Consistent with the findings in
the literature trade costs among non-OECD countries are considerably higher.
2.3.2.4 Technologies
The most straightforward approach to recovering technologies is to follow Fieler (2010)
and take per capita incomes17 as a proxy for wages - indeed in the model wages and per
capita incomes coincide. Using the estimates for the country fixed eﬀects, Sˆi, one then
can directly solve for the implied technologies, Tˆi = Sˆi (wi)θ. An alternative approach
disregards the country fixed eﬀects and uses the market clearing conditions (2.2.9) to
recover the technologies: Plugging the per capita incomes, the estimated trade costs
and the trade elasticity into the market clearing conditions allows me to solve for the
unique set of technologies for which all markets clear. Figure 2.3 plots the expected
productivity draw in a country, Ei [z] = T 1/θi , against its per capita income. Clearly the
two approaches yield very similar technologies. Moreover, as it is to expect there is a
high correlation between estimated technology and observed incomes. However, note that
the correlation is not perfect as diﬀerent geographic locations imply that countries with
the same technology face diﬀering levels of demand and thus have diﬀerent equilibrium
incomes. For the remainder of the chapter I use the technologies calibrated using the
market clearing conditions.18
2.3.3 Calibration results
Given the calibrated parameters I now can simulate the model and compare the behavior
of its extensive margin to the data. Remember that with respect to volumes the non-
homothetic model behaves similar to the homothetic model. Hence, as we used volumes to
calibrate technologies and trade costs, these calibrated values also apply to the homothetic
17In the context of the model using nominal incomes is appropriate as deviations from PPP are en-
dogenous in the EK framework.
18The results for the alternative technologies are very similar with diﬀerences in the outcomes typically
lying within 1-2%.
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Figure 2.3: Calibrated technologies vs. observed incomes
model. I.e. we obtain the homothetic model’s predictions simply by setting the non-
homotheticity parameter to zero, x = 0.
The motivating fact of this chapter is the positive correlations between the extensive
margin of bilateral trade and the per capita incomes of the trading partners. Table 2.4
reports the income elasticities that follow from repeating the regressions cited in the
introduction using the model data.
For the exporter income elasticity both models yield the same elasticity. Moreover the
elasticity is reasonably close to what is observed in the data. For the importer income
Table 2.4: : Income elasticities of the extensive margin of bilateral trade
elasticities in data elasticities in models
all vars C only non-homothetic homothetic
exporter income 0.83 0.65 0.86 0.86
importer income 0.49 0.46 0.63 −0.12
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Figure 2.4: Calibrated extensive margins of consumption vs. observed incomes
elasticity on the other hand only the non-homothetic model’s sign is consistent with
the data. With 0.63 the non-homothetic model’s elasticity is somewhat higher than the
data’s income elasticity of around 0.5, but still reasonably close. The homothetic model
on the other hand predicts a negative importer income elasticity of -0.12. The reason for
this counterfactual prediction is its negligence of the extensive margin of consumption.
So that only the negative eﬀect of a technologically advanced country producing more
varieties locally is present. In the non-homothetic model this negative eﬀect is dominated
by a positive eﬀect coming from the demand side - the expanding extensive margin of
consumption. Figure 2.4 plots the calibrated extensive margin of consumption against per
capita income. Note that the relation is not perfect. The reason for that are diﬀerences
in the remoteness. Spain and New Zealand for example had the same nominal per capita
income in 2003, however Spain’s calibrated extensive margin of consumption is almost
10% higher than New Zealand’s as Spain’s geographic location is much more favorable.
This means that prices tend to be lower in Spain so that its real income is higher and
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agents find it optimal to consume a broader set of varieties.
2.3.4 The quantitative importance of the demand side
In this section I perform two counterfactual experiments. The goal of these exercises is
to demonstrate that accounting for demand side eﬀects is quantitatively important when
thinking about the reaction of the extensive margins of trade to changes in the economic
environment. In each case I start with the world economy as calibrated in the previous
section and compare the counterfactual outcome to the initial situation.
2.3.4.1 The rise of China and India
One of the most important trends in the global economy is the rise of China and India.
These two countries experienced spectacular growth rates in the recent years - according to
the World Development Indicators (Worldbank, 2010) China’s per capita income almost
doubled (95%) relative to the world per capita income between 1993 and 2003, important
India’s per capita income grew by 31% relative to world per capita income. In this
experiment I consider the calibrated 2003 world economy and ask how trade pattern
would change if China’s and India’s technologies improve such that their incomes rose
again by the same magnitudes relative to the world income.
The homothetic model predicts that because China and India’s technologies improve
these two countries become competitive in more varieties. Therefore these countries export
broader sets of varieties (the median increase is 76% for China and 17% for India). At the
same time the better technology implies also that these countries import a narrower set of
varieties. In important China is predicted to source 54% more varieties locally, whereas
India’s home share extends by 2%. This translates into median decreases in the extensive
margin of bilateral import flows of 15% and 14% for China and India respectively.
These predictions turn when one allows for non-homothetic consumer behavior. In the
non-homothetic model China and India extend their extensive margin of consumption as
their incomes increase (82% in China and 34% in India), so that the measures of imported
varieties actually increase by 53% and 33%. This translates into median increases in the
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Table 2.5: : Summary statistics for changes in trade costs
10%-reduction 25%-reduction 50%-reduction
new EK new EK new EK
mean 9% 2% 27% 5% 103% 37%
median 8% 0% 22% −1% 85% 18%
top10% 22% 16% 65% 43% 207% 118%
bottom10% −2% −11% −3% −25% 16% −31%
% negative 15% 49% 15% 51% 6% 35%
extensive margins of bilateral import flows of 55% for China and 14% for India.
2.3.4.2 Changes in trade costs
In a second experiment I consider the eﬀect of reductions in trade costs. Lower trade
costs aﬀect the extensive margin of trade trough two channels. The first channel is the
standard supply side channel - lower trade costs imply that trade becomes worthwhile
for more varieties, i.e. the extensive margin of trade will expand. However, there is a
second channel operating trough the demand side - lower trade costs lead to lower prices19
which increases real incomes. With higher incomes agents will find it optimal to consume
broader sets of varieties, which in turn will tend to increase the extensive margins of trade.
In order to assess the relative importance of these two channels I take again the calibrated
2003 world economy and uniformly decrease trade costs by 10, 25, and 50 percent.
From Table 2.5 reporting summary statistics on the percentage changes in the extensive
margins of bilateral trade the starkly diﬀering predictions of the homothetic and the non-
homothetic model become apparent. The homothetic model for example predicts that
for a 25%-reduction in trade costs more than halve of country-pairs actually experience
reductions in the bilateral extensive margins. This is because low-tech supplier countries
were competitive in nearby markets in the initial situation with high trade costs, but lower
trade costs imply that they are now dominated by countries with better technologies such
19Above I chose the US wage as the numéraire. Therefore I describe the adjustment via lower prices.
Alternatively with some goods price as the numéraire the corresponding adjustment would be described
by lower trade costs increasing productivity and therewith wages.
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Figure 2.5: Absolute and relative changes in the extensive margin of consump-
tion
that their export margins tend to fall. In the non-homothetic model this supply-side eﬀect
is attenuated by the demand-side eﬀect of a rising extensive margin of consumption, the
absolute and relative changes in which are plotted in Figure 2.5 against per capita incomes.
Whereas poor countries experience the highest relative changes, middle income countries
have the highest absolute changes. Relative to the supply side eﬀect these changes are
large such that for example the number of country pairs experiencing falling extensive
margins goes back to 15% and the predicted median change is an increase of 22% instead
of a decrease of 1% in the homothetic model. These contrasting predictions demonstrate
that it is indeed important to account for demand side eﬀects when thinking about the
extensive margin of bilateral trade.
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2.4 How general is the proposed channel?
I have presented a model of international trade where agents adjust their extensive margin
of consumption with income, which has quantitatively important eﬀects for the extensive
margin of bilateral trade. In order to highlight this novel demand side channel, I kept
the supply side very simple by adapting a perfectly competitive Ricardian framework. I
found that when allowing for non-homothetic consumer behavior the EK model is not
only able to capture the pattern of aggregate trade volumes, but also the behavior of
the extensive margin of trade. The more general message is that the extensive margin
of trade may be driven by a considerable amount trough diﬀerences in demand pattern
across countries. In the following I discuss how this channel generalizes to richer models
and why accounting for the demand side is potentially important.
A richer model of international trade would model the firm explicitly by allowing for
market power as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003). Fixed market entry costs implied
that not all firms find it optimal to enter all markets, which gives rise to an extensive
margin of trade. In particular, for a given level of entry costs, it is more attractive
to enter bigger markets since the contribution margin in these markets is larger. With
homothetic preferences the notion of a “big market” is purely driven by aggregate gdp
- due to constant expenditure shares it does not matter if we have a large and poor
population or a small and rich population. With non-homothetic preferences however the
decomposition of aggregate gdp becomes relevant as poor agents adjust their expenditure
shares with income. In the model developed above this is particularly apparent when
the expenditure share goes from zero (when the non-negativity constraint is binding) to
some positive share - the thus emerging extensive margin of consumption then drives the
extensive margin of trade. In a more general setting with market entry costs it is not only
the bounded marginal utility that is relevant but also poor agents relatively concentrating
their expenditures on cheap goods. A small, but rich market may therefore be suﬃciently
“big”, whereas demand in the poor, but populous market (with the same aggregate gdp)
may be too low for the operating profits to cover market entry costs - accordingly the
small, but rich market’s extensive margins of import flows will tend to be higher than
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the ones of the large, but poor market. Clearly, in such a framework it would not only
be average income, but also the entire shape of the income distribution that is relevant
for a firm’s entry decision. Ignoring non-homothetic demand thus leads a researcher to
attribute diﬀerences in the extensive margins of import flows entirely to diﬀerences in
market entry costs, whereas a considerable part of it may be driven by diﬀerences in
average income and the income distribution.
2.5 Robustness and extensions
2.5.1 Extending the model to trade in intermediates
The model I developed above is one of consumption goods only. I chose to abstract from
intermediate goods to keep the model as simple as possible. In this section I outline
a model with intermediate goods and final goods - both tradable. The purpose of this
extension is twofold: First, I use the extended model to assess if abstracting from inter-
mediate goods introduces a significant bias in the quantification. Second, to compute the
left hand side of equation (2.3.2) I used trade and gdp data. However, many papers using
the EK framework are models of trade in intermediates, in the context of which gross
manufacturing output is used instead of gdp data. With the intermediate extension I will
need to use gross manufacturing output and thus one can assess by how much the results
were driven by these diﬀerent ways of computing the normalized trade flows.
In the extended model there are two industries, ι = I, F . I produces tradable in-
termediate goods and F produces tradable final goods.20 Both industries bundle labor
and a CES-aggregate of intermediates using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with
labor share β. Cost minimization implies that the price of at which country i can oﬀer a
industry ι-variety jι in market n is
pni (jι) =
dni
zi (jι)
wβi P
1−β
i ,
20Note that in EK and follow up papers it is usually assumed that final goods are non-traded.
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where Pi =
￿´ 1
0 p (jI)
1−σ djI
￿1/(1−σ)
is the CES price index.21 I omitted a constant de-
pending on the labor share β. For expositional simplicity I will omit constants in the
following formulas, which corresponds to a particular normalization of technologies. As-
suming Fréchet distributed productivities with similar parameters across industries yields
a gravity-like expression that looks in its reduced form similar to the one derived above
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
.
However, there are two crucial diﬀerences: First, total demand, Xn, is now the total inter-
mediate absorption, XIn, plus total final goods demand, XFn . Consequently, following EK
the home supply now has to be imputed by subtracting a country’s total manufacturing ex-
ports from its gross manufacturing output, which I mostly get from UNIDO (2003) (details
in the appendix). Data constraints reduce the sample to 71 countries. Second the country
fixed eﬀects include now the countries’ intermediate price indices, Si = Ti
￿
wβi P
1−β
i
￿−θ
.
Note that in the simple model without intermediates the price indices Pi were absorbed
into the calibrated technologies and wages entered with an exponent of one, which implies
that the model tended to overstate the dispersion in technologies (standard deviation in
log of technologies is 2.7 with intermediates22 vs. 7.5 without intermediates). Explicitly
considering intermediates may particularly matter for counterfactual experiments chang-
ing the trade costs, as this implies potentially large changes in the intermediate price
indices.
Using the same procedure as in the main text (but a diﬀerent measure for Xnn)
I can estimate the trade costs and the country fixed eﬀects. To recover technologies
there are again two approaches: The more direct approach uses the estimated coun-
try fixed eﬀects, ￿Si and trade costs, dˆni, to compute the implied price indices, Pˆn =￿￿N
i=1 Ti
￿
wβi P
1−β
i dni
￿−θ￿−1/θ
=
￿￿N
i=1 Sˆi
￿￿dni￿−θ￿−1/θ and then use these price in-
dices together with the per capita incomes, wi, and calibrated values for β and θ to solve
21I assume that trade costs and labor share are the same across the two industries.
22The standard deviation of log
￿
TiP
−(1−β)θ
i
￿
, i.e. the technologies with absorbed intermediate price
index is 2.9.
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for the implied technologies, ￿Ti = ￿Si ￿wβi ￿P 1−βi ￿θ. Alternatively, one can combine the
estimated trade costs and the per capita incomes and solve directly for the unique set
of technologies for which all markets clear.23 The correlation (in logs) between the thus
calibrated technologies is very high at 0.96. I use the technologies based on imposing
market clearing.
The price distribution of final goods in country n is
Gn (p) = 1− exp
￿
−pθ
N￿
i=1
Ti
￿
wβi P
1−β
i dni
￿−θ￿
.
Normalizing technologies such that
￿N
i=1 Ti
￿
wβi P
1−β
i dUSi
￿−θ
= 1 I can use the same value
for the non-homotheticity parameter as above. Simulating the thus calibrated model
yields an importer income elasticity of the extensive margin of bilateral trade of 0.58 (the
corresponding elasticity in the model without intermediates is 0.57 whereas the empirical
elasticity is 0.50 in the restricted sample of 71 countries). Considering the counterfactual
experiments, the model with intermediates generally features even stronger diﬀerences
between the predictions of the homothetic and the non-homothetic model. This is because
the intermediate price index reacts to changes in trade costs or technologies respectively,
which amplifies the reaction of the price distribution of final goods and thus agents tend
to adjust their extensive margins of consumption more strongly.
2.5.2 Inequality
Up to now I abstracted from within-country inequality and had each country populated
by representative agents. Although most of the global inequality is indeed explained by
diﬀerences in average incomes, within-country inequality is a potentially important deter-
minant for the extensive margin of trade - consider two countries with the same average
income, but one with a wider range of the income distribution. My model would predict
that the country with the richer agents has a broader extensive margin of consumption
23Specifically, I take an initial guess for the technology vector, compute the implied price indices, and
use these together with the initial guess to compute πni and then the countries’ balances of payments. I
adjust the technology guess using a tâtonnement-like algorithm until all markets clear.
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and thus tends to import more varieties.24
Taking my model literally implies that if each country features one very rich agents
all countries extensive margins of consumption were one and all the demand side eﬀect
disappeared. I.e. this model’s extensive margin is very sensitive to the upper tail of the
income distribution. The main theoretical reason why this may not be the case is the
presence of fixed market entry costs (beachhead costs). Incorporating these into my model
would require departures from the competitive setting to allow for positive markups that
can be used to cover the beachhead costs, which would disproportionally complicate the
model.25
In order to nonetheless get a feeling for the potential importance of the within-country
income distribution I propose a simple exercise that allows me to stay within the Ricardian
framework. In particular I choose to use the average income in the top quintile to compute
the extensive margin of consumption: Remember that conditional on entering market n
the price distribution is the same across supplier countries. Therefore agents will have
the same average expenditures across countries, which implies that πni is the expenditure
share of each agent independent of his total expenditures. Consequently the aggregate
value of the flow from i to n is still Xni = πniwnLn. I.e. aggregate volumes do not
depend on the income distribution so that we can use the same calibration strategy
as above. The non-homotheticity parameter x calibrated using the CEX data remains
unchanged. However, I acknowledge the presence of within-country inequality by using
the average income among the top quintile in the budget constraint (2.3.1) instead of per
capita income. Taking the model literally this amounts to allowing for a general income
24Indeed, when repeating the regressions cited in the introduction including the importer’s top-quintile
of the income distribution I get positive coeﬃcients for the top-quintile. The elasticity considering
consumption goods only is 0.23 and significant at the 1% level, whereas the elasticity for all types of
goods is lower at 0.15 and significant only at the 10% level.
25With non-homothetic preferences markups become endogenous. With a representative agent the
model still preserves some tractability (see Simonovska (2010)) as per market there is one cutoﬀ pro-
ductivity above which firms enter this market and below which firms abstain from entering. However,
if one introduces within-country inequality firms not only decide whether to enter a market or not, but
also whom to supply in this market. I.e. the equilibrium is characterized by a correspondence between
productivity and income of the agent that just consumes this firms variety at the optimal quantity of
zero. Unfortunately, there is no simple expression for this correspondence. Since each country has its
own productivity and income distributions, there are N2 such correspondences, which is the reason why
the model loses all its tractability.
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distribution that is bounded by the average income in the top quintile. In a more general
sense I hope to learn from this exercise how the results change when trying to account
for diﬀerences at the top of countries’ income distributions.
I use quintile data from UNU-WIDER (2008) that are described in detail in the ap-
pendix. As the quintiles are not available for the full sample I consider a smaller sample
of 112 countries. I reestimate the model parameters for this smaller sample of countries.26
Accounting for within-country inequality by using average incomes in the top quintiles in
the budget constraint yields a lower importer income elasticity of 0.52 (vs. 0.46 in the
data).
2.5.3 Alternative utility functions
In the theory part I worked with a general utility function with the crucial feature of
a bounded marginal utility. For the quantification I then had to assume some partic-
ular functional form for the utility function (Stone-Geary). This section considers two
alternative utility functions with bounded marginal utility and shows that the calibration
results are robust to the particular functional form. I only consider one-parameter utility
functions as my calibration strategy for the demand side targets only one moment.
In particular, I consider quadratic utility
vquadr (x) = x− 1
2
aquadrx2,
which is popular for its linear demand functions and constant absolute risk aversion utility
(CARA)
vcara (x) = − exp {−acarax} .
A reader might note that often these utility functions are written with three parameters.27
However, in the context of a static trade model utility functions have a pure ordinal
purpose so that all monotonic transformations of the utility function, U =
´
v (x (j)) dj,
26For this smaller sample of countries the calibrated importer income elasticity for the representative
agent model barely changes (0.62 instead of 0.63).
27vcara (x) = Bquadr − Cquadr exp￿−aquadrx￿ and vquadr (x) = Bcara + Ccarax− 1/2acarax2.
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yield the same economic behavior.28 The one-parameter versions above are simply linear
transformations of the often seen three parameter versions.
As aggregate trade volumes do not depend on the particular functional form of the
utility function the supply side parameters calibrated above (trade elasticity, trade costs,
technologies) still apply, i.e. I only need to recalibrate the demand side parameter. In
the appendix I derive the analog to equation (2.3.1) governing the extensive margin of
consumption for a given income and price distribution. Using these equations I calibrate
the new utility parameters by targeting US consumers’ income elasticity of the extensive
margin consumption.29 I then simulate the calibrated models and calculate the income
elasticities of the extensive margin. The resulting exporter income elasticities are the
same as above as they do not depend on the demand side of the model. The importer in-
come elasticities on the other hand crucially depend on the demand side as demonstrated
above when comparing the homothetic model with the non-homothetic model. However,
when considering the alternative non-homothetic utility functions the importer income
elasticities change only very little (0.618 for CARA and 0.623 for quadratic preferences
instead of 0.614 for Stone-Geary). Similarly, the quantitative eﬀects in the counterfac-
tual experiments do not significantly change. These results demonstrate that whereas
accounting for non-homotheticity when thinking about the extensive margin of trade is
very important, the quantitative behavior does not seem to depend very much on the
particular functional form.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I discuss the importing country’s demand structure as a determinant of
the extensive margin of bilateral trade. I draw on the evidence of microeconomic studies
that show that richer agents consume more variety. Allowing for such an extensive margin
of consumption in an otherwise standard Ricardian trade model oﬀers an explanation for
the positive correlation between the extensive margin of bilateral trade and the importers
28It is important to note, that the transformation is applied to the aggregate utility function, U , and
not directly to the sub-utility function.
29The resulting parameters are aquadr = 3.59 and acara = 0.33.
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per capita income. I quantify the model using data on aggregate trade volumes, and US
consumer behavior. I find that the calibrated model’s extensive margin of trade behaves
similar to what we observe in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate that
this novel demand side channel is quantitatively important.
I mentioned in the introduction that other authors have used non-homothetic prefer-
ences to discuss diﬀerent aspects of the pattern of international trade such as aggregate
volumes and quality. A potentially fruitful avenue for future research is a model where
these two aspects and the extensive margin of trade could be analyzed simultaneously.
On the demand side, such a framework would feature agents that adjust their consump-
tion decision at the intensive, the extensive, and the quality margin. On the supply side
variations in countries abilities to produce quality goods would introduce comparative
advantages. Trade pattern – volumes, extensive margin, and quality – could then be
analyzed as the result of interactions of the exporter country’s production structure and
the importer country’s demand pattern.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Derivation of the country specific price distribution Gn (p)
Using the productivity distribution and the pricing equation (2.2.4) the probability of
country i supplying a particular variety j at a price lower than p in market n can be
written as
Gni (p) = Pr [Pni ≤ p] = Pr
￿
widni
Zi (j)
≤ p
￿
= Pr
￿
widni
p
≤ Zi (j)
￿
= 1− exp
￿
−Ti (widni)−θ pθ
￿
.
The probability that the lowest price on oﬀer in market n is below p is the complement
to the probability that all oﬀered prices lie above p
Gn (p) = Pr
￿
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 ≤ p
￿
= 1− Pr
￿
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 > p
￿
.
As the productivity draws are iid across countries above probability is simply the product
of the individual probabilities, which yields the price distribution from the main text
Gn (p) = 1−
N￿
i=1
Pr [Pni (j) > p] = 1− exp
￿
−pθ
N￿
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ
￿
.
2.A.2 Derivation of the trade share πni
The probability that country i is the cheapest supplier for a variety j in market n is given
by
πni (j) = Pr
￿
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
=
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
￿
p < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
dGni (p) .
Again one can write the distribution of the minimum price as the product of the
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individual distributions
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
￿
p < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
dGni (p) =
ˆ ∞
0
￿
k ￿=i
Pr [p < Pnk (j)] dGni (p)
=
ˆ ∞
0
￿
k ￿=i
Gnk (p) dGni (p) .
Inserting for the price distributions yields
πni (j) =
ˆ ∞
0
￿
k ￿=i
Gnk (p) dGni (p) =
Ti (widni)
−θ￿N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θ .
Note that this probability does not depend on the index j so that it also represents the
shares of varieties for which country i is the cheapest supplier in n
πni (j) = πni =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
2.A.3 Conditional on entry price distributions are the same across
sources
The distribution of prices from country i in market n conditional on being the cheapest
supplier is
Pr
￿
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
=
Pr
￿
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
Pr
￿
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿ .
The denominator is πni. The nominator can be written as
Pr
￿
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
=
ˆ p
0
Pr
￿
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
dGni (p) .
Similar steps as above yield
Pr
￿
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
= πniGn (p) .
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Reinserting this into the initial expression completes the proof
Pr
￿
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k ￿=i
￿
= Gn (p) = Pr
￿
min {Pnk (j)}Ni=1 ≤ p
￿
.
2.A.4 Derivation of the budget constraint for Stone-Geary pref-
erences
First note that with Stone-Geary utility the first order conditions (2.2.1) become
1
x (j) + x¯
= λp (j) for x (j) > 0
1
x¯
< λp (j) for x (j) = 0.
Using these first order conditions I can solve for the price of the marginal variety
p (M) =
v￿ (0)
λ
=
1
x¯λ
and for the inverse of the marginal utility of income respectively
1
λ
= x¯p (M) .
Optimal expenditures for varieties j < M are
p (j) x (j) =
1
λ
− x¯p (j) = x¯ (p (M)− p (j)) .
Inserting this into a country n agent’s budget restriction (2.2.3) yields
wn = x¯
￿
p (Mn)Mn −
ˆ p(M)
0
pdGn (p)
￿
.
Using the country specific price distribution Gn (p) one can write
p (Mn) = G
−1
n (Mn) =
￿
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
￿ 1
θ
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and
dGn (p) = θp
θ−1Φn exp
￿−pθΦn￿ dp.
Substituting this into the budget contraint yields
wn = x¯
￿￿
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
￿ 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(M)
0
pθpθ−1Φn exp
￿−pθΦn￿ dp￿ .
Changing variables in the integral, t = pθΦn,
wn = x¯
￿￿
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
￿ 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(Mn)θΦn
0
￿
t
Φn
￿ 1
θ
exp {−t} dt
￿
,
where the integral equals the incomplete Gamma function so that we can write
wn = x¯
￿￿
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
￿ 1
θ
Mn −
￿
1
Φn
￿ 1
θ
γ
￿
1
θ
+ 1, p (Mn)
θ Φn
￿￿
.
Substituting for the price of the marginal variety and rearranging leads finally to the
expression of the main text.
2.A.5 Deriving the budget constraint for alternative utility func-
tions
In the following I derive analogs to equation (2.3.1) for quadratic and CARA preferences.
The resulting equations pin down the extensive margin of consumption for a given income,
E, and price distribution, G (p) = 1− exp￿−Φpθ￿ .
2.A.5.1 Quadratic utility
With quadratic utility we have
v￿ (x) = 1− aquadrx.
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So that optimal expenditures are
px =
￿
aquadrp− λp2￿ .
Inserting this and the country specific price distribution into the budget constraint yields
E =
￿
aquadr
ˆ p(M)
0
pΦθpθ−1 exp
￿−Φpθ￿ dp− λ ˆ p(M)
0
p2Φθpθ−1 exp
￿−Φpθ￿ dp￿ .
Changing variables, t = Φpθ, we get
E =
￿
aquadr
ˆ p(M)
0
￿
t
Φ
￿ 1
θ
exp {−t} dt− λ
ˆ p(M)
0
￿
t
Φ
￿ 2
θ
exp {−t} dt
￿
.
Using the first order condition for the extensive margin of consumption, aquadr = λp (M),
I can substitute for λ
E = aquadr
￿ˆ Φp(M)θ
0
￿
t
Φ
￿ 1
θ
exp {−t} dt− 1
p (M)
ˆ Φp(M)θ
0
￿
t
Φ
￿ 2
θ
exp {−t} dt
￿
.
The integrals are incomplete Gamma functions
E = aquadr
￿
(Φ)−
1
θ γ
￿
1
θ
+ 1;Φp (M)θ
￿
− 1
p (M)
(Φ)−
2
θ γ
￿
2
θ
+ 1;Φp (M)θ
￿￿
.
From the price distribution we have Φp (M)θ = − log (1−M) and p (M) =
(− log (1−M) /Φ)−1/θ, so that
E = aquadr (Φ)−
1
θ γ
￿
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
￿
− aquadr (Φ)− 1θ (− log (1−M))− 1θ γ
￿
2
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
￿
.
2.A.5.2 CARA
With CARA we have
v￿ (x) = acara exp (−acarax) .
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Optimal expenditures are
px = − p
acara
log
￿
λp
acara
￿
.
As the price of the marginal variety is p (M) = acara/λ we can write
px = − p
acara
log
￿
p
p (M)
￿
.
Inserting this into the budget constraint
E = − 1
acara
ˆ p(M)
0
p log
￿
p
p (M)
￿
dG (p)
and substituting for p (M) and dG (p) we get
E = − θΦ
acara
ˆ (− log(1−M)/Φ) 1θ
0
log
￿￿
− log (1−M)
Φ
￿− 1θ
p
￿
pθ exp
￿−Φpθ￿ dp.
2.A.6 Data
I use data for the year 2003. In the baseline specification the sample consists of 164
countries, which corresponds to 26732 = 164∗163 bilateral trade relations. In the following
I describe the sources of the data that is used in the quantification.
2.A.6.1 Aggregate value of bilateral trade
I use the COMTRADE trade data of the year 2003 as provided by CEPII (Gaulier,
Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar, 2010). This data set provides the dollar values of
the bilateral trade flows between 239 economic entities (mostly countries) on the HS6 level
of aggregation Xni (j), which corresponds to 5111 goods categories. Summing over all HS6
categories I get the aggregate value of a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to
the importing country n, Xni =
￿5111
j=1 Xni (j) .
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2.A.6.2 Extensive margin of bilateral trade
A simple and intuitive measure for the extensive margin is to count the number of HS6
categories with positive volumes
mni =
￿
j
I (Xni (j) > 0) ,
where I (Xni (j) > 0) is an indicator function taking the value of one if the bilateral
trade flow from i to n in the HS6-category j is positive. A potential drawback of this
measure is the fact that the HS6-categories are defined for custom purposes, which is why
heavily regulated goods tend to have more categories. The associated measurement error
is absorbed into the error term and the estimated elasticities are unbiased if the coarseness
of the traded HS6-categories is orthogonal to the regressors.
An alternative measure for the extensive margin is brought forward by Broda and
Weinstein (2006)
mBWni =
￿
j Xn (j) I (Xni (j) > 0)￿
j Xn (j)
,
where Xn (j) =
￿
k ￿=n,iXnk (j) is the value of country n’s total imports in category j.
There are two reasons why this measure may be inappropriate in my context. First, this
measure is derived using a CES-demand system (Feenstra, 1994), whereas the central
assumption in my model is that preferences are non-CES. Second, it has been argued
that besides being directly derived from an underlying preference structure the advantage
of this measure is that the categories are weighted which may alleviate measurement
errors due to diﬀerences in the coarseness of the categorization. In the context of my
model, the numerator then would represent the extensive margin of bilateral trade, mni,
and the denominator is the multilateral extensive margin of imports, i.e. the measure of
varieties that are sourced internationally,
￿
k ￿=nmnk. Using the corresponding expressions
from the model one sees that the central element of my theory - the extensive margin of
consumption - cancels, mni/
￿
k ￿=nmnk = πni/ (1− πnn). In other words the Broda and
Weinstein (2006)-measure is unlikely to reflect the income eﬀects coming from the non-
homothetic consumer behavior.
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2.A.6.3 Per capita incomes and population sizes
The per capita incomes and the population sizes are taken from the Worldbank’s World
Development Indicator. The per capita incomes are measured in current (year 2000)
US-dollars. Following EK I deliberately abstain from using purchasing power adjusted
incomes as deviations from PPP arise endogenously in the EK framework.
2.A.6.4 Bilateral distances, shared border, and common language
All transportation cost proxies are from the database provided by CEPII. The bilateral
distance is measured as the distance between two countries’ most populous cities. The
common language indicator takes the value one if two countries have the same oﬃcial
language30 and common border takes the value one if two countries share a common
land-border.
2.A.6.5 CEX
The US consumer expenditure survey (CEX) is a rotating panel collected by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Its “interview survey” part provides detailed information on
household characteristics and expenditures. One of the main purpose of the survey its
use in determining and revising the baskets that are used for the computation of the
consumer price index. I obtain the CEX data from the website of the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). A detailed documentation of the
data can be found in BLS (2003). In the following I briefly discuss the raw data and how
I processed the raw data.
The unit of observation in the CEX is a “consumer unit”, CU, which basically comprises
of all members of a household using their income to make joint expenditures.31 Each CU is
in the panel for 5 consecutive quarters with one interview per quarter. The initial interview
only collects demographic characteristics, whereas the following four interviews collect
expenditures from the previous three months. Expenditures are collected for around 600
30The results remain basically unchanged when using major languages instead of oﬃcial languages.
31Under this definition a family constitutes a CU, whereas a roomer living with a family would constitute
his own CU as he is financially independent.
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categories (represented by “universal classification codes”, UCC). Of these 600 UCCs I
select the UCCs that correspond to tradable manufactures. This clearly involves some
ad-hoc decisions. I develop two classifications - a conservative classification, where I
disregard all uncertain UCCs and a liberal classification, which includes more UCCs.
Particularly diﬃcult are housing related items since they are often separated by renter,
owned home, and owned vacation home. For the conservative classification I disregard
these UCCs all together. In the liberal classification I lump together the renter and owner
categories for the same expense, e.g. I combine the categories “Installed and non-installed
replacement wall to wall carpeting for owned homes” and “Installed and non-installed
original wall to wall carpeting for rental homes” into one category, and ignore UCCs that
are only available for either renter or owner such as “Installed and non-installed original
wall to wall carpeting for owned homes”. Another diﬃcult class of UCCs is related to
cloths - a CU buying “men’s footwear” depends very much on if this CU comprises an
adult male. Therefore, in the liberal classification, I lump together UCCs across gender
and age, e.g. I collapse “men’s footwear”, “women’s footwear”, “Boys’ footwear”, and “Girls’
footwear” into one category. The conservative classification disregards these categories. In
the end, the liberal classification consists of 186 distinct expenditure categories, whereas
the conservative classification comprises of 107 categories.
2.A.6.6 Manufacturing absorbtion
I use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2003)
on gross manufacturing output. For the year 2003 this database provides the gross man-
ufacturing output for 74 countries. Unfortunately, the database does not include gross
output for several large countries, most notably China. I therefore choose to impute the
gross manufacturing output for countries that belong to the 20 largest economies in 2003
and for which I do not observe gross manufacturing output. I do this by following Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) and scaling value added in the manufacturing sector by
the average ratio of gross output and value added across countries. These countries are
China, Switzerland, Canada, and Mexico.
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2.A.6.7 Top quintiles of income distributions
I get data on the top quintiles of the income distributions from UNU-WIDER (2008). A
well-known problem of inequality data is that the measure to which the inequality data
refer varies across countries. In particular some quintiles refer to expenditures and others
to income. Moreover income may be measured in gross or net terms. To correct for
this I follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) and regress the observed quintiles on dummies for
the underlying measure. I then use the resulting coeﬃcients to estimate the net income
quintiles.

Chapter 3
Non-homothetic preferences, parallel
imports and the extensive margin of
international trade
(This chapter has been written together with Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller)
3.1 Introduction
Theories of international trade typically assume that consumers have homothetic pref-
erences, showing why product diﬀerentiation, increasing returns, and firm heterogeneity
are crucial in explaining the extensive and intensive margins of international trade (e.g.
Krugman, 1980, Melitz, 2003, Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008, Chaney, 2008).
While both casual observation and econometric analyses of consumer budgets suggest
that homothetic preferences cannot be defended on empirical grounds, their nice aggre-
gation properties and high tractability make them an ideal tool for studying settings in
which technology rather than demand factors are the main driving force of aggregate
outcomes.
The assumption of homothetic preferences, however, is clearly inappropriate for study-
ing how the composition of aggregate income aﬀects consumption and trade patterns.
Consider two countries, Austria and Nigeria. In 2008, their PPP-adjusted national in-
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come was roughly of the same order of magnitude (311 bill US $ and 281 bill US $,
respectively). While Austria is small and rich, with a population of 8.4 mill and per
capita income of 37,680 US $, Nigeria is large and poor, with a population of 152 mill
and per capita income of 1,940 US $. Should we expect the two countries to display sim-
ilar economy-wide demands for a given set of consumer goods? Homothetic preferences
predict that the representative Nigerian consumer purchases the same menu of goods as
the representative Austrian consumer, but in quantities that are 95 percent lower. If
this were so, trade patterns are unaﬀected by the composition of aggregate income and
exclusively shaped by supply conditions such as comparative advantages, diﬀerences in
factor endowments, trade costs, and other technological asymmetries.
In this chapter, we explore the implications of non-homothetic preferences in the con-
text of the "new" trade theory framework. While the supply side of our model is identical
to the basic Krugman (1980) framework, we deviate from this framework by introducing
non-homothetic preferences in a very stylized way: we assume that consumer goods are
indivisible and either consumed in unit quantity or not consumed at all.1 Prima facie,
this assumption may seem overly simplistic. However it is a "natural" deviation from the
standard CES-framework in the following sense. In our framework, consumption choices
are about the number of goods – the extensive margin of consumption – while a choice
along the intensive margin is ruled out by assumption. This is orthogonal to the standard
CES framework where consumption choices only aﬀect the intensive margin of consump-
tion and a choice along the along the extensive margin is ruled out by infinite reservation
prices (hence even the poorest household will consume all goods in positive, albeit tiny,
amounts).
Adopting this stylized way of introducing non-homotheticities provides a simple and
tractable framework that leads to equilibrium outcomes quite diﬀerent from the standard
model. To keep things simple and transparent we confine the basic analysis to the most
simple case of two countries. First, we show that, when per capita endowments of the
1Preferences of this type were used, inter alia, by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) to study how
demand composition aﬀects technology choices in the development process, by Matsuyama (2000) to
study the role of non-homotheticities in Ricardian trade, and by Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) to study
the relationship between inequality and growth.
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two countries are very similar, the world economy ends up in a full trade equilibrium. In
such an equilibrium, all goods are internationally traded and consumed in both countries.
In contrast, when per capita endowments of the two countries are suﬃciently unequal, a
partial trade equilibrium emerges. The reason is that only households in the rich country
consume all goods produced worldwide whereas households in the poor country can af-
ford only a subset of all goods. In a partial trade equilibrium, the fraction internationally
traded goods increases in the similarity of per capita endowments. This result is reminis-
cent of the "Linder hypothesis", according to which more similar countries trade more
intensively with each other.
Second, the partial trade regime provides us with a simple general equilibrium frame-
work of parallel trade. The partial trade equilibrium is supported by the price setting
behaviors of monopolistic firms. With indivisible goods, the highest price a firm can
charge is the representative consumer’s willingness to pay which is finite. But this may
create arbitrage opportunities. Consider a US firm selling its good both in the US and
in China. When price diﬀerences are suﬃciently large, arbitrage traders will purchase
the good cheaply on the Chinese market, ship it back and underbid local producers on
the US market. Anticipating this, US firms either set a price such that the incentive for
parallel trade vanishes; or US firms do not supply their product on the world market,
but therefore can charge the high price in the US. The general equilibrium perspective
of our model makes the latter fraction of firms endogenous. This eﬀect is typically not
considered in partial equilibrium settings of parallel trade but has a potentially important
impact on trade patterns.
Third, we make precise the relative importance of population sizes and per capita
endowments for trade patterns. The country with a large population is more productive
because a smaller fraction of resources is wasted due to (iceberg) trade costs. When
per capita endowment diﬀerences are small, a higher population can compensate a lower
per capita endowment so that a world economy that is initially trapped in a partial
trade equilibrium may switch to a full trade equilibrium as a result of population growth.
However, when per capita endowment diﬀerences are high, a larger population can never
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fully compensate for a small per capita endowment. In that case, the world economy
remains trapped in partial trade even when the population grows very large. Hence the
impact of population size diﬀers crucially from the impact of per capita endowments.
A higher degree of similarity in per capita endowments lets the world economy always
escape the partial trade regime, whatever the diﬀerences in population size of the two
countries. In this sense per capita endowments are a more significant determinant of the
trade regime than population sizes.
A fourth main result of our model concerns the welfare eﬀects of trade. Comparing
trade to autarky it turns out that in a full trade equilibrium the poor country gains
relatively more from trade; in a partial trade equilibrium, however the rich country gains
more. Moreover, a trade liberalization (a reduction in iceberg trade costs) increases welfare
of consumers in both countries when the world economy is in a full trade equilibrium.
However, in a partial trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization is beneficial for the rich
country but actually hurts the poor country. The reason is that trade liberalizations
deteriorate the poor country’s terms of trade, because international price discrimination
becomes more limited. Exporters of the poor country need to lower the prices they charge
in the rich country to inhibit parallel trade, whereas exporters of the rich country have
no need to adjust their export prices. However, they must adjust the prices they charge
in their home market. This makes selling on the rich market at unrestricted high prices
more attractive - thus, in the new partial trade equilibrium more firms of the rich country
will concentrate their sales exclusively only on the home market and less products will be
available on the world market. Consumers in the rich country benefit from the decreasing
prices of the internationally traded goods, whereas consumers in the poor country are
confronted with a lower range of import goods at unchanged prices.
Our basic model is simple enough to be extended in various directions. We first look
at a world with more than two countries. It turns out that in a multi-country world
our result that a trade liberalization decreases rather than increases trade needs to be
qualified. With many rich and many poor countries, a trade liberalization stimulates
trade and welfare due to more trade within the rich North and within the poor South.
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However, it decreases overall trade (and increases the welfare-gap) between the Northern
and the Southern region. While the North gains for sure, also the South may gain when
within-South trade increases more strongly than North-South trade falls.
Second, we allow for heterogenous trade costs. When trade costs diﬀer for the various
products (but are not too large to inhibit trade at all), trade liberalization implies that
goods with high (low) trade costs will be traded more (less). The reason is that high-
trade-cost producers can suﬃciently price discriminate hence they have an incentive to
sell their product also in the poor country. For a low-trade-cost producer a trade liber-
alization implies fiercer price competition on world markets. Therefore more low-trade
cost producers will decide to sell their product exclusively on the rich home market and
not to sell abroad. In such a situation, it depends on the relative importance of high-cost
and low-cost producers whether a trade liberalization stimulates or dampens international
trade.
In a third extension we look at the impact of policy-restrictions on parallel trade. Our
basic model assumes "international exhaustion" in which case parallel imports are not
legally forbidden. The holder of a product’s property right (patent, trademark, copyright)
can no longer exercise his property right once this product is sold either on the home
market or on the world market - his property rights are exhausted. In contrast, many
countries have implemented "national/regional exhaustion" in which case the property
right runs out when the product is sold on the home market, but does not run out when
the product is sold abroad. It turns out that restrictions to parallel trade help consumers
in the poor country but hurt consumers in the rich country. The reason is a general
equilibrium eﬀect. Stronger parallel trade restrictions encourage producers of the rich
country to sell their product abroad while being able to charge high prices at home. This
tends to improve the terms of trade for the poor country.
The fourth extension explores the consequences of income inequality. In such a con-
text the level of trade costs and the extent of within-country inequality determine the
equilibrium outcome. For low trade costs there are producers charging high prices selling
to the rich at home and abroad and other producers charging low prices selling to all
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households. Interestingly, in such a situation with low trade costs, where inequality arises
within countries and not between countries, lower trade costs actually benefit the poor.
Finally, we show that our model extends to a more general class of preferences where
consumers have a choice not only along the extensive margin but also along the intensive
margin. We demonstrate that, with more general specifications of preferences, a partial
trade equilibrium emerges provided that (i) the derived individual demand functions fea-
ture finite reservation prices (so that some consumers optimally choose not to buy certain
goods when prices are too high) and (ii) demand elasticities decrease (and mark-ups in-
crease) along the demand function. This makes an equilibrium possible where firms are
indiﬀerent between selling at high prices and small quantities in rich economies or low
prices and large quantities on the world market so that a partial equilibrium (supported
by a threat of parallel trade) emerges.
Several previous papers have incorporated non-homothetic preferences into the new
trade theory framework. The classical contributions are Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand
(1990) who stick to CES-preferences for diﬀerentiad products but introduce non-homo-
theticities trough a homogenous produc with a minimum consumption requirement.2 Sev-
eral recent papers abandon the CES-assumption and instead introduce variable elasticity
of substitution (VES-) preferences. One approach, followed by Markusen (2010) and
Simonovska (2010) aggregates diﬀerentiated consumer goods with a Stone-Geary subu-
tility (with negative required consumption levels). This formulation implies that firms
charge higher prices in richer markets, an outcome in line with empirical evidence (see
e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2007,Simonovska, 2010, and Manova and Zhang, 2009). Sauré
(2009) also uses a Stone-Geary subutility and studies how heterogeneous trade costs af-
fect trade patterns among symmetric countries. Behrens and Murata (2009) explore the
2Important empirical contributions include Hunter and Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991), Francois and
Kaplan (1996), Dalgin, Mitra, and Trindade (2008), and Fieler (2010). Mitra and Trindade (2005) use
nonhomothetic preferences over the industry aggregates to study how income inequality aﬀects trade
patterns. Chung (2005) used quasihomothetic preferences to address Trefler (1995) missing trade puz-
zle. Falkinger (1990) uses nonhomothetic preferences in a dynamic innovator-imitator model. Flam and
Helpman (1987) consider qualitative product diﬀerentiation in a North-South model. This model has
been extended by Choi, Hummels, and Xiang (2009), who focus on the role of income distribution in de-
termining the trade patterns. Krishna and Yavas (2005) used consumption indivisibilities in combination
with labor market imperfection to explain possible losses from trade in transition economies.
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pro-competitive eﬀects of free trade when consumers have CARA-preferences. They find
that trade reduces mark-ups and that low-income countries gain more from trade than
high income countries. These papers focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria where
all goods are consumed by all households worldwide.3 Their approaches diﬀer from that
of ours, which focuses on the (asymmetric) partial trade equilibrium where some goods
are consumed by all households worldwide, whereas other goods are only aﬀordable to
households in the rich country.
As mentioned above, we contribute to the literature by presenting a general equi-
librium model of parallel trade. A large partial-equilibrium literature has explored the
determinants and consequences of parallel trade (see Maskus, 2000, and Ganslandt and
Maskus, 2007, for surveys). The empirical relevance and importance of parallel trade is
undisputed. The question whether parallel imports should be permitted or not (or in-
hibited by appropriate policies) triggers hot political debates in many countries. While
empirical evidence on the quantitative importance of parallel trade is hard to get, exist-
ing estimates suggest that parallel imports are quantitatively important. A large body
of empirical evidence has looked at the pharmaceuticals market, where the pros and cons
of parallel trade are most obvious (see Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004, for an interesting
study of parallel trade on prices of pharmaceuticals in the EU). However, parallel trade is
quantitatively important in many other industries. For instance, KPMG (2003) estimates
that grey market sales of IT products could exceed USD 40 billion annually and that price
advantages drive grey market activity. According to the estimates of the National Eco-
nomics Research Association (NERA), parallel imports account for between 5% and 20%
of trade within the EU for goods such as consumer electronics, cosmetics and perfumes,
musical recordings, and soft drinks (NERA, 1999). In other words, parallel trade is an
important phenomenon and relevant in many markets. It is therefore interesting to study
the determinants and consequences of parallel trade (and/or the threat of it) in a general
3Other papers that give up the standard CES framework have studied the role of income inequality on
trade patterns. Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009) use a nested logit demand system in which
income distribution aﬀects quality choice and patterns of trade. Desdoigts and Jaramillo (2009) adopt
Lancaster’s ideal variety approach to study the impact of inequality on trade patterns.
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equilibrium framework.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section, we present
the basic assumptions and discuss the consumer behavior with non-homothetic prefer-
ences. Section 3.3 first discusses the closed economy case and then applies our basic
framework to study patterns of trade among equally large but unequally rich countries.
Section 3.5 discusses the role of population size versus per capita incomes. Section 3.6
extends the model to other relevant settings such as a multi-country world, restrictions
to parallel trade, income inequality within countries. Section 3.7 discusses more general
specifications of preferences. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The model
The economy is populated by P identical households. Each household is endowed with L
units of labor, the only production factor. Labor is perfectly mobile within countries and
immobile across countries. The labor market is competitive and the wage is W. Hence
household income is y = WL. Production requires a fixed labor input F to set up a new
firm and a variable labor input 1/a to produce one unit of output, the same for all firms.5
Producing good j in quantity x(j) thus requires a total labor input of F+x (j) /a. Product
markets are imperfectly integrated in the sense that trade costs accrue when goods are
traded internationally. Iceberg trade costs imply that τ ≥ 1 units have to be shipped to
the other country in order for 1 unit to arrive at the destination.
Households spend their income on a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, indexed by j.
We assume that good j yields positive utility only for the first unit and zero utility for
any additional units. Hence consumption is a binary choice: either you buy or you don’t
buy. Denote an indicator x(j) that takes value 1 if good j is purchased and value 0 if not.
4Note that due to the static setting, we do not need to introduce patents. The design of patents is
crucial for the outcomes in a dynamic setting. Grossman and Lai (2004) and Grossman and Lai (2006)
discuss these models.
5An extensive literature has documented the importance of productivity diﬀerences between firms.
While relaxing the assumption of homogeneous firms is straightforward, we stick to it in order to keep
the supply side of the model as simple as possible, allowing us to focus on the new eﬀects due to the
demand side.
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Then utility takes the simple form
U =
ˆ ∞
0
x(j)dj, where x(j) ∈ {0, 1} . (3.2.1)
Notice that utility is additively separable and that the various goods enter symmetrically.
Hence the household’s utility is given by the number of consumed goods.
Now consider a household with income y which can choose among (a measure of) N
goods that are supplied at prices {p(j)}.6 The problem is to choose {x(j)} to maximize the
objective function (3.2.1) subject to the budget constraint
´ N
0 p(j)x(j)dj = y. Denoting
λ as household’s marginal utility of income, the first order condition can be written as
x(j) = 1 if 1 ≥ λp (j)
x(j) = 0 if 1 < λp (j)
Rewriting this condition as 1/λ ≥ p (j) yields the simple rule that the household will pur-
chase good j if the household’s willingness to pay 1/λ does not fall short of the price p(j).7
The resulting demand curve, depicted in Figure 3.1, is a step function which coincides
with the vertical axis for p(j) > 1/λ and equals unity for prices p(j) ≤ 1/λ.
By symmetry, the household’s willingness to pay is the same for all goods and equal to
the inverse of λ, which itself is determined by the household’s income and product prices.
Intuitively, the demand curve shifts up when the income of the consumer increases (λ
falls) and shifts down when the price level of all other goods increases (λ rises).
It is interesting to note the diﬀerence between consumption choices under 0-1 pref-
erences and under the standard CES-case. With 0-1 preferences the household chooses
how many goods to buy but there is no choice about the quantity in which a good is
6Notice that the integral in (3.2.1) runs from zero to infinity. While preferences are defined over an
infinitely large measure of potential goods, the number of goods actually supplied is limited by firm entry,
i.e. only a subset of potentially producible goods can be purchased at a finite price.
7Strictly speaking, the condition 1 ≥ λp(j) is necessary but not suﬃcient for c(j) = 1 and the condition
1 < λp(j) is suﬃcient but not necessary for c(j) = 0. The reason is that purchasing all goods for which
1 = λp(j) may not be feasible given the consumer’s budget. For when N diﬀerent goods are supplied at
the same price p but y < pN the consumer picks at random which particular good will be purchased or
not purchased. This case, however, never emerges in the general equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1: microeconomic demand function
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consumed.8 Under CES preferences, a household has a choice about the (positive) quan-
tities of the supplied goods, but essentially has no choice about how many diﬀerent goods
to buy (due to a reservation price of infinity it is optimal to purchase each product in
positive amounts, whatever its price). In other words, the stylized case of 0-1 preferences
is interesting because this assumption shifts the focus of consumer choice to the extensive
margin, thus deviating from the CES case with its focus on the intensive margin. In
Section 3.7 we show that our results generalize to more general preferences, allowing for
adjustments on both the extensive and the intensive margin.
3.3 Autarky equilibrium and the emergence of trade
Consider an economy living in autarky under monopolistic competition. After incurring
the set-up costs, the various producers have a natural monopoly for their products. Since
all monopolists have the same cost and demand curves and since there is a representative
consumer, we can omit indices. The monopolistic firm faces a demand curve as depicted in
8The discussion here rules out the case where incomes could be larger than pN , meaning that the
consumer is subject to rationing (i.e. he would want to purchase more goods than are actually available
at the available prices). While this could be a problem in principle, it will never occur in the equilibrium
of the model.
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Figure 3.1. This firm will charge a price equal to the representative consumer’s willingness
to pay p = 1/λ and sell output of quantity 1 to each of the P households.
Without loss of generality, we choose labor as the numéraire and set W = 1. Two
conditions characterize the autarky equilibrium. The first is the zero-profit condition, en-
suring that operating profits cover the entry costs but do not exceed them to deter further
entry. Entry costs are FW = F and operating profits are [p−W/a]P = [p− 1/a]P . The
zero-profit condition can be written as p = (aF + P) /aP .9 This implies a mark-up µ -
the ratio of price to marginal cost – given by
µ =
aF + P
P .
which is determined by technology parameters a and F and the market size parameter
P . The second equilibrium condition is a resource constraint ensuring that there is full
employment PL = FN +PN/a. From this equation, equilibrium product diversity in the
decentralized equilibrium can be calculated10
N =
aP
aF + PL.
Market size and technology influence mark-ups in our framework. We will show below
that the mark-up channel is a crucial channel by which non-homothetic preferences aﬀect
patterns of trade and the international division of labor.
Now assume there are two countries, rich and poor, and consumers in both countries
have the same preferences given by (3.2.1). Assume further that firms in the two countries
produce diﬀerent products. Under which condition will the two countries trade?
9Notice that we have argued that p = 1/λ and p = (aF + P ) /aP ; it therefore seems that p is overde-
termined, unless we have λ = aP/ (aF + P ) . To see that this is in fact the case, notice that increasing
income by one unit approximates an increase in L (because income is y =WL and we normalizedW = 1).
Hence we can write λ = dU/dL = (∂U/∂N) · (∂N/∂L). Since we have U = N , ∂U/∂N = 1, and we have
∂N/∂L = aP/ (aF + P ) from equilibrium product diversity, this confirms the claim.
10Notice the diﬀerence between the 0-1 outcome and the standard CES-case. With CES, the mark-up is
determined by the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods; it is independent of technology
and market size. In fact, the variability of the mark-up with 0-1 preferences will drive many of our
results below. Moreover, with CES, equilibrium product diversity is independent of productivity a and
proportional to set-up costs F and inversely proportional to market size P. We notice that with 0-1
preferences product diversity in the decentralized equilibrium is equal to the socially optimal product
diversity.
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Assumption 1. (Trade Condition) τ ≤￿aF/P + 1.
The above assumption states a suﬃcient condition for the emergence of international
trade. To see this, consider an entrepreneur shipping τ 2 units of his or her product to
the other country so that, due to iceberg trade costs, τ units arrive there. The firm can
exchange the remaining τ units for τ units of a (symmetric) foreign variety ship it back and
sell it on the home market at price p. Thus autarky cannot be an equilibrium if the costs
of producing τ 2 units falls short of the (local) autarky prize, i.e. τ 2/a < (aF + P) /aP .
Solving for τ yields the trade condition. Note that the trade condition is independent of
the other country’s parameters such as population size, labor endowment, or technology
parameters. The above trade condition is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition for
the emergence of international trade. We will assume throughout the main text that
Assumption 1 holds.11
3.4 Trade between equally large but unequally rich coun-
tries
Let us now assume that Assumption 1 holds and consider a world economy with two
countries with unequal wealth. We denote variables of the rich country with superscript
R and variables of the poor country with superscript P . To highlight the importance of
diﬀerences in per capita incomes as a source of international trade, we start by assuming
that the two countries diﬀer only in per capita endowments, but have equally large popu-
lations, hence LR > LP and PR = PP = P . We also assume that the two countries have
identical production and transport technologies.
3.4.1 A full trade equilibrium
When the two countries are not very unequal, a possible equilibrium is one in which
all producers sell on the world market, so that all goods are traded internationally. In
such a full trade equilibrium, the price for a diﬀerentiated product in country i = R,P
11The case when Assumption 1 does not hold (high trade costs), is discussed in the Appendix.
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equals the respective households’ aggregate willingness to pay (see Figure 3.1), hence we
have pR = 1/λR and pP = 1/λP . Since country R is wealthier than country P , we have
λR < λP and pR > pP . By symmetry, the prices of imported and home-produced goods
are identical within each country.
Solving for the full trade equilibrium is straightforward. Consider the resource con-
straint in the rich country. When NR firms enter, NRF labor units are employed to set
up these firms and NRP (1 + τ) /a labor units are employed in the production to serve
the world market. Since each of the P households inelastically supplies LR units of labor,
the resource constraint is PLR = NRF +NRP (1 + τ) /a. This is analogous for the poor
country P. Solving for N i lets us determine the number of active firms in the two countries
N i =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)PL
i, i = R,P.
Now consider the zero-profit conditions in the two countries. An internationally active
firm in the rich country generates total revenues equal to P(pR + pP ) and has total costs
WR [F + (1 + τ)P/a]. An internationally active firm in the poor country generates the
same total revenues and has to incur the same labor requirement F +(1+ τ)P/a. Hence,
wages per eﬃciency unit have to equalize, WR = W P , for the zero profit conditions to
hold in both countries. We use labor as the numéraire in the following, WR = W P = 1.
The budget restrictions are therefore pi
￿
NR +NP
￿
= Li. Combining the zero profit
condition with the budget restrictions and the number of firms lets us express the price
charged in country i as
pi =
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP , i = R,P. (3.4.1)
The prices of all diﬀerentiated products are the same within a country, irrespective of
whether they are produced at home or abroad. Consequently, imported goods generate
a lower mark-up than locally produced goods as exporters have to bear the trade costs
fully.12 The mark-ups (price over marginal cost) producers charge on their home market
12In this respect, 0-1 preferences diﬀer strongly from CES preferences, as higher costs cannot be passed
through to prices. With CES preferences, transportation costs are more than passed through to prices as
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µiD = ap
i and the mark-ups set in the export market µiX = api/τ are given by
µiD =
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
P , and µ
i
X =
1
τ
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
P , i = R,P.
In sum, the full trade equilibrium has a simple structure: the ratios of rich relative
to poor country varieties, prices, and mark-ups are identical to the ratio in relative la-
bor endowments (and nominal incomes), i.e. NP/NR = pP/pR = µPD/µRD = µPX/µRX =
W PLP/
￿
WRLR
￿
= LP/LR < 1. The diﬀerences in per capita endowments and incomes
translate one-to-one into diﬀerences in prices, hence international trade establishes an
equilibrium such that real incomes and welfare levels equalize between the two countries.
Under autarky, on the other hand, the poor country is clearly worse oﬀ than the rich
country. As a result, international trade benefits the poor country more than it does the
rich country.
3.4.2 Partial trade and the threat of parallel imports
Full trade cannot be an equilibrium outcome when per capita labor endowments and
hence incomes between the two countries are very unequal, i.e. when LP/LR becomes
small. The reason is that if countries are suﬃciently unequal, a threat of parallel trade
emerges. To see the point most clearly, consider a US firm that sells its good both in the
US and in China. The firm charges a price in China that equals a Chinese household’s
willingness to pay pP = 1/λP and a price in the US that equals the US households
willingness to pay pR = 1/λR. Because the diﬀerence between 1/λP and 1/λR is large,
arbitrage opportunities emerge. Arbitrage traders purchase the good cheaply on the
Chinese market, ship it back to the US, and underbid local producers on the US market.
This threat of parallel trade also concerns Chinese firms which both produce for the local
market and export to the US. When these firm charge prices in the US that exploit US
households’ high willingness to pay, arbitrage traders have an incentive to purchase the
exporters charge a fixed mark-up on marginal costs (including transportation). Notice limited cost pass-
through is consistent with empirical evidence. A number of empirical studies document that marginal
cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at the firm level and that prices are substantially less
volatile than costs. See Ravn et al. (2007) and the references quotes there.
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product in China cheaply and parallel export it to the US.
Clearly, firms anticipate this threat of parallel trade and adjust their international
pricing accordingly. These firms thus take advantage of the large world market but are
constrained in their pricing due to the threat of parallel trade. There is an alternative,
potentially profitable, strategy: a rich-country firm could abstain from trading its product
internationally and focus exclusively on its rich home market. This producer type has
a smaller market but can exploit the rich country households’ high willingness to pay
because it is not subject to the threat of parallel imports. In equilibrium, both types of
firms exist simultaneously and the relative popularity of the two strategies adjusts such
that both yield the same profits. (We will see below that all firms in the poor country
are strictly better oﬀ selling their product on the world market rather than limiting their
sales to exports to the rich country and not selling on the local market.) This implies
that only a subset of all available products is actually traded, which is why we call this
equilibrium "partial trade" equilibrium.
Denote the price in the rich country of a good that is traded internationally by pRT ;
the price in the rich country of a good that is not traded by pRN ; and (as above) the price
of a good in the poor country by pP . When setting their prices, suppliers of goods traded
internationally anticipate the threat of parallel trade and set a price that just prevents
any incentive for arbitrage. This implies that the prices charged in the rich country for
goods traded internationally may not exceed the corresponding prices for these goods in
the poor country plus trade costs, i.e. pRT ≤ τ/λP , profit maximization implies that this
condition holds with equality. Hence we must have pRN = 1/λR, and pP = 1/λP .
The zero profit condition for a traded good is (pRT + pP )P = [F + P(1 + τ)/a]WR for
an internationally active rich-country producer and (pRT + pP )P = [F + P(1 + τ)/a]W P
for a poor-country producer. Both types of firms generate the same total revenues and
have to incur the same labor input. As a result, the zero-profit condition requires the
compensation per eﬃciency unit of labor to be the same in the two countries, WR =
W P = 1. The prices of traded goods can be calculated straightforwardly from these zero
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profit conditions as
pRT =
τ
1 + τ
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP and p
P =
1
1 + τ
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP .
The zero profit condition for a rich-country producer that sells his product exclusively on
the home market is pRNP = F + P/a, from which we calculate the equilibrium price of a
non-traded variety
pRN =
aF + P
aP .
In a partial trade equilibrium, domestic and internationally active firms co-exist in
equilibrium. To see why this is an equilibrium, consider the alternative situation in which
all goods produced in the rich country are traded internationally. If all products were
sold at a price that prevented parallel trade, all goods would be priced below the rich-
country households’ willingness to pay. However, this corresponds to a situation where
the representative rich-country household is not able to spend all income. This, in turn,
implies that country-R households have an infinitely large willingness to pay for additional
products, which induces some country-R firms to switch strategy and sell only on their
home markets.
In contrast to the rich country, do all producers in the poor country sell their prod-
uct both at home and abroad? In principle one might think that country-P producers
also have an incentive to sell their product exclusively in the rich country exploiting the
country-R households’ high willingness to pay (and not to sell their product on the home
market to prevent parallel exports). While such a strategy generates the same total sales,
it generates high overall costs as the country-P exporter also has to bear trade costs.
Hence selling exclusively on the R market is not a profitable option for a P producer.
We are now ready to solve for the partial trade equilibrium. The resource constraint
in the poor country is still given by PLP = NP (F + (1 + τ)P/a) from which we calculate
NP =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)PL
P . (3.4.2)
The resource constraint in country R is diﬀerent from before because now we have to dis-
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tinguish products that are exclusively sold domestically and those that are traded interna-
tionally. Denoting the traded and non-traded goods produced in the rich country by NRT
andNRN , respectively, the resource constraint of country R is PLR = NRT (F + (1 + τ)P/a)
+NRN (F + P/a). Together with the trade balance condition NRT pPP = NPpRTP and the
terms of trade pRT /pP = τ we can calculate
NRT =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)P τL
P , and NRN =
aP
aF + P
￿
LR − τLP ￿ . (3.4.3)
3.4.3 Per capita incomes and patterns of trade
It is straightforward to see the condition under which the threat of parallel trade becomes a
binding constraint on price setting in the rich country, allowing a partial trade equilibrium
to emerge. In a full trade equilibrium, relative prices are pP/pR = LP/LR and the threat
of parallel trade is not binding as long as the price ratio satisfies pR/pP ≤ τ . It follows
that the parallel trade constraint kicks in when
τ =
LR
LP
. (3.4.4)
In other words, a full trade equilibrium emerges when per capita incomes are suﬃciently
similar, LR/LP ≤ τ , and a partial trade equilibrium emerges when the gap in per capita
incomes is high, τ < LR/LP .
Figure 3.2 draws condition (3.4.4) in the (LP/LR, τ) space. Figure 3.2 is drawn for
values of τ that satisfy the trade condition of Assumption 1. In region F (full trade),
characterized by high values of LP/LR and intermediate values of τ, there is full trade.
In that region, consumers in the two countries have very similar incomes (and hence
the diﬀerences in their willingness to pay are minor) so that the parallel trade constraint
on prices in the rich market does not become binding and arbitrage opportunities do
not emerge. In region P (partial trade), characterized by low trade costs and high diﬀer-
ences in average incomes, a partial trade equilibrium emerges. When relative endowments
LP/LR are low, the diﬀerence in willingness to pay between rich- and poor-country house-
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Figure 3.2: partial vs. full trade equilibria
!"#$%& '!?"#$%&#'?()*?+,'' %$#-. ./,&'&0$&#
?
1/ ?!aF
P
F
RP LL1
10
holds is large, making the parallel-trade constraint binding.13
Let us highlight how the volume and structure of international trade depend on relative
per capita incomes LP/LR. We define "trade intensity" φ as the fraction of traded goods,
NP+NRT , over the total goods produced worldwide, NP+NRT +NRN . Using equations (3.4.2)
and (3.4.3) calculating trade intensity in a partial trade equilibrium is straightforward.
φ =
(1 + τ) (1 + aF/P)
1 + aF/P − τ 2 + (1 + τ + aF/P)LR/LP if L
P/LR < 1/τ , (3.4.5)
Alternatively, the world economy is in a full trade equilibrium with φ = 1 if LP/LR ≥ 1/τ .
Equation (3.4.5) reveals that a higher LP/LR, i.e. higher similarity between the two coun-
tries, is associated with a higher trade intensity φ. In Figure 3.3 we draw φ (vertical axis)
against relative labor endowments LP/LR (horizontal axis) holding worldwide resources
P ￿LR + LP ￿ constant. (A decrease in LP/LR is then a mean-preserving spread in world
endowments.) A reduction in LP/LR leads to a lower intensity of trade: a decreasing
range of traded goods NP + NRT is associated with an increasing range of non-traded
goods NRN . In other words as the similarity of the two countries in per capita endowments
13Notice that there is international trade even when income diﬀerences become extremely large and
LP /LR becomes very small. The range of traded goods approaches zero, however, when LP /LR goes to
zero.
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Figure 3.3: trade intensity as a function of relative per capita endowments
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(and per capita incomes) increases, the intensity of trade φ increases as well. The world
economy reaches full trade when LP/LR ≥ 1/τ . We summarize this discussion in
Proposition 1. a) When relative per capita endowments are suﬃciently similar so that
LP/LR ∈ [1/τ, 1], the general equilibrium features full trade. b) When per capita endow-
ments become suﬃciently dissimilar so that LP/LR ∈ (0, 1/τ), the general equilibrium
is characterized by partial trade where a threat of parallel imports/exports constrains the
prices charged for internationally traded goods in the rich country.
Proof. In text
It is worth noting that this simple model features the famous Linder hypothesis. Linder
(1961) emphasized that the similarity of two countries, as measured by similarity in their
per capita incomes, should be an important determinant of trade between them.
3.4.4 Welfare and the gains from trade
We proceed by studying welfare implications and the gains from trade. In particular,
we are interested in how trade liberalizations (a reduction of τ) aﬀect welfare and the
distribution of trade gains between rich and poor countries. In a full trade equilibrium,
households in both countries purchase all goods produced worldwide. Hence the welfare
levels are identical in both countries despite their unequal endowment with productive
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resources
UR,f = UP,f = a
P ￿LR + LP ￿
aF + (1 + τ)P .
Firms’ price setting behavior drives this result. R-consumers are willing to pay higher
prices than P -consumers because their nominal income is higher. In the full trade equi-
librium, higher nominal incomes translate one to one into higher prices. Real incomes
and welfare are therefore identical. To see the mechanism by which welfare is equalized
even though the two countries have unequal welfare levels under autarky, consider firms’
mark-ups. By assumption, all firms have identical production costs hence diﬀerent prices
reflect diﬀerences in mark-ups across countries. Since in equilibrium profits are zero,
the markups are fully used to cover fixed costs and iceberg losses during transportation.
Hence, the higher mark-ups in the rich country imply that the rich country households
bear a larger share of these costs.
In a partial trade equilibrium, welfare levels of consumers in the two countries diverge.
Country-P households purchase NRT + NP goods and country-R households purchase
NP +NRT +N
R
N goods. Using (3.4.2) and (3.4.3) we can calculate the welfare levels
UP,p = a
P(1 + τ)LP
aF + (1 + τ)P and
UR,p = a
P(1 + τ)LP
aF + (1 + τ)P + a
P ￿LR − τLP ￿
aF + P .
Notice that while welfare in country R decreases in τ (lower trade costs or trade liberal-
ization increases welfare), the opposite is true for country-P welfare. We are now able to
state the following proposition.
Proposition 2. a) Compared with autarky, country P gains more from trade than country
R. b) R-consumers favor free trade, i.e. τ = 1, whereas P -consumers derive their highest
utility when there are trade barriers such that τ = min
￿￿
aF/P + 1, LR/LP
￿
.
Proof. The proposition can be readily demonstrated using Figure 3.4. Panel a) is drawn
for the case when LR/LP ≤ ￿aF/P + 1 so that a full trade equilibrium emerges with
moderate trade costs. Panel b) is drawn for the case when LR/LP >
￿
aF/P + 1 so that
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a full trade equilibrium is not feasible. Country-R welfare (the bold graph) is monoton-
ically decreasing in τ in both panels of Figure 3.4. Hence the R-consumer reaches his
maximum welfare when trade costs have reached their lowest possible level, at τ = 1.
However, the welfare of country P (the dotted graph) increases in τ in both panels of
Figure 3.4 when trade costs are suﬃciently low, i.e. in a situation where the world
economy is in a partial trade equilibrium. A full trade regime emerges in panel a)
when τ ∈ ￿LR/LP , (aF/P + 1)LP/LR￿ where welfare decreases in τ . The economies
remain autarkic for even higher τ > (aF/P + 1)LP/LR where welfare obviously becomes
independent of τ . Figure 3.4 also shows that the highest welfare for country-P con-
sumers occurs at τ = LR/LP when LR/LP ≤￿aF/P + 1 and at τ =￿aF/P + 1 when
LR/LP >
￿
aF/P + 1. Taken together, this yields the result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 shows the crucial role of trade costs for welfare. Unequal countries have
diﬀerent preferred trade barriers (or diﬀerent preferred degrees of trade liberalizations).
Consumers in the rich country are essentially free-traders whereas consumers in the poor
country only want liberalization up to a positive level of trade costs. What is the intuition
behind this result? When the world economy has reached a partial trade equilibrium the
threat of parallel imports constrains prices in the rich country to pRT = τpP . Further trade
liberalization forces country-P exporters to lower prices in country-R relative to prices in
country P because price discrimination is limited by factor τ . Hence the terms of trade
for the poor country deteriorate leading to the welfare loss.
3.5 Population sizes versus per capita endowments
In the previous Section, diﬀerences in incomes across countries were due to diﬀerences
in per capita endowments and the two countries had equally large populations. Let us
now consider the case when countries diﬀer along both dimensions. This is interesting
because it allows us to gain insights on how the composition of aggregate income aﬀects
the extensive margin of international trade under non-homothetic preferences (as standard
new trade theory also predicts that the two countries’ sizes aﬀect trade volume).
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Figure 3.4: welfare and trade costs
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With 0-1 preferences it becomes most transparent how the composition of aggregate
income aﬀects the size of the home market if one considers a given product. As every
household consumes exactly one unit of a given variety, a larger endowment of the rep-
resentative home-consumer leaves the size of the home market unchanged. For the same
reason, a larger population increases the home market one to one. For internationally
active producers, having a relatively larger home market means that trade costs are a
relatively smaller part of total costs. As firms located in a large country bear relatively
fewer iceberg losses as a fraction of their total costs, labor in a large country is more
productive than labor in a small country.
3.5.1 Relative wages and general equilibrium
To see how diﬀerent population sizes aﬀect relative wages, we need to check the zero-profit
conditions of internationally active firms. Total revenues are given by pP
￿
τPR + PP￿
and do not diﬀer by firm location. However, the amount of labor needed to serve the
world market does diﬀer. It is given by F +
￿PR + τPP￿ /a for country-R firms and by
F +
￿
τPR + PP￿ /a for country-P firms. We can calculate relative wages from the zero-
profit conditions (note that the formula is the same under both full and partial trade)
ω ≡ W
P
WR
=
aF + τPP + PR
aF + PP + τPR . (3.5.1)
It follows that ω ￿ 1 if PP/PR ￿ 1. Hence the compensation per eﬃciency unit of labor
is higher in the poor country when the poor country is larger and vice versa.
The discussion above suggests that a backward country in terms of per capita en-
dowment can get ahead in terms of per capita income if it has a large population. This
raises an interesting question. Could it be that a huge population raises incomes and
willingness to pay in country P so much that the parallel-trade constraint on price setting
becomes binding in country P rather than in country R? In other words, is it possible
that producers in a poor country with a large population face a threat of parallel trade
leading to a "reversed" partial trade equilibrium in which only a subset of poor-country
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varieties are internationally traded?
The answer is no. To see this, recall that the households’ budget constraints in a full
trade equilibrium areW iLi = pi(NP +NR), i = R,P from which we can calculate relative
prices under full trade
pP
pR
=
aF + PR + τPP
aF + τPR + PP
LP
LR
.
Verification that limPP→∞ pP/pR = τLP/LR < τ is straightforward. Even if the popula-
tion in country P becomes extremely large, country-P households’ willingness to pay –
while eventually exceeding that of country-R households – will remain below τpR. Hence
arbitrage opportunities and therefore a threat of parallel trade do not exist. In sum, a
"reversed" partial trade equilibrium will never emerge.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates that per capita incomes aﬀect trade volumes for a given
aggregate size of the economy. The bold line represents the combinations of relative
per capita endowments and relative population sizes such that the world economy just
enters the full trade regime (FP-boundary). More precisely, along this line the relative
willingness to pay pR/pP are exactly equal to trade costs τ . Per capita incomes are more
similar to the right of this curve (LP/LR closer to unity) so that the relative willingness
to pay is strictly lower than τ . Per capita income diﬀerences are too dissimilar to the left
of this curve, creating a threat of parallel trade so that a partial equilibrium emerges.14
The figure shows that, whatever relative population sizes PP/PR, the world economy
can reach a full trade equilibrium provided that relative per capita endowments LP/LR
suﬃciently approach unity. However, we cannot argue in the same way with increases
in relative populations. When per capita incomes are suﬃciently similar, an increase in
population in the poorer country may push the world economy out of a partial trade
into a full trade equilibrium. However, when per capita endowments are very dissimilar,
LP/LR < 1/τ 2, the world economy remains trapped in a partial trade equilibrium even
when relative population size PP/PR goes to infinity. In this sense, the model predicts
that per capita incomes are more important than population sizes in shaping patterns of
14The FP boundary is defined by ω(PP /PR)LP /LR = τ. From equation (3.5.1) we have ω￿ > 0, which
implies a negative relationship between PP /PR and LP /LR.
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Figure 3.5: relative per capita endowments vs. relative population sizes
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international trade.
To consider the distinct impact of per capita income, we draw a dotted ’iso-size’ line,
i.e. the combination of relative per capita endowments and relative population sizes for
which aggregate endowments of the two economies are identical, LPPP = LRPR. (Recall
that, under CES preferences, such a situation would feature a world equilibrium with
perfect symmetry). Since the iso-size line is flatter than the FP boundary, the two curves
cross when LP/LR becomes suﬃciently low. Hence two countries with identical aggregate
endowments end up in partial trade when one country is rich but small and the other
country is large but poor.
3.5.2 Welfare implications
When we allow populations to diﬀer between the two countries, welfare implications
remain qualitatively unchanged. In a full trade equilibrium, the welfare levels are
U i,f = U i,f = a
PRLR + ω(τ)PPLP
aF + PR + τPP , i = R,P
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the same for both countries. Comparing full trade with autarky, it may be that the rich
(rather than the poor) country gains more than the poor country. Welfare levels under
autarky are U i,a = Li/ (F/P i + 1/a), i = R,P , which reveals that country-R households
gain more from full trade when LPPP/(LRPR) > (aF + PP )/(aF + PR). This situation
arises when the rich country is very small so that access to the large world market generates
a large gain in eﬃciency.
In a partial trade equilibrium we have
UP,p = a
￿PP + τPR￿LP
aF + τPR + PP , and
UR,p = a
￿PP + τPR￿LP
aF + τPR + PP + a
PR ￿LR − ω(τ)τLP ￿
aF + aPR .
It can be shown that ∂UP,p/∂τ > 0 and ∂UR,p/∂τ < 0. Hence, allowing for unequal
population sizes does not change the welfare implications of a trade liberalization. When
the world economy is in partial trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization improves welfare
of country-R consumers but hurts consumers in country P . The reason is the same
as above. In a partial trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization deteriorates terms of
trade for the poor country. The higher relative price of imported goods implies that the
consumption basket poor country consumers can aﬀord becomes smaller. The preferred
level of openness is τ = 1 in the rich country and τ˜ > 1 in the poor country, where τ˜
satisfies ω(τ˜)LP/LR = τ˜ . Notice that τ˜ is also the critical level of trade costs that lets
the world economy switch from a full trade to a partial trade equilibrium.
3.6 Extensions
3.6.1 More than two countries
The above analysis examined the case of bilateral trade. In a two-country context, we
demonstrated that per capita incomes have a crucial impact on trade patterns and that
the impact of the aggregate size of an economy depends on whether size comes from per
capita income or from population. We also showed that trade liberalizations (a reduction
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in trade costs) increase trade in a full trade equilibrium; but may decrease the volume of
international trade in a partial trade equilibrium. One could argue that the latter result
is an unattractive feature of our model.
3.6.1.1 Two rich and two poor countries
We show below that this result becomes much weaker or completely vanishes once we allow
for more than two countries. To make the point, we consider the following interesting
special case. Suppose there are four countries, identical in all dimensions except for
their per capita endowments. Assume further that there are two rich countries, each
of which has per capita endowment LN , the "North"; and two poor countries with per
capita endowment LS < LN , the "South". If LN/LS < τ there will be full trade, each
country buys all domestically produced goods and imports all goods produced in all other
countries. If LN/LS > τ , however, there is partial trade. Partial trade now means that
not all countries consume all goods, as the two poor (but not the two rich) countries
consume only a subset of the global menu of goods. Denote by pi and W i the willingness
to pay and the wage in country i ∈ {N,S} . Consider the partial trade equilibrium. The
zero profit conditions become
2pSP + 2τpSP =
￿
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
￿
W i, i = N,S
for goods that are traded between all four countries and
2pNP =
￿
F +
1 + τ
a
P
￿
W i
for goods that are traded only among the two rich countries. Exactly as in the two-country
case, equal population sizes ensure factor price equalization, so we have WN = W S = 1.
The resource constraints are
LSP = NS
￿
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
￿
in type S countries and
LNP = NNN
￿
F +
1 + τ
a
P
￿
+NNT
￿
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
￿
in type N countries
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where NS is the range of goods produced in each S country; NNT is the range of goods
supplied by firms in one of the N countries and traded worldwide; and NNN is the range
of goods produced and traded only in the North. Since each Northern country imports
all goods produced worldwide but each Southern country imports only a subset of these
goods, the aggregate (regional) trade balance between North and South has to be balanced
in equilibrium.15 The value of aggregate Northern imports from the South are 2τpSNS
and the value of aggregate Northern exports to the South are 2pSNNT hence trade balance
requires
τNS = NNT .
Calculating the number of goods that are produced worldwide from the equations above
is straightforward; it is equal to the level of welfare in the Northern country
UN (τ) = 2NS + 2NNT + 2N
N
N = 2
(1 + τ)LSP
F + 1+3τa P
+ 2
￿
LN − τLS￿P
F + 1+τa P
From this equation, it can be shown that ∂UN (τ) /∂τ < 0, i.e. the welfare level of N -
consumers increases as a result of a trade liberalization. Notice that, similar to the two-
country case, this result arises because goods imported from the South become cheaper,
creating demand for new goods. In the new equilibrium, more goods are produced and
traded in the North. The deterioration (from the perspective of S countries) in the terms
of trade leads to a situation where fewer goods are traded between the Northern and
Southern world regions. This eﬀect is similar to the two-country case. The increased
threat of parallel trade induces Northern producers to withdraw their products from the
world market and to sell their product exclusively in the rich Northern region.
15Due to the symmetry of our set-up, the volume of bilateral trade is undetermined. One of the Northern
countries could produce predominantly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed only in the North while
the other Northern country produces mainly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed worldwide. In that
case, the first Northern country runs a trade surplus with the other Northern country and a trade deficit
with both Southern countries taken together. Such trade imbalances cannot occur between the Southern
countries, since each Southern country consumes all goods produced by the other Southern country,
meaning that the South-South trade flows are of the same magnitude in either direction. However, each
Southern country may run a surplus with one of the Northern countries that is balanced by a deficit
with the other Northern country. Notice further that all bilateral trade flows are equalized in a full
trade equilibrium. This is because all households in each country consume all goods that are produced
worldwide.
3.6. EXTENSIONS 77
The situation is somewhat diﬀerent in the Southern countries. In particular, it may
be that a trade liberalization also increases welfare in the South. We saw that the poorer
country is strictly worse oﬀ as a result of lower trade costs in the two-country case.
This need no longer be the case in the multi-country case. While North-South trade
will unambiguously decrease due to a trade liberalization, lower trade costs will increase
South-South trade. As a result, the impact of trade liberalizations on welfare in the South
is unclear. To see this, calculate the welfare of the Southern consumer as
US (τ) = 2NS + 2NNT = 2
(1 + τ)LSP
F + 1+3τa P
from which ∂US (τ) /∂τ ≤ 0 follows when aF/P−2 < 0. The South is more likely to gain
from lower trade costs if scale eﬀects (lower aF/P) grow in importance. A uniform global
trade liberalization decreases N -S trade in this situation, but increased N -N and S-S
trade dominate this eﬀect in such a way that global trade increases, proving our initial
claim.
3.6.1.2 Three unequal countries
Now consider the alternative interesting case with three equally large but unequally rich
countries, R, M , and P . The diﬀerences in endowments between any bilateral combi-
nation of countries is suﬃciently large such that min{LR/LM , LM/LP} > τ . This latter
assumption implies that the threat of parallel trade exists in all bilateral trade flows.
The equilibrium then takes the following structure. Households in country R consume
all goods produced worldwide; households in country M consume only a subset of these
goods; and households in country P an even smaller subset. There are three groups of
firms: firms that sell worldwide, firms that sell in M and R, and firms that only sell in
R. The latter producers set a price pR that equals the willingness to pay of country R
households. The second group of producers sets a price pM in country M and τpM in
country R. The first group sets a price pP in country P, and a price τpP in countries M
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and R. The zero profit conditions are given by 16
￿
pP + 2τpP
￿P = W i￿F + 1 + 2τ
a
P
￿
i = P,M,R; sales worldwide (3.6.1)
￿
pM + τpM
￿P = W i￿F + 1 + τ
a
P
￿
i = M,R; sales in M and R
pRP = WR
￿
F +
1
a
P
￿
; sales in R only.
Prices pP , pM and pR can be directly calculated from the zero profit conditions. To ensure
that we have τpP < pM the modified trade condition
(1 + 2τ) (τ 2 − 1)
τ 2 − τ − 1 <
aF
P
has to be satisfied. This condition is stronger than Assumption 1, hence τpM < pR
follows. This condition ensures that all possible bilateral trade flows are strictly positive
in equilibrium.
From equation (3.6.1) it is clear that equal population guarantees equal wages (per
eﬃciency unit of labor); this also holds in the three-country case. To see this, notice that
country P exports to both country M and country R. To ensure balanced trade, either
country M or country R (or both) export to country P . When both countries export to
country P , the first zero-profit condition has to hold in all three countries, from which
factor prize equalization follows immediately. The situation is similar when only country
M but not country R exports to country P . Then the first zero-profit condition ensures
factor price equalization between countries M and P . In that case the country R runs a
trade deficit with country P which has to be oﬀset by a surplus with country M . Ruling
out the knife-edge case where country M exports only to country P but does export to
country R, we conclude that there must be some goods country M exports to country R
which establishes factor price equalization between M and R. Taken together, we have
16When specifying the zero-profit conditions, we have already implicitly assumed that goods are pro-
duced in a country that also consumes this good. In particular, goods that are consumed exclusively
in country R are also produced in country R, and goods that are not consumed in country P are not
produced in country P . This will be the case in equilibrium because equal population sizes lead to factor
price equalization across the three countries WP = WM = WR and because larger profits margins (due
to the absence of transport costs) let firms first serve the home market before selling abroad.
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W P = WM = WR = 1.
Solving the equilibrium is somewhat tedious but straightforward. Using resource con-
straints and the trade balance conditions between each country and the rest of the world
yields the following utility levels in the three countries (see Appendix)
UP (τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP
UM(τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP + (1 + τ)
￿
LM/LP − τ￿
F + 1+τa P
LPP
UR(τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP + (1 + τ)
￿
LM/LP − τ￿
F + 1+τa P
LPP
+
LR/LP − τLM/LP + τ − τ 2
F + 1aP
LPP
These results allow us to determine the level of welfare in the three countries.
Proposition 3. In a three country model with suﬃcient endowment diﬀerences across
countries, LR > τLM > τ 2LP , and suﬃciently low trade costs so that the modified trade
condition (1 + 2τ) (τ 2 − 1) / (τ 2 − τ − 1) < aF/P holds, the poor (rich) country loses
(gains) from a trade liberalization (lower τ). The middle income country gains from a
trade liberalization if LM/LP is not too large.
Proof. Clearly, we have ∂UP (τ)/∂τ > 0. We check the sign of the derivative ∂UM(τ)/∂τ.
∂UM(τ)
∂τ
= LPP 2F￿
F + 1+2τa P
￿2 − LPP 2F￿
F + 1+τa P
￿2
+LPP
￿
LM/LP + 1− 2τ￿F − (1+τ)2a P￿
F + 1+τa P
￿2 < 0
if and only if
￿
F + 1+τa P
￿2￿
F + 1+2τa P
￿2 < −
￿
LM/LP − τ￿F + (1 + τ)￿F + (1+τ)a P￿
2F
.
In the special case LM/LP = τ the inequality becomes [F+
1+τ
a P]
2
[F+ 1+2τa P]
2 <
(1+τ)(F+ (1+τ)a P)
2F .
Hence, when LM/LP is not too large, the middle income country will gain.
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Finally, ∂
￿
UP (τ)P + UM(τ)P + UR(τ)P￿ /∂τ < 0. As ∂NRR /∂τ < 0, we must have
∂UR(τ)/∂τ < ∂UM(τ)/∂τ. Hence, ∂UR(τ)/∂τ < 0 whenever ∂UP (τ)/∂τ > 0.
If LP is suﬃciently above zero, the middle income country gains from lower trade
costs. As in the two-country case, changes in the terms of trade drive the results. The
terms of trade improve for the rich country, both for trade with country P and countryM .
This improves the welfare of country R consumers. The terms of trade deteriorate for the
poor country, both for trade with country M and country R. The situation is ambiguous
for the middle income country. Here terms of trade improve against the poor country
but deteriorate against the rich country. Hence it is not a prior clear whether country
M will gain or lose. If the majority of goods is imported from the poor country, overall
terms of trade will improve. In contrast, if the majority of goods is imported from rich
country, overall terms of trade will deteriorate. The terms of trade eﬀect will be negative
if country P is very poor (and hence LM/LP large). In that case, the improvement in
terms of trade with the poor country is negligible because the range of goods that can
be imported from country P is small, and most goods will be imported from country R,
with which the terms of trade deteriorate.
3.6.2 Heterogeneous trade costs
Another reason why the eﬀect of trade liberalizations on volumes may be less clear are
heterogeneous trade costs. For clarity, we go back to the case of two countries that are
symmetric in all dimensions except for per capita endowments. Assume there are two
product types, type 0 has low trade costs τ0 and type 1 has high trade costs τ1 > τ0,
but τ1 ≤
￿
aF/P + 1 still holds. To keep things simple, we assume that a firm does
not learn of the type of its product until the fixed setup investment has been made.17
More precisely, a firm comes up with a product of type 0 with probability π, and type 1
with probability 1−π. Assume further that firms can insure themselves perfectly against
high-cost realizations, meaning that all firms make zero profits in equilibrium.
17This formulation avoids a situation where firms with low transport costs make positive profits in
equilibrium. Allowing for profits would complicate the analysis but would not yield any substantial
additional insights.
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The interesting case is when the threat of parallel trade restricts firms of type 0 (low
trade cost) in their price-setting, while this does not apply to firms of type 1 (high trade
cost). In that case, there will be partial trade in low-cost varieties but full trade in high-
cost varieties, and we have pR0T/pP0 = τ0 and pR1 /pP1 < τ1. Notice that, since high-cost and
low-cost varieties yield the same utility, the prices of these goods do not diﬀer by type,
pP1 = p
P
0 = p
P and pR1 = pR0N = pR. Denote by Eτ ≡ πτ0 + (1− π) τ1 the expected trade
cost, and by EpR ≡ πτ0pP + (1− π) pR the expected price that an internationally active
producer can charge in the rich country. The zero-profit condition of internationally active
firms and of exclusive country-R producers now becomes
(EpR + pP )P = W i
￿
F +
P (1 + Eτ)
a
￿
and (3.6.2)
pRP = WR
￿
F +
P
a
￿
. (3.6.3)
When producers of type 1 do not face a pricing constraint, while producers of type 0 do,
the equilibrium has the following structure. All type 1 goods are traded internationally,
while type 0 goods are only partially traded. This means country R produces πNR goods
of type 0 and (1− π)NR goods of type 1. The situation is analogous for country P .
The resource constraints for the two countries are now
LRP = NRT
￿
F +
P (1 + Eτ)
a
￿
+NRN
￿
F +
P
a
￿
(3.6.4)
LPP = NP
￿
F +
P (1 + Eτ)
a
￿
. (3.6.5)
Finally, the balance of payments condition is given by
NPEpR = NRT p
P . (3.6.6)
Equations (3.6.2) - (3.6.6) constitute a system of 6 equations in 7 unknowns: pR, pP ,
WR, W P , NP , NRT , and NRN . We get the seventh equation by the choice of the numéraire
WR = 1.
We can solve for the general equilibrium in this regime and calculate welfare levels. An
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examination of the welfare level of country P – which is simply the sum of the worldwide
traded varieties – suﬃces for checking the impact of a trade liberalization. This yields
UP = NP +NRT = a
(1 + τ1 (1− π))P
aF (1− π) + ((1− π) + πτ0 + (1− π) τ1)PL
P .
It is straightforward to check that ∂UP/∂τ0 < 0 whereas ∂UP/∂τ1 > 0. Hence whether a
trade liberalization has a positive or a negative impact on the number of internationally
traded varieties is ambiguous and depends on the relative importance of the types of goods
constrained in price setting. When the proportion of high-trade cost products (1− π) is
suﬃciently large, a general trade liberalization (a simultaneous reduction in τ0 and τ1)
will increase the extensive margin of international trade.
3.6.3 National versus international exhaustion rules
Up to now we were working under the assumption of unrestricted parallel trade. The
implicit assumption in the equilibria presented above was that there is "international ex-
haustion". This means that the intellectual property owner (i.e. a patent-, copyright-,
and/or trademark-holder) loses its control of commercial exploitation when the product
is sold on the national or international market. Hence, international arbitrageurs force
firms to restrict their international price schedules to deter parallel trade. In many coun-
tries, however, parallel trade is restricted by law. For instance, the US applies "national
exhaustion", meaning that a producer’s patent or copyright expires when it is sold on
the home market but not when sold on the international market. Similarly, the EU ap-
plies "regional exhaustion" which allows parallel trades only within the EU area. Parallel
imports are restricted under national or regional exhaustion.
By introducing a new policy parameter we now investigate the role of exhaustion rules.
Assume that ex ante there is an exogenous probability π that parallel trade is legally
restricted for a particular good. Think of π as representing the share of industries for
which "national exhaustion" applies (alternatively we can think of a world with "national
exhaustion" rules, but the enforcement of these rules is uncertain. π then represents the
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probability that the rules are actually enforced). Firms learn only after paying the fixed
costs F whether their product is subject to parallel trade. To keep things simple, we
go back to the case where both countries have the same population sizes PR = PP =
P , so that we have wage equalization WR = W P = 1. The zero profit conditions of
internationally active and domestic firms, respectively, become
EpP = F + (1 + τ)P
a
and pRP = F + P
a
where an internationally active firm’s expected sales are given by EpP ≡ π ￿pP + pR￿P+
(1− π) ￿pP + τpP ￿P . (Notice that we implicitly assume that firms can perfectly insure
themselves against low-price realizations in the case when no parallel trade restrictions ap-
ply. This assumption keeps things simple because it means that all firms make zero profits
in equilibrium.) Using the zero-profit conditions of internationally active producers, we
can solve for the price in the poor country
pP =
1
1 + τ − πτ
￿
F
P +
1 + τ
a
− π
￿
F
P +
1
a
￿￿
.
Using Assumption 1, it is easy to show that stricter enforcement of parallel import
restrictions or, equally, a higher share of products with "national exhaustion" rules (both
represented by a higher π) is associated with lower prices pP for internationally traded
products in the poor country. The reason is that a higher π increases the incentive for rich-
country firms to trade internationally. This generates a pro-competitive eﬀect reducing
prices in the poor country and thus increasing the welfare of the households there. The
welfare of the rich country households falls. To see this, notice that the number of goods
produced in the poor country is still given by equation (3.4.2) which does not depend on
π. Using the budget constraint of poor consumers LP = pP (NP +NRT ) lets us calculate
∂NRT
∂π
=
∂NRT
∂pP
∂pP
∂π
> 0
Since the number of goods produced in the poor country remains unchanged, welfare of
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households in the poor country increases. The pro-competitive eﬀect on price in the poor
country implies that poor consumers can aﬀord more goods, improving their welfare. The
opposite is true for the rich country. As the higher π induces more rich country firms to
trade internationally, a larger fraction of resources is devoted to the production of these
internationally traded goods. Hence a smaller range of goods is produced in the rich
country and the total number of goods produced worldwide goes down. This establishes
that welfare of rich-country consumers falls.
The eﬀect of trade liberalizations (lower τ) on trade is now ambiguous. To see this
consider first the case of "national exhaustion", i.e. π = 1. In such a situation producers
can perfectly price discriminate between countries and hence a full trade equilibrium
always prevails. Lower trade costs simply free resources to produce additional varieties.
As all these additional varieties will be traded, trade will increase as a reaction to the
liberalization. We have seen above that the converse holds for "international exhaustion",
π = 0. Thus, in general the eﬀect of a trade liberalization depends on the share of products
with "national exhaustion" rules π, with positive eﬀects more likely the closer π is to one.
3.6.4 Within-country inequality
Non-homotheticities not only generate important eﬀects of per capita endowments on
trade, they also imply that within-country inequality may shape trade patterns in an im-
portant way. In our context, the case of within-country inequality can be best understood
as a special case of a multi-country model, where the trade costs between some countries
are zero. Between these countries, the parallel trade restrictions would immediately be-
come binding as long as there is a slight diﬀerence in per capita endowments. In other
words, with inequality within countries we always have some degree of exclusion, meaning
that some firms will only sell to the rich charging a high price while other firms will sell
to all consumers.
We highlight the role of inequality by looking at the most simple case of two identical
countries that are both populated by rich and poor households. This simple example shows
which mechanisms are present in the more general cases. In particular, we demonstrate
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that the threat of parallel trade under within country inequality aﬀects trade patterns
even when countries are completely symmetric.
3.6.4.1 Low trade costs
We assume that β percent of the population in every country are poor owning an endow-
ment of θL < L and that the remaining 1 − β percent of the population are rich and
own an endowment [(1− βθ) / (1− β)]L > 1 (hence per capita endowment is still L).
We index rich and poor households by r and p, respectively. Let us first consider the
case when trade costs are low. In a fully integrated market when τ = 1 there are two
group of firms: "mass producers" selling to all consumers in both countries and "exclusive
producers" selling only to the rich in both countries. In fact, this equilibrium holds true
for small values of τ such that the scope for price discrimination between countries is
limited. By symmetry, we have factor price equalization and set W = 1. Using coun-
tries’ resource-constraints, firms’ zero-profit and households’ budget constraints,18 it is
straightforward to calculate the number of products, Np and N r, sold to everyone and to
the rich, respectively, as
Np =
θaL
aF/P + 1 + τ and N
r =
(1− θ)aL
aF/P + (1 + τ) (1− β) .
It is straightforward to study the impact of a trade liberalization. Using Up = Np
and U r = Np + N r it follows that both rich and poor consumers gain from a trade
liberalization. While the rich gain more in absolute terms, the poor gain more in relative
terms. Hence a trade liberalization even reduces consumption inequality Np/ (N r +Np).
This result generalizes to the case of more types of consumers. Notice that this is quite
diﬀerent from inequalities across countries where we saw that a fall in trade costs helps
the richer but hurts poorer households.
18The resource constraint is given by LP = Np [F + (1 + τ)P/a] + Nr [F + (1− β) (1 + τ)P/a] in
both countries, the zero-profit conditions are 2ppP = F +(1 + τ)P/a for firms that sell to all households
worldwide and 2(1− β)prP = F + (1− β) (1 + τ)P/a for firms that sell only to rich households in both
countries. Rich households’ budget constraints are given by [(1− βθ) / (1− β)]L = 2prNr + 2ppNpin
both countries, and poor households’ budget constraints are θL = 2ppNp.
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3.6.4.2 High trade costs
The above equilibrium arises if trade costs are suﬃciently small. When trade costs are
higher, an equilibrium with exclusive producers selling only to rich consumers and mass
producers selling to all consumers worldwide no longer exists. The reason is that high
trade costs make a new strategy attractive: sell to all consumers at home and only to rich
consumers abroad. In the Appendix we show that, depending on the extent of within-
country inequality, either of two diﬀerent equilibrium scenarios will emerge. If inequality
is high, the equilibrium is characterized by some firms selling only to rich consumers in
both countries while other firms follow a "separating" strategy: selling to both types
of households in the home market; and only to the rich on the foreign market. With
high within-country inequality, these strategies yield zero profit in equilibrium; and they
strictly dominate the strategy of selling to rich and poor consumers in both markets.
In contrast, if inequality is low and trade costs are high, the equilibrium is characterized
by the co-existence of firms selling to all households worldwide and firms selling to all
consumer on the home market and to rich consumers on the foreign market. The exclusive
strategy, i.e. selling only to the rich on both markets is not a profitable option. We find
that trade liberalizations increase welfare for both types of consumers. The results that,
in relative terms, the poor gain more than the rich from a trade liberalization continues
to hold.
3.7 More general preferences
We assumed 0-1 preferences in the analysis above. On the one hand, this assumption
yields a framework that is highly tractable and generates closed-form solutions. On the
other hand, this assumption restricts households’ adjustments to the extensive margin.
The standard CES case with all adjustments happening on the intensive margin and our
0-1 case should thus be understood as two polar cases. We go beyond these polar cases in
this Section and introduce more general preferences that allow for adjustments on both
margins. In particular, we will show that the qualitative characteristics of the equilibria we
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obtained with 0-1 preferences carry over to the case of more general preferences featuring
both non-trivial intensive and extensive margins.
We take up the analysis of Section 3.4 where we study two equally large, but un-
equally rich countries. Within countries, households are identical. Trade patterns are
therefore shaped by diﬀerences in per capita endowments across countries. Now replace
0-1 preferences by the following general utility function
U =
ˆ ∞
0
v(c(j))dj,
where c(j) denotes the consumed quantity of good j. It is assumed that the subutility
v() satisfies v￿ > 0, v￿￿ < 0 and v(0) = 0. Beyond these standard assumptions on
v(), we make two further crucial assumptions: (i) v￿(0) < ∞ and (ii) −v￿(c)/[v￿￿(c)c] is
decreasing in c. The former assumption implies that reservation prices are finite and there
is therefore a non-trivial extensive margin of consumption; the latter assumption implies
that the price elasticity of demand is decreasing along the demand curve. Notice that
monopolistic pricing implies p = (1 + v￿(c)/[v￿￿(c)c])−1W/a. To ease notation, we denote
by µ(c) ≡ (1 + cv￿￿(c)/v￿(c))−1 a monopolistic firm’s mark-up. Since −v￿(c)/[v￿￿(c)c] is
decreasing in c, we have µ￿(c) > 0.
It is straightforward to see that finite reservation prices again make an autarky equi-
librium possible. To ensure that there will be trade, we have to adjust the trade condition
of Assumption 1 as follows
Proposition 4. Denote by cRa consumption per variety under autarky in the rich country.
If trade costs are suﬃciently small τ < µ(cRa )v￿(0)/v￿(cRa ) where aF/P = cRa (µ(cRa ) − 1),
trade occurs in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is based on the same tenet as in Section 3.3 above. We determine the
autarky equilibrium and ask under which conditions an entrepreneur has incentives to sell
his products abroad. Setting W = 1, optimal monopolistic pricing implies p = µ(c)/a.
88 CHAPTER 3. PER CAPITA INCOMES AND PARALLEL TRADE
With free entry, profits P(pRa − 1/a)cRa must equal set up costs F
aF/P = ￿µ(cRa )− 1￿ cRa (3.7.1)
The equilibrium is symmetric for all firms, hence the resource constraint reads
LR = NRa
￿
F + PcRa /a
￿
(3.7.2)
Solving (3.7.1) and (3.7.2) for cRa and NRa , we see that cRa does not depend on LR. Hence
when the two countries diﬀer only in Li but have equal populations, intensive consumption
levels under autarky are identical between the two countries, cRa = cPa . Selling one marginal
unit abroad at price v￿(0)/λPa , allows the purchase of v￿(0)/(λPa pPa ) foreign goods. Since
λPa = v
￿(cPa )/p
P
a and cRa = cPa this is equal to v￿(0)/v￿(cRa ) > 1. Reselling this (new)
product at home, yields a price v￿(0)pRa /v￿(cRa ) minus trade costs. Hence, this strategy is
profitable if
￿
v￿(0)pRa /v
￿(cRa )
￿ · ￿v￿(0)/v￿(cRa )￿ > τ 2. Expressing pRa in terms of cRa , we get
the condition of the Proposition.
We are now able to discuss the full trade regime. Let us start from a full trade
equilibrium where diﬀerences in per capita endowment LP/LR are suﬃciently close to
unity, so that firms do not face a threat of parallel trade. We denote the optimal price of
a country-R firm on its home market by pRR and the corresponding price in country P by
pPR. Monopoly pricing implies pRR = µ(cRR)/a and pPR = µ(cPR)τ/a, respectively. The firm
does not face any threat of parallel trade if pRR/pPR ≤ τ, or if
µ(cRR)
µ(cPR)
≤ τ 2. (3.7.3)
This is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a full trade equilibrium.
Let us now consider the existence of a partial trade equilibrium. A necessary condition
for such an equilibrium is that condition (3.7.3) is violated. This condition may be violated
either if τ is close to unity, or if consumption levels cRR and cPR diverge strongly (recall
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that µ￿(c) > 0 and µ(0) = 1).19 If LP approaches zero, cPR approaches zero as well, and
the denominator in equation (3.7.3) approaches unity. There is thus a level of trade cost
τ suﬃciently close to unity and/or a country-P endowment LP suﬃciently small, so that
we get µ(cRR) > τ 2µ(cPR).
When the inequality in (3.7.3) is violated, exporting firms will set prices pRR/pPR = τ
to prevent parallel trade. Notice, however, that violation of condition (3.7.3) does not
necessarily imply a partial trade equilibrium. The reason is that there is adjustment both
along the extensive margin and along the intensive margin. Even when condition (3.7.3)
is violated, all goods may be traded as country-P households may still consume all goods
produced worldwide, but in lower quantities. In other words, violation of the condition
(3.7.3) is necessary but not suﬃcient for a partial trade equilibrium.
To show under which conditions country-P households will not consume all goods
produced worldwide, we need to look at incentives of country-R firms to sell their products
exclusively to rich domestic consumers. The profit of a country R producer is given as
follows (to ease notation let us write pRR ≡ τp and pPR ≡ p)
π = P (τp− 1/a) cRR + P (p− τ/a) cPR.
The demand curve of country-R consumers is given by v￿(cRR) = λRτp and the cor-
responding demand curve of country-P consumers is v￿(cPR) = λPp. Hence we have,
dcRR/dp = (1/p)v
￿(cRR)/v
￿￿(cRR) and dcPR/dp = (1/p)v￿(cPR)/v￿￿(cPR). The first order condi-
tion of the monopolistic firm’s price setting choice is given by
τp− 1/a
τp
￿
− v
￿(cRR)
v￿￿(cRR)
￿
+
p− τ/a
p
￿
− v
￿(cPR)
v￿￿(cPR)
￿
= τcRR + c
P
R.
To examine whether a partial trade equilibrium exists, let LP and therefore cPR approach
zero. The first order condition then becomes
19By d’Hôpital’s rule, noting that v(0) = 0 and v￿(0) finite, limc→0 v￿(c)c/v(c) = limc→0 1+v￿￿(c)c/v￿(c).
However, limc→0 v￿(c)c/v(c) = v￿(0)·limc→0 c/v(c) = v￿(0)/v￿(0) = 1. This implies limc→0 v￿￿(c)c/v￿(c) = 0
and limc→0 µ(c) = 1.
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τp− 1/a
τ 2p
￿
− v
￿(cRR)
v￿￿(cRR)c
R
R
￿
+
p− τ/a
τpcRR
￿
− lim
cPR→0
v￿(cPR)
v￿￿(cPR)
￿
= 1 (3.7.4)
Now consider the optimal decision of a country-R firm which decides to produce for
domestic consumers only. Denoting by pN and cNR price and quantity of non-traded goods,
the first order condition for exclusive producers is
pN − 1/a
pN
￿
− v
￿(cNR )
v￿￿(cNR )c
N
R
￿
= 1. (3.7.5)
We now compare equations (3.7.4) and (3.7.5) for the case where τ is suﬃciently close
to 1 such that p > τ/a. If v￿(0)/v￿￿(0) is larger than zero - which is fulfilled if v￿￿(0) is finite
- the price of a non-exporting firm pN is strictly larger than the price of an exporting
firm τp. Since cPR → 0 when LP → 0, export revenues are zero, hence profits of the
non-exporting firm must be higher because it sets the profit maximizing price pN > τp.
This implies that an outcome where all firms export cannot be an equilibrium – provided
that LP is suﬃciently close to zero and τ is suﬃciently close to one. We summarize our
discussion in
Proposition 5. If v￿￿(0) is finite, a partial trade equilibrium always exists.
Proof. In text.
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter incorporates non-homothetic preferences into a standard "new" trade theory
framework. We propose modeling non-homotheticities by indivisible consumer goods that
are either consumed in unit quantity or not consumed at all. Such a specification implies
that consumer choice is along the extensive margin whereas a choice along the intensive
margin of consumption is ruled out by assumption. This is orthogonal to the standard
CES-framework where households have infinite reservation prices and the allocation of
expenditures relates solely to the intensive margin of consumption.
We elaborate the role of per capita incomes in international trade patterns which, for
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given aggregate output, is absent in any homothetic model of international trade. Consider
two countries with the same aggregate endowment, one country is small and rich and the
other country is large and poor. Our model predicts that large diﬀerences in per capita
endowments lead to a partial world trade equilibrium in which many goods produced in
the rich country will not be traded and consumed in the poor country, while all goods
produced in the poor country will be traded and consumed in the rich country. In contrast,
when diﬀerences in per capita endowments are small, a full trade equilibrium emerges. In
such an equilibrium, all goods produced in the two countries are traded internationally
and consumed in both countries. Hence our model features the famous Linder hypothesis
according to which countries that are more similar in per capita endowments trade more
intensively with one another.
Our analysis provides us with a simple general equilibrium framework of parallel trade.
The partial world trade equilibrium emerges when inequality across countries is high
so that diﬀerences across countries in consumers’ willingness to pay for diﬀerentiated
products are very large. In that case, the threat of parallel trade limits the scope of
price setting in the rich country. This is because arbitrage traders can purchase the good
cheaply in the poor country, ship it back and underbid local producers in the rich country.
To inhibit such parallel trade, internationally active firms have to set low prices in the
rich country. In equilibrium, firms in the rich country are indiﬀerent between selling their
product on the world market and selling their product only on the home market. The
general equilibrium perspective of our model makes the fraction of internationally active
firms endogenous. This eﬀect is typically not considered in partial equilibrium settings of
parallel trade but has a potentially important impact on trade patterns.
Concerning the welfare eﬀects of trade, we find that a trade liberalization (a reduction
in iceberg trade costs) increases welfare of consumers in both countries when the world
economy is in a full trade equilibrium, but hurts the poor country (and benefits the rich
country) when the world economy is in a partial trade equilibrium. The reason for the
latter result is that exporters of the poor country need to reduce prices of traded goods in
the rich country to inhibit parallel trade, while exporters of the rich country have no such
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restrictions in the poor country. Consumers in the rich country face decreasing prices, and
consumers in the poor country are confronted with a lower range of import goods because
higher competition on the world market induces rich-country firms to concentrate their
sales exclusively on the home market.
While our analysis is made under very specific assumptions, our model is simple enough
to be extended in several directions. We extended our set-up to more than two countries,
to heterogeneous trade costs, to commercial policies, and to within-country inequality.
Finally, we showed that partial trade equilibria emerge for a broad class of more general
preferences.
Our model is complementary to existing supply side approaches and potentially helpful
in understanding the dynamics of world trade patterns that arise due to major changes
in the distribution of world purchasing power. This is particularly relevant in the case
of large emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil, etc. that have experienced high
growth in per capita incomes over the past decades. From an empirical point of view,
disentangling the demand eﬀects emphasized in this chapter from the supply/technology
factors emphasized in the standard model is of particular interest.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 High trade costs: the equilibrium when assumption 1 does
not hold
We discuss the outcome when trade costs are so high such that assumption 1 does not
hold, τ >
￿
aF/P + 1. We will see that this case is characterized by multiple equilibria.
From our discussion in Section 3.4.1 we know that full trade is an equilibrium if
p∗ > τW/a (where p∗ is the price on the foreign market under full trade). We use
equation 3.4.1 in the text to get
L∗
L+ L∗
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP > τ/a (3.A.1)
L∗
L
>
τ
aF/P + 1 (3.A.2)
where W = 1 is again chosen as numéraire.
This condition is more likely to be fulfilled when countries are less diﬀerent, L∗/L
close to one, which is intuitive. Note that for higher setup costs F the trade condition
is ceteris paribus more likely to hold, which reflects the fact that high fixed costs make
trade more beneficial. Further, full trade becomes less likely when trade costs τ increase.
(Eventually, when τ exceed aF/P + 1, full trade will not be an equilibrium, even when
the countries are symmetric. This confirms our discussion in Section 3.3).
When the foreign country gets poorer, L∗/L becomes smaller, the foreign country
price p∗ eventually falls short of τW/a and condition (3.A.1) is reversed. In that case, the
foreign consumers buying all goods cannot constitute an equilibrium any more. Because
of the discrete nature of 0-1 preferences, the number of products consumed adjusts such
that their willingness to pay is just suﬃcient to cover the production and trade costs, i.e.
p∗ = W τ/a. In this case, obviously, home firms are indiﬀerent whether to export or sell
at home only. In equilibrium, NT firms trade and N −NT firms sell at home only whereas
all foreign firms export. Hence, this equilibrium looks in some way similar to the partial
trade regime. The reason for "partial" trade is not the price diﬀerential but the mere size
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of the willingness to pay. It should be noted, however, that this outcome is restricted to
0-1 preferences and not robust to more general preferences as discussed in the previous
Section. With continuous preferences all products are exported albeit at a low quantity,
as long as trade costs are below the autarky level. In the general case, partial trade
equilibria only occur when the price diﬀerential constraint p/p∗ ≤ τ to prevent parallel
imports is binding.
The mass of exporters NT can be determined from the balance of payments condition
p∗NT = pN∗. Note that p∗ = τ/a and p = (aF + P) / (aP), where the latter equation
follows from the zero profit condition (p+ p∗)P = F + (1 + τ)P/a. Besides, we see
that the price diﬀerential constraint p/p∗ ≤ τ holds, as τ > ￿aF/P + 1 in the high
trade costs regime. Using the resource constraints L = N (F + (1 + ϕτNT/N)P/a) and
L∗ = N∗ (F + (1 + τ)P/a) and we note that p∗ = τ/a and p = (aF + P) / (aP). We get
NT
N
=
aF/P + 1
τ
L∗/L
1 + τaF/P+1 − L∗/L
.
We see that the share of exporters NT/N is monotonically increasing in L∗/L and ap-
proaches 1 at L∗/L = τ/ (aF/P + 1) .
Having characterized the trade equilibria for all parameter combinations (τ, L∗/L),
there is one important aspect left. With high trade costs, aF/P + 1 > τ >￿aF/P + 1,
there are multiple equilibria. The reason is the following: autarky is a Nash equilibrium
in that case. The argument follows the same lines as the derivation of assumption 1: If
a country is in autarky, a single entrepreneur will not find it worthwhile to export as he
will incur losses from doing so: p < τ 2W/a.
The multiplicity of equilibria arises because the individual firms cannot coordinate
their actions. If countries are in autarky, there exists no clearing of balances at the
border. Therefore a single firm has to export and then import at the same time (which
gives rise to the τ 2 term in the inequality p < τ 2W/a. 20 Finally, note that the trade
20This is also the reason why there are only two equilibria, not three. As soon a small but positive
measure of firms is trading a foreign exchange market through the balance of payment exists. Hence,
export revenues discretely jump up a soon as a positive measure of firms is engaged in international
aﬀairs. This discontinuity precludes the existence of an "intermediate" second equilibrium.
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equilibria are always pareto superior to the autarky equilibrium as long as τ < aF/P +1.
Finally, we analyze what happens if Assumption 1 is satisfied in only one country (and
violated in another country e.g. because its P is very small). Obviously, the country for
which the trade condition holds starts doing these trade and thus creates a foreign ex-
change market. Thus trade now needs not to overcome τ twice, but only once. Therefore,
if for the foreign country τ < aF/P∗+1 we will swich to a normal trade equilibrium (i.e.
the trade condition τ <
￿
aF/P + 1 has to hold for one country only). If on the other
hand τ ≥ aF/P∗+1 the home country will go on shipping goods back and forth, but the
tiny foreign country producers do not engage in international trade - they sell their goods
to local consumers and foreign firms, but do not export their goods on their own. Some
consumers in this country will consume the foreign varieties and some the home varieties,
but the measure of varieties is the same as under autarky.
3.A.2 Details: three unequal countries
In equilibrium, the current account of each with the rest of the world has to be equalized.
Denoting by N ij the imports of country j from country i, balanced trade implies
2τpPNMP = p
P
￿
NMP +N
R
P
￿
for country P
(1 + τ)pPNMP + τp
MNMR = p
MNRM + τp
P
￿
NPM +N
R
M
￿
for country M
(1 + τ)pPNRP + p
MNRM = τp
MNMR + τp
P
￿
NPR +N
M
R
￿
for country R
Note that we have 5 linearly independent equations and 6 unknowns (the prices pi, i ∈
{P,M,R} are determined by the zero profit conditions). Hence, it is only possible to
determine the sum of
￿
NMP +N
R
P
￿
. Because of this indeterminacy we are free to consider
the case where all bilateral trade flows are balanced.21 Then we have
τNPP = N
M
P = N
R
P and τNMM = NRM .
21Notice that countries M and R consume all goods produced in country P ; and country R consumes
all goods produced in country M .
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Using the resource constraints we may calculate the goods produced in the three countries
NPP =
LPP
F + 1+2τa P
, NMP =
τLPP
F + 1+2τa P
, NRP =
τLPP
F + 1+2τa P
NMM =
￿
LM − τLP ￿P
F + 1+τa P
NRM =
τ
￿
LM − τLP ￿P
F + 1+τa P
NRR =
￿
LR − τLM − τ(τ − 1)LP ￿P
F + 1aP
.
3.A.3 Details: within-country inequality with high trade costs
We discuss equilibria under within-country inequality and high trade costs. With high
trade costs, a "separating strategy" - selling their product to all consumers on the home
market at price pp; and only to the rich consumers on the foreign market at price τpp < pr
- becomes a profitable option. In the following we show that, under high inequality,
firms are strictly better oﬀ using this separating strategy than the "mass consumption
strategy". The equilibrium is then characterized by the co-existence of exclusive firms
and separating firms. (In constrast, when inequality is low, firms are strictly better oﬀ
using this separating strategy than the "exclusive strategy". In that case, the equilibrium
is characterized by the co-existence of mass consumption firms and separating firms.)
Let us first find the critical value of τ under which a separating strategy breaks even.
A separating firm set ps = τpp (the price she sets to rich consumers abroad). This yields
profits
ΠS = (1− β) τppP + ppP −
￿
F +
1 + τ (1− β)
a
P
￿
In the equilibrim with low trade costs, the zero-profit condition for exclusive firms 2ppP =
F +(1 + τ)P/a from which we can calculate pp and insert the resulting expression in the
above zero-profit condition for separating firms. This lets us calculate the critical value
of τ such ΠS ≥ 0 so that the separating strategy break even. This yields
￿
(1− β) τME − 1￿ ￿aF/P + 1 + τME￿+ 2τMEβ = 0.
For τ > τME where, we are in a high-trade-cost equilibrium where separating firms exist.
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3.A.3.1 High inequality
With high inequality separating producers co-exist with exclusive producers. The zero-
profit condition for a separating producer is
(1− β) prP = F + 1 + τ (1− β)
a
P
and for an exclusive producer we have
2 (1− β) prP = F + (1 + τ) (1− β)
a
P .
From these conditions we calculate the equilibrium prices
pR =
1
2 (1− β)
￿
F
P +
(1 + τ) (1− β)
a
￿
pp =
1
2
￿
F
P +
1 + β + τ (1− β)
a
￿
.
Interestingly, ineﬃcient trade occurs. Firms gain from exporting as long as pr > τ/a
which is equivalent to 1 + 1/(1− β)aF/P > τ .
Inserting the expression for prices into the budget constraint (the balance of payment
condition holds through Walras’ law) yields for rich agents
1− βθ
1− β L = p
r (2N r +Np) + ppNp
and for poor agents
θL = ppNp.
The resulting equilibrium goods spectra are
Np =
2θaL
aF/P + 1 + β + τ (1− β)
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and
N r =
(1− 2θ) (aF/P + 1 + β + τ (1− β)) + 2θβ
(aF/P + 1 + β + τ (1− β)) (aF/P + (1 + τ) (1− β))aL.
We see that both Np and N r decrease in τ.
3.A.3.2 Low inequality
For lower levels of inequality at higher values of τ, an equilibrium situation emerges where
the "exclusive" producers sell to all consumers at home but only to the rich abroad and
the "mass" producers sell to all agents in both countries. By symmetry, we have factor
price equalization and set W = 1.
ΠM : 2p
pP = F + 1 + τ
a
P
ΠS : (1− β) prP + ppP = F + 1 + τ(1− β)
a
P .
The resource constraint and the budget constraints read
LP = Np
￿
F +
1 + τ
a
P
￿
+N r
￿
F +
1 + τ (1− β)
a
P
￿
1− βθ
1− β L = p
rN r + pp (2Np +N r)
θL = pp (2Np +N r) .
Inserting the budget constraint of the poor in that of rich yields
1− θ
1− βL = p
rN r
θ(1− β)
1− θ =
pp
pr
￿
2
Np
N r
+ 1
￿
.
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Prices are given by the zero profit conditions
pp =
1
2
￿
F
P +
1 + τ
a
￿
pr =
1
1− β
￿
1
2
￿
F
P +
1 + τ
a
￿
− τβ
a
￿
and we substitute this into the budget constraints of poor and rich households. This lets
us solve Np and N r as (pp > τa and p
r < τpp)
N r =
2 (1− θ)
aF/P + 1 + τ − 2βτ aL
Np =
(2θ − 1) (aF/P + 1 + τ)− 2βθτ
(aF/P + 1 + τ) (aF/P + 1 + τ − 2βτ)aL.
Note that a necessary condition for this equilibrium to emerge is θ > 1/2. For Np > 0,
we must have (2θ − 1) (aF/P + 1 + τ) > 2βθτ. Otherwise, the high-inequality equilibrium
described above emerges. We also see that an increase in τ increases welfare of poor and
rich households.

Chapter 4
Market entry costs and the
cross-country variation in per capita
incomes
4.1 Introduction
How important a determinant is international trade for the welfare of a country? And how
much of the variation in incomes across countries can be attributed to diﬀering degrees of
integration into the global trade network? In this chapter I attempt at answering these
question by adapting a quantitative version of the Melitz (2003) model as a development
accounting framework. In its most stylized form development accounting assumes a Cobb-
Douglas production function and compares the variation in incomes that are implied by
the measured endowments (human and physical capital) to the actual variation in the
data. This exercise typically finds that 40-50% of the variation can be explained with
diﬀering endowments. The remaining variation is attributed to exogenous diﬀerences in
technology. Modern quantitative trade models as the one outlined in this chapter oﬀer a
structural interpretation for these technology diﬀerences.
I see my framework as a parsimonious synthesis of the modern quantitative versions
of the seminal Melitz (2003) model (see for example Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2008,
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Chaney, 2008, and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). It describes a multi-
country world, where an endogenous set of heterogeneous firms produces tradable in-
termediates. These intermediates are bundled with local production factors to produce
a non-tradable final good. Diﬀerences in the per capita consumption of the final good
across countries are the model analogue to cross-country variation in real per capita in-
comes. In the model there are several channels for why per capita incomes may diﬀer –
unequal endowments and diﬀering population sizes, exogenous technology variation, and
trade-related mechanisms. Moreover these channels interact with each other. The trade-
related mechanisms are driven by the presence of two types of trade frictions. Market
entry costs require an exporter to invest a fixed amount of resources before he is able to
sell his product in a new market and variable trade costs are proportional to the quantity
that is shipped to a particular market. In order to develop an intuition for the role of
these trade frictions it is helpful to think of an export- and an import-related eﬀect. If the
export destinations of a particular producer country have high entry costs or it is costly
to ship to these countries demand for this exporting country’s production factors is low,
so that the incomes of the factor owners tend to be low too. If an importing country on
the other hand has high entry costs or its location is relatively remote the measure of
available intermediate varieties tends to be low and the prices of the varieties available
tend to be high. Consequently, the local production cannot benefit too much from the
existence of intermediates, which aﬀect the output of the final good and thus real income.
Moreover, since intermediates themselves are also inputs in the intermediate production
this import channel spills back to the export channel.
In order to assess the actual relevance of these mechanisms I quantify the model econ-
omy by combining data on the aggregate values and the extensive margins of bilateral
trade flows with the standard endowment data used in development accounting. I calibrate
the model to match observed trade pattern. The thus quantified model does a remark-
ably good job in replicating the actual variations in incomes. To assess the quantitative
relevance of trade frictions I perform two types of experiments. First, I consider a coun-
terfactual world where countries are symmetric except for the calibrated trade frictions.
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I find that there is almost no between-country inequality in such a world for both, fixed
and variable trade costs. This finding however, is not suﬃcient to conclude that there
is no role for trade-related elements in explaining cross-country variations in incomes,
because trade frictions may only gain relevance when interacting with other asymmetries
across countries. To investigate this possibility I perform a second type of counterfactual
experiments, where I take the calibrated asymmetric countries and assess by how much
between-country inequality is reduced when I consider a situation with symmetric trade
frictions. I find that both giving all countries the same fixed entry costs or giving all
country-pairs the same variable trade costs both reduce inequality by around 10%. In
this sense the integration of a country in the global trade network seems to explain only
a modest share of the observed variance in per capita incomes. Moreover, the eﬀects are
mostly driven by interactions with other asymmetries across countries.
This chapter is closely related to Waugh (2010), Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2009a),
and Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2009b). These authors adapt the quantitative Ricar-
dian trade model due to Eaton and Kortum (2002) and perform exercises that are similar
in spirit to the ones outlined in this chapter. The advantage of the monopolistically com-
petitive framework adapted here is the possibility of introducing fixed market entry costs.
The potential relevance of entry costs can be seen from Figure 4.1 plotting the number of
diﬀerent imported intermediate varieties against real incomes. The clear positive relation
is apparent and very much contradicts the Ricardian model, which actually predicts a
strong negative relation (see previous chapter). Whereas I argue in the previous chapter
that a similar positive relation for consumer goods is due to non-homothethic preferences,
a natural candidate explanation for the case of intermediates is the presence of fixed mar-
ket entry costs that negatively correlate with per capita income. The structural equations
describing trade pattern in the Ricardian and in the monopolistically competitive frame-
work look very similar and one may conclude that unless one is explicitly interested in
fixed entry costs the choice of the modeling framework is not too relevant. In Section 4.3.
I describe the commonalities and diﬀerences of the two frameworks and investigate if and
how their quantitative predictions diﬀer.
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Figure 4.1: Number of diﬀerent imported varieties vs. importer income
This chapter shows that trade frictions help to explain a part of the variation in incomes
across countries. A complementary question considers a country’s gains from trade and
asks where these gains actually originate from? I investigate this question in an application
of the model to Switzerland. I first rank the countries according to their contributions
to Switzerland’s gains from trade. Not surprisingly most gains originate from nearby
European neighbors and large countries such at the USA and China. I then consider two
counterfactual situations. In the first experiment I set the trade costs between Switzerland
and particular foreign country to infinity and in the second experiment I consider a world
where this foreign country does not exist at all. Both experiments yield surprisingly low
compensating variations. This counterintuitively results highlight an important limitation
of the approach taken in this chapter. I compare diﬀerent equilibria of a static trade
model (in a dynamic model this would correspond to comparing steady states) and use
this as a development accounting tool. One has to be careful when directly drawing policy
conclusions from the results, since the framework applied here cannot make statements
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about the transition path between static equilibria.
This chapter contributes to the very broad deleopment accounting literature surveyed
for example in Caselli (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2010). An early paper discussing
the eﬀect of diﬀering intermediate availability on incomes is Romer (1994). More recently
Jones (2008) shows that allowing for an endogenous set of intermediates in an otherwise
standard growth model explains a much larger share of the cross-country variation in
incomes. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) provide evidence that firms that use inter-
mediates are more productive using. This chapter relates also to the gains from variety
literature, implementing Feenstra’s (1994) formula for the price index changes associated
with new varieties. Important contributions include Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2006)
and Hummels and Klenow (2005)s. My approach diﬀers from this literature in specifying
a fully structural model that allows me to quantify the relative importance of diﬀerent
elements of the model.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the structural model.
In Section 3 I present the data and outline the quantification strategy. Section 4 then
presents the results of the quantification. In Section 5 I apply the model to Switzerland
and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The model
In the following I propose a simple and tractable quantitative model of the world economy.
At its core are monopolistically competitive firms with heterogeneous productivities pro-
ducing tradable intermediates. These intermediates are used as inputs in the intermediate
industry itself and in a competitive final goods industry that produces a homogenous non-
tradable consumption good.The model strongly draws on Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2008), where elements that are used to match firm-level-facts (firm specific shocks to
entry costs and market penetration costs à la Arkolakis, 2008) are muted for the sake of
parsimony.
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4.2.1 Structure of the economy
The world economy consists of N countries. Country i is inhabited by a measure Pi
homogeneous agents, each endowed with hi eﬃciency units of labor (human capital) and
ki units of capital. Labor and capital are internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile
within countries.
4.2.1.1 The intermediate industry
The intermediate industry produces diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs that are interna-
tionally tradable. Setting up an intermediate firms requires capital k and labor l such
that kαl1−α ≥ f ei . After covering this initial setup cost the firm learns its productivity z
and can produce a diﬀerentiated intermediate variety with the following CRS technology
y (z) = z
￿
k (z)α l (z)1−α
￿β
q (z)1−β ,
where q (z) is a CES-aggregator over all available varieties Ω
q =
￿ˆ
Ω
x (j)
σ−1
σ dj
￿ σ
σ−1
.
The firm specific productivity is modeled as a realization of a Pareto random variable
Pr [Zi ≤ z] = 1− Tiz−θ.
Ti is a country specific parameter governing the lower bound of the productivity distribu-
tion (and thus also the expected productivity) and θ is a shape parameter common to all
countries. There is free entry in the intermediate industry such that in equilibrium total
operating profits just cover aggregate outlays for setup costs.
4.2.1.2 International trade
In order to enter a foreign market n producers from country i face two types of costs -
fixed market entry costs and variable trade costs. Market entry requires local labor and
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capital inputs such that fnαα (1− α)(1−α) ≤ kαl1−α. For given factor prices an optimizing
firm therefore needs to spend
En = fnr
α
nw
1−α
n
in order to enter a market n. For future reference I will call fn the market entry factor
requirement of country n. Variable trade costs are of the Samuelsonian iceberg type, i.e.
per dni units shipped in i only one unit arrives at the destination n.
4.2.1.3 Final goods industry
The final goods industry is competitive and produces a homogenous non-tradable con-
sumption good. This good is the only quantity that yields utility for the agents. The
final goods industry bundles capital, labor, and intermediates with a intermediate share
of (1− γ)
yF =
￿
kαF l
1−α
F
￿γ
q1−γF .
The final goods industry’s intermediate aggregator has the same functional form as the
intermediate industry’s aggregator.1
4.2.1.4 Some equilibrium features
The Appendix provides a full derivation and description of the equilibrium of this model.
Since the model is fairly standard I describe here only the main features and introduce
some notation that will be needed later on.
In equilibrium each country i has a measure of Ni intermediate producers. The mea-
sure of entering firms is endogenous and adjusts such that the expected profit from entering
is exactly zero. The variable production cost of a firm is given by the local unit costs2
ci =
￿
rαi w
1−α
i
￿β
P 1−βi
1This can be generalized to diﬀerent elasticities of substitutions, but does not deliver additional insights
in the quantification.
2I omit here and in the following multiplicative constants that will be irrelevant for the quantitative
behavior of the model.
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scaled by the firm-specific productivity z, where Pi is the CES-price index. A firm com-
pares the operating profits from entering a particular market n with the associated entry
cost, En. I define the bilateral cutoﬀ productivity z∗ni as the productivity of the country i
firm that just breaks even when entering market n. Firms in country i with productivities
above z∗ni will therefore find it optimal to export to n and firms with lower productivities
will choose not to enter this market. Plugging the cut-oﬀ productivity into the country
specific productivity distribution yields the share of i firms that enter n. The extensive
margin of the trade flow from i to n follows from multiplying this share with the total
measure of firms in i, Ni. It can be shown to be
mni = NiTi (cidni)−θ (c∗n)θ ,
where c∗n is the importing specific cut-oﬀ cost of delivering goods to market n above which
firms find it optimal not to deliver the goods. For later use I denote the total measure of
intermediate varieties that are available in country n by Mn =
￿N
i=1mni.
Aggregating over all country i firms’ revenues in market n yields the total value of the
trade flow from i to n, Xni. An importing country n demands intermediates as inputs
into its own intermediate production and as inputs for the local final good production.
Let Xn denote country n’s intermediate absorbtion, i.e. the total value of its intermediate
demand, Xn =
￿N
i=1Xni. I define the trade share λni as the share of the importing
country’s intermediate demand that is met by the supplying country i
λni =
Xni
Xn
.
Balanced trade requires that a country i’s total exports,
￿
n ￿=iXni, equal that country’s
total imports,
￿
k ￿=iXik. Adding the value of intermediate varieties that are bought from
local producers, Xnn, allows me to write the balanced trade condition as
Xi =
N￿
n=1
λniXn.
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To summarize, in this model international trade is in intermediates only. The trade
patterns are characterized by the aggregate value of trade flows and their extensive mar-
gins and in equilibrium countries intermediate absorption equals the value of their inter-
mediate production (balanced trade).
4.2.2 Real per capita incomes
Real per capita income in country n is given by the per capita consumption of the final
good in this country, Un = yF,n/Pn. I show in the Appendix that the equilibrium per
capita income can be written as
Un = Ank
αγ
n h
1−αγ
n .
This expression for real per capita income looks very similar to the one of the standard
development accounting framework (see e.g. Caselli (2005)) with the diﬀerence that An
is not a mere residual, but has a structural interpretation
An = (wn/Pn)
1−γ . (4.2.1)
How does the fact that countries are integrated in a global trade network aﬀect the
wage rates and the intermediate price indices - and therewith real income - of a country?
Let’s consider first the price index, which can be written as (see Appendix)
Pn =
￿
fn
Pn (kn)α (hn)1−α
￿ 1−σ+θ
θ(σ−1)
￿
N￿
i=1
NiTi (cidni)−θ
￿− 1θ
. (4.2.2)
The term in the first bracket captures a variety eﬀect.3 The larger a market is (represented
by the aggregate of human and physical capital) relative to market entry costs, the more
firms will enter this market. More entrants in turn lower the price index via the love for
3I assumed that market entry costs are only destination market specific and aﬀect local and interna-
tional producers equally, which buys me a lot of tractability. If entry costs would be country-pair specific
the variety eﬀect would depend on an aggregate of supplier specific entry costs. Since it is not clear how
one would implement such a more general model empirically, I abstained from modeling such country-pair
specific entry costs and chose the more parsimonious formulation of destination specific entry costs.
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variety built into the CES production function. The second bracket captures the eﬀect of
international trade on prices. The countries’ technologies, Ti, are weighted by the local
unit costs, the bilateral distance, and the measure of firms. If a country is favorably
positioned in the global trade network (a favorable position could be low trade costs in
general or proximity to technologically advanced countries or countries with many firms)
the average price of the varieties supplied in its market will be low and correspondingly
it will have a low intermediate price index.
The wage rate on the other hand is determined by the global demand for county i
labor. To elaborate on this I use the fact (shown in the Appendix) that a country’s
total intermediate absorption, Xn, is proportional to total labor income in this country,
wnhnPn. Substituting this into the balance of payments yields
wihiPi =
N￿
n=1
λnihnPnwn. (4.2.3)
This equation can be read as a labor market clearing condition with the wage rate adjust-
ing such that global demand for country i’s labor (the left hand side) equals total supply
of labor in country i. Global demand for country i labor is driven by the market sizes of
the trading partners, hnPnwn, and the bilateral trade shares λni. In the Appendix I show
that the trade shares are proportional to the extensive margin relative to totally available
varieties in the importing country, λni = mni/Mn. Substituting for the extensive margins
I can write
λni =
NiTi (cidni)−θ￿N
k=1NkTk (ckdnk)−θ
. (4.2.4)
Thus, a country i tends to have a high wage rate if it has a good technology, if it has a
large number of firms, if the trade costs with its trading partners are low or if unit costs
are low (for example due to a low intermediate price index). A country also has a high
equilibrium wage rate if it is close to large markets so that for given trade shares the
demand for its factors is high.
In summary, international trade aﬀects a country’s per capita income trough imports
4.3. QUANTIFICATION 111
via a lower price index and through exports via high demand for a country’s factors due
to international trade.
4.3 Quantification
Having developed a parsimonious model of the global economy I seek to quantify this
model. This will allow me to compare the model’s predicted per capita income with the
data and later on to consider the relative importance of the building blocks for explaining
the cross country variation in incomes.
4.3.1 Data
In order to quantify the model I use data on aggregate values of bilateral trade flows,
the extensive margin of bilateral trade flows, endowments, population sizes, and proxies
for trade costs. I calibrate the model to the year 2003. The number of countries in the
sample is determined the set of countries for which all data is complete. In the following
I briefly describe the data. Table 4.1 summarizes the availability of the diﬀerent data and
describes the resulting data set.
4.3.1.1 Aggregate values and extensive margins of bilateral trade
In order to compute the aggregate values and extensive margins of bilateral trade I use the
COMTRADE database as provided by the Centre d’Edutes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar, 2010). For the year 2003
this dataset provides the dollar values of bilateral trade flows aggregated at the HS6 level
for over 200 economic entities (mostly countries). I consider only HS-categories that
are classified as manufactures in Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar (2010)
since the model is one of trade in manufactures.4 Summing over all manufacturing HS-
categories I get the aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, Xni. Counting
4Additionally I experimented with considering only intermediate manufactures. The results do not
change. I use total manufactures since the data for gross output are not classified as intermediates or
consumer goods. In my experiments I used the intermediate share of a countries export to infer this
country’s gross output in intermediate manufactures.
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the number of manufacturing HS-categories with positive values gives me a measure for
the extensive margin of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, mni. Clearly, it is very likely
that the trade flow within a HS-category is an aggregate over several firms, so that my
count measure is only a proxy for the true extensive margin.5
4.3.1.2 Endowments and population sizes
Human capital hi is taken from Caselli (2005) who uses the data of Barro and Lee (2001).
These authors compute human capital as a piece-wise log-linear function of average years
of schooling of a country’s population over 25 year. The capital stocks are constructed
using the perpetual inventory method outline in Caselli (2005) using data on aggregate
investment from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).6 Population sizes are taken from
the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010)
4.3.1.3 Gross output
GDPmeasures the total value added in an economy. To quantify this model however, I will
need a measure the total value of a countries intermediate output (including the value of
inputs),
￿N
n=1Xni. UNIDO (2003) provides estimates for gross manufacturing output for
77 countries. Additionally they provide estimates for the value added in agriculture and
manufacturing for 192 economic entities. In order to impute gross manufacturing output
for the countries with value added data, but no gross output data, I follow Simonovska
and Waugh (2010) and run a 3rd order polynomial regression of gross manufacturing
output on the value added shares, GDP, and population size.
5Even firm level data usually only proxies the true extensive margin since many firms export several
products.
6I take the year 1978 as the initial year. The initial capital stock is computed as I1978/ (g + δ), where
I1978 a country’s aggregate investment in 1978, g is this country’s average growth rate in aggregate
investment between 1970 and 1978, and δ = 0.06 following Caselli (2005). Based on this initial capital
stocks I then construct the capital stock for the year 2003 by iterating the capital accumulation function,
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It.
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Table 4.1: Data availability and the resulting data set
data availability
data observations
trade pattern (Xni, mni) 221
endowments (hi, ki) 104
population sizes 227
gross output - measured 77
gross output - imputed 118
trade cost proxies 224
resulting data set
number of countries 86
% of global gdp 87%
% of global trade volume 64%
4.3.1.4 Trade cost proxies
Since I do not directly observe the variable bilateral trade costs, dni, I will estimate these
trade costs. For that I will follow the Gravity literature in using the usual proxies -
bilateral distance, a shared border, and speaking the same languages. The corresponding
data is from CEPII (2006).
4.3.2 Transforming the data into inputs for the quantification
The available data described above requires some manipulation to be useful as an input
for the quantification. These transformations are guided by the theoretical model and are
described in the following.
4.3.2.1 Total manufacturing absorption and trade shares
We have data on a country i’s total manufacturing output,
￿N
n=1Xni. Subtracting the
aggregate value of this country’s exports,
￿
n ￿=iXni, yields i’s manufacturing demand that
is met by local producers, Xii. Adding all imports from countries that are in the sample7
7Note that I subtracted total exports (to countries that are in the sample and countries that are not)
since this yields as the residual Xii. However, I add only imports from countries in the sample in order
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gives me the gross value of this country’s total intermediate demand, Xi. The bilateral
trade shares, λni, follow immediately by dividing the aggregate value of the bilateral trade
flow from i to n by the importing country total manufacturing absorption, λni = Xni/Xn.
The home share, λnn, is computed as a residual, λnn = 1−
￿
i ￿=n λni.
4.3.2.2 Wage rates
Since I am interested in between-country inequality I want to have a sample of countries
that is as large as possible. Using actual wage data would restrict me to considering
basically only OECD countries. To avoid this I follow Waugh (2010) and take the wage
rates that are implied by the general equilibrium. Slightly rearranging (4.2.3) I get
wi =
N￿
n=1
λni
hnPn
hiPi wn.
Using the data on population sizes and human capital and the trade shares derived above
this represents a linear system that can be solved for the unique set of relative wage rates
consistent with market clearing.
4.3.2.3 Total measure of locally available varieties, Mn
In the data we observe the measure of imported manufacturing varieties,
￿
i ￿=nmni, but
not the measure of locally sourced varieties, mnn, so that we cannot directly compute
Mn =
￿N
i=1mni. In the following I discuss two methods for imputing the total measure
of available varieties, Mn.
For the first approach remember that the trade share of an exporting country i in
the market n equals the share of varieties that this exporter supplies in market n, λni =
mni/Mn. Adding over all exporters and rearranging yields Mn = (1− λnn)
￿
i ￿=nmni.
From above we know the extensive margins of imports, mni, and the home share λnn
so that we can directly solve for the implied measure of totally available varieties. An
alternative approach combines and rearranges two expressions for the trade share, λni =
Xni/Xn and λni = mni/Mn, to show that the average intensive margin of a country’s
to obtain a measure for intermediate absorption consistent with the model.
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Figure 4.2: Comparing the two approaches to estimating Mn
import flows in proportional to this country’s entry costs
Xn
Mn
=
Xni
mni
=
σθ
θ − σ + 1En.
Adapting a stochastic version with a multiplicative error for this equation I obtain an
estimate for log (En) (up to a constant) by regressing log (Xni/mni) on country fixed
eﬀects.8 I obtain an estimate for Mn by dividing the total intermediate absorption, Xn,
by the previously estimated En.
Figure 4.2 plots the resulting estimates forMn against each other. Clearly the resulting
estimates are highly correlated. I use the Mn computed with the first approach in what
follows. The results remain unchanged when using the alternative estimates for Mn.
8This is of course equal to taking the geometric mean across supplier countries.
116 CHAPTER 4. MARKET ENTRY COSTS AND PER CAPITA INCOMES
4.3.3 Quantifying the model
The model parameters are the countries endowments, ki and hi, the population sizes, Pi,
the technologies, Ti, the setup costs parameters, f ei , the market entry cost parameters, fi,
the matrix of bilateral trade costs, dni, and a set of parameters common to all countries,
α, β, γ, θ, and σ. Some of the parameters directly correspond to data (ki, hi, and Pi).
Others will be estimated using the preparatory work done in the previous section (Ti, f ei ,
fi, and dni) and for the remaining parameters I will use standard values commonly used
in the literature. In the following I first describe these standard values and then discuss
the estimation strategies for Ti, f ei , fi, and dni.
4.3.3.1 Labor share, intermediate shares, and trade elasticity
The Pareto shape parameter θ governs the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs. I
use the estimate from Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) of θ = 4.87, which follows from
fitting their model to French firm-level data. 9 For the intermediate share in the tradable
manufacturing sector I follow Waugh (2010) in choosing β = 1/3, which is the average
value added in UNIDO manufacturing data for 61 countries. I follow Alvarez and Lucas
(2007) in choosing γ = 3/4 and for α I choose α = 1/3 to get the common assumption
of a labor share of 2/3. For the elasticity of substitution finally note that in contrast to
the Ricardian frameworks used e.g. in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2010) the
value of the elasticity of substitution matters very much for the quantitative behavior of
the model. The reason is that the elasticity of substitution governs the demand elasticity
and thus the markups. The markups in turn determine how many firms find it profitable
to enter a market and therefore the set of available varieties. As a baseline I choose a
σ = 3.4, which is the median value of the elasticities estimated in Broda, Greenfield,
and Weinstein (2006). I discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to the chosen
parameter values in Section 4.6.
9More recently Simonovska and Waugh (2010) estimate the trade elasticity for a broad set of countries
and provide strong evidence that there is no systematic correlation between the trade elasticity and the
level of a country’s development - their baseline estimate is θ = 4.5. In Eaton and Kortum (2002) the
authors propose three approaches to estimating θ. The resulting values are 3.6, 8.28, and 12.68.
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Figure 4.3: Market entry costs, En, and factor requirements, fn
4.3.3.2 Fixed market entry costs
In order to get an estimate for the fixed market entry costs I rearrange (4.A.1) to use
En = Xn/Mn (ignoring multiplicative constants, see Appendix for derivation). Since I
have values for the intermediate absorption and the total measure of available varieties
I can calculate the implied market entry costs. The upper panel of Figure 4.3 plots
those against real per capita incomes (as measured in the Penn World Tables, Heston,
Summers, and Aten, 2009). There is clearly a positive relation between per capita income
and market entry costs. However, there are two possible reasons for why En is high
- high market entry factor requirements, fn, or high local factor prices. Whereas the
first reason is indeed unambiguously bad for a country, the second reflects this country’s
strength. Indeed the lower a factor requirement for entry the higher this country’s factor
productivity and consequently its factor prices. In order to isolate the eﬀects I substitute
for En and solve for the factor requirement
fn =
1
wn
￿
hn
kn
￿−α Xn
Mn
.
Since I have data on the relative capital stocks and I computed the wage rates above I can
implement this equation and construct the implied factor requirements. The lower panel
of Figure 4.3 plots these factor requirements against real per capita incomes revealing that
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the factor requirements itself are clearly negatively correlated with per capita incomes. In
the counterfactual experiments I will assess how important the fact that poor countries
have high factor requirements is for the pattern of between-country inequality.
4.3.3.3 Variable trade costs
I obtain an empirically implementable gravity equation by normalizing the trade shares
with the importing country’s home share
λni
λnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
,
where Si = NiTic−θi . Since I cannot directly observe the trade costs I model them as a
function of observables and an exporter fixed eﬀect
−θ log (dni) = dk + b+ l + exi + δni,
where I suppressed the dummy variables for notationally simplicity. dk is the eﬀect of
the bilateral distance being in the interval k. Similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) the
intervals are (measured in miles) [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000), [3000, 6000),
and [6000,∞). b is the eﬀect of sharing a bilateral border and l the eﬀect of having a
common language. exi is an exporter fixed eﬀect. Whereas the explanatory power of
this regression would be the same using importer fixed eﬀects instead, Waugh (2010)
demonstrates that exporter fixed eﬀects yield consistent results along other dimensions,
in particular with respect to the price-indices of tradable goods across countries. Inserting
the functional assumption about trade costs into the normalized trade share equation and
taking logs yields a linear equation that is straight forward to implement.
Table 4.2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients and the implied percentage eﬀect on trade
costs for the OLS regression and the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) regres-
sion proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In our context, the main advantage of the
PPML approach is its ability to use also zero trade flows. This may be relevant in the
present sample since 13% of all possible trade flows are zeros. The correlation between
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Table 4.2: Trade cost coeﬃcients and implied eﬀects
Poisson regression OLS regression
variable coeﬃcient %-eﬀect coeﬃcient %-eﬀect
[375, 750) −0.32∗∗∗ 7% −0.59∗∗∗ 13%
[750, 1500) −0.65∗∗∗ 14% −1.15∗∗∗ 27%
[1500, 3000) −1.98∗∗∗ 50% −2.32∗∗∗ 61%
[3000, 6000) −2.86∗∗∗ 80% −3.51∗∗∗ 106%
[6000,∞) −3.32∗∗∗ 98% −4.33∗∗∗ 143%
shared border 0.50∗∗∗ -10% 1.01∗∗∗ -19%
same language 0.50∗∗∗ -10% 0.92∗∗∗ -17%
the trade costs implied by OLS and PPML however is high with 0.85. With the estimates
based on PPML being less spread out. In order to preserve comparability with Waugh
(2010) I choose to use the trade costs estimated with OLS.
4.3.3.4 Technologies
I recover technologies by using the general equilibrium conditions of my model. Market
clearing requires (4.2.3) to hold for every country. Substituting for the countries’ unit
costs I can write the trade shares as
λni =
￿Ti ￿wβi P 1−βi dni￿−θ￿N
k=1
￿Tk ￿wβkP 1−βk dnk￿−θ ,
where ￿Ti = (hi/ki)−αβθ NiTi is a composite of a country’s technology, its measure of
entrants, and the ratio of human and physical capital. Adapting this composite expression
the price yields
Pn = (Mn)
1
θ+
1
1−σ
￿
N￿
i=1
￿Ti ￿wβi P 1−βi dni￿−θ
￿− 1θ
.
From above I have values for Mn, wn, hn, Pn, dni for the parameters β, σ, and θ. Given
these I can solve for the (up to a constant) unique vector of ￿Ti for which the corre-
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sponding price indices and trade shares ensure that all markets clear.10 Solving for the
corresponding technologies Ti is then straight forward. In the appendix I discuss an alter-
native approach to calibrating the technologies and show that the resulting technologies
are highly correlated with the ones recovered above.
4.4 Results
In the previous section I described how I calibrate the model and briefly discussed the
resulting values. In this section I now turn to the actual question of this chapter - how does
considering the global macroeconomy help us to understand variations in income that may
be interpreted as pure technological variations using a closed economy framework? To
answer this question I first compare the global variation in per capita incomes generated
by the model with the data. Later I then consider the relative importance of diﬀerent
aspects of the model in explaining global income inequality.
4.4.1 Comparing global inequality in the model and the data
To calibrate the model I combined standard endowment data with data on trade flows,
but I did not use data on per capita incomes. How do the per capita incomes generated
by the model line up with the data? Figure 4.4 plots the model’s incomes against the
data. The model captures the variation in the data quite well. Indeed the slope of the
best fit through Figure 4.4 is 1. To assess the model’s performance one can also compare
the variance in incomes and percentile ratios of the model and the data in the spirit of
Caselli (2005). Table 3 reports the respective values. The model’s variance in log-incomes
and the 90/10-percentile ratio are slightly too high, whereas the 75/25-percentile ratio is
lower than in the data.
In the data there is a strong correlation between the reduced form TFP and the
capital-labor composite, kαl1−α, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.87. The correlation
10In the code I start with an initial guess for ￿Ti. Based on this guess I first compute the implied price
indices. Using these I then calculated the corresponding trade shares. I plug the trade shares into the
market clearing conditions and check by how much the markets fail to clear. I adjust the initial guess
using a tâtonnement-like algorithm until all markets clear.
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Figure 4.4: per capita incomes of the model and in the data
Table 4.3: Income diﬀerences in the model and the data
var (log (U)) p90%/p10% p75%/p25%
data 1.44 25.8 7.7
model 1.53 29.8 6.7
of the model’s reduced-form TFP with the capital-labor composite is very similar with
0.91. To summarize, the model seems to replicate the actual between-country inequality
remarkably well. I now turn to investigate which elements of the model actually drive
inequality.
4.4.2 The Sources of inequality
To discuss the sources of between-country inequality it is helpful to go back to (4.2.1).
After some manipulations outlined in the Appendix I obtain the following expression for
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real income in country n
Un = (λnn)
− 1−γβθ (fn)
− 1−σ+θ(σ−1)βθ (1−γ)P
1−γ
β(σ−1)
n
￿
(kn)
α (hn)
1−α￿ 1−γβ(σ−1) ￿Tn
f en
￿ 1−γ
βθ
kαnh
1−α
n . (4.4.1)
This expression nicely highlights the diﬀerent elements of the model and how they aﬀect
a country’s per capita income. The capital-labor composite, kαnh1−αn , is the standard
explanatory variable of the simple development accounting framework. The next term,
Tn/f en, represents exogenous variations in technologies (relative to set-up costs for firms).
The third term is a multiplier on the capital-labor composite coming from the two stage
production with love from variety. The fourth term is a scale eﬀect - larger countries have
higher demand and therefore it is more attractive to enter these markets, which lowers
the price index. Similarly, the market entry factor requirement, fn, aﬀects the measure
of entering firms - the lower it is the more firms enter a market for a given size. The
last element is the home share, λnn, that captures the eﬀect of international trade. With
a home share of 1 a standard lives in autarky. The lower the home share the higher
the benefits from trade and the higher real income U . Note that all previous elements
also aﬀect the equilibrium value of the home share. In the following I will consider the
quantitative importance of these elements separately.
4.4.2.1 Endowment Diﬀerences, country sizes, and technologies
In the the baseline development accounting framework endowment diﬀerences explain
about 37% of the variance in per capita incomes. In the present model endowment
diﬀerences have additional eﬀects via the love for variety production functions and the
home share. I first focus on the production function channel. Setting trade costs to
infinity (and thus the home shares to 1) and giving all countries’ the same technologies,
factor requirements, fn and f en and populations, I can assess the additional explanatory
power coming from having a two stage production process. The resulting variance in
the logs of per capita incomes is 0.63% relative to the data, which is significantly higher
than the usual 40%. This result is reminiscent of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) who
find that increasing the weight on capital in the production process helps replicating the
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Table 4.4: The role of trade-related elements in an otherwise symmetric world
countries are symmetric except for... var (log (U))
... market entry costs, fn 0.01
... trade costs, dni 0.05
... market entry and trade costs 0.06
data 1.44
observed diﬀerences in per capita incomes. When I additionally allow for the scale eﬀect
by plugging in the actually observed populations I obtain a log-variance in incomes of
73% relative to the data. Considering technology first note that one cannot separately
identify the factor requirement for setting up a firm f en and a country’s technology. Thus
I lump the two together and call the resulting ratio technology. When we additionally
allow for technological diﬀerences the explained variance rises to 77%.
4.4.2.2 Fixed and variable trade costs
How important is the imperfect global integration for the patterns of inequality between
countries? In order to assess this question I make the countries symmetric along all
dimensions except for the market entry factor requirement, fn, and the trade costs. In
this way I preclude interactions between endowments and technologies and trade related
elements of the model. Table 4.4 summarizes the results. Clearly, taken for themselves
trade barriers seem not to be important in generating between-country inequality. If one
considers a world with symmetric countries except for the calibrated asymmetries in fixed
and variable trade costs the corresponding log-variance in per capita incomes would only
be 0.06 which is very small relative to the 1.44 in the data.
However, the real world is not symmetric and a question of more policy relevance is
therefore how inequality reacts to changes in trade costs given asymmetries in endow-
ments, populations, and technologies. The results may diﬀer due to interactions of the
trade-related elements with other asymmetries in the model. Table 4.5 reports the per-
centage changes in the variance of log-incomes that are associated with changes in fixed
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Table 4.5: Reductions in inequality associated with changes in trade costs
counterfactual experiment % change in var (log (U))
fn = min {fk}Nk=1 -12.8%
dni = mean {dni}i ￿=n -12.5%
above experiments combined -22.7%
and variable trade costs. Given the actual asymmetries in endowments, populations, and
technologies introducing symmetry in trade costs has about the same eﬀect for variable
and fixed trade costs. The resulting reductions in inequality are non-neglible, but rather
small when compared to the reductions that are for example associated with giving all
countries the same endowments of human capital (-31%) or physical capital (-76%). In
summary, I therefore conclude that there is some relevance of asymmetries in trade costs
for understanding the observed between-country inequality. The eﬀects come mostly from
interactions with other asymmetries (endowments and population sizes). In spite of the
relatively small eﬀects the results may be of interest for policy-makers since asymmetries
in trade costs can be influenced immediately to the extent that they are due to regula-
tory asymmetries, whereas policy changes aiming at influencing asymmetries in human
or physical capital require time for the capital stocks to adjust.
4.4.3 How do the results compare to a Ricardian setup?
The model proposed above features monopolistically competitive firms, market entry
costs, and an endogenous set of firms. The Ricardian model proposed by Waugh (2010)
based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) features perfect competition, no market entry cost,
and an exogenous set of varieties. The resulting structural equations (I outline the corre-
sponding model in the Appendix), however, look very similar to the ones resulting from
my model. Indeed, the Ricardian model in the spirit of Waugh (2010) and monopolistic
competition models as outlined in this chapter are emerging as the two most prominent
quantitative trade models. Which of the two frameworks is chosen for a given question
is usually a question of parsimony - if the research question is more concerned with ag-
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gregate trade pattern the simpler Ricardian model is often chosen, whereas endeavors
investigating firm level facts tend to use the monopolistic competition framework. Arko-
lakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) show that both models belong to a more
general class of model for which the gains from trade (the compensating variation when
comparing a trade equilibrium with autarky) are fully summarized by a country’s home
share and the trade elasticity.11 However, this does not imply that the predicted changes
in welfare as a reaction to common elements (e.g. variable trade costs or endowments)
are the same since the home share may adjust diﬀerently. In this section I investigate
how diﬀerent the two classes of models’ quantitative predictions are.
In terms of the quantification, the two main diﬀerences between the Ricardian and the
monopolistically competitive setup are the interpretation of the reduced form technology,￿Ti, and the fact that in the monopolistic competition case the countries price indices scale
by the measure of locally available varieties. In the quantification, this implies that the
explanatory power of the endowments is higher in the monopolistically competitive envi-
ronment, whereas these additional channels are lumped into technology in the Ricardian
framework. As long as one does not consider counterfactual experiments with respect
to endowments this diﬀerence does not directly matter. However, interactions between
the scale eﬀects and trade costs may imply that even experiments that leave endowments
constant yield quite diﬀerent predictions depending on which framework is used. In order
to assess if this concern is of quantitative importance I calibrated the two model to the
data used above and performed three experiments with respect to trade cost. The first
experiment gives all country-pairs the same average trade costs, the second experiments
is Waugh’s (2010) experiment of making trade costs symmetric12, and the third experi-
ment gives all country-pairs the average trade costs among OECD countries. Table 4.6
summarizes the results. Concerning the models’ abilities to replicate the actual variance
in incomes both models slightly overpredict with the Ricardian doing so more strongly.
11To be precise, in the context of my model, the trade elasticity is not suﬃcient, but we actually need
the combination of trade elasticity and labor shares, − (1− γ) / (βθ).
12Remember that we included exporter fixed eﬀects in the gravity equation. This implies that if
e.g. Switzerland has a lower exporter fixed eﬀect than the US, the trade costs for shipping from US to
Switzerland are higher than the costs for flows in the other direction. In this experiment I abolish this
asymmetry, dnewni = min (dni, din).
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Table 4.6: Comparing the monopolistically competitive and the Ricardian setup
comparison of ability to reproduce the data
var (log (U))
data 1.44
monopolistic competition model 1.53
Ricardian model 1.64
comparison of predicted % reduction in var (log (U))
predictions
experiment monop. comp. Ricardian
dni = mean (dni) -13% -1%
dni = min (dni, din) -20% -19%
dni = mean
￿
dOECDni
￿
-26% -24%
In the counterfactual experiments the models yield similar for the last two experiments
and very diﬀerent predictions in the first experiment. Therefore I conclude that there are
indeed situations where the two classes of models yield very diﬀerent predictions and cor-
respondingly quantitative work in international trade should check if the results strongly
depend on the chosen model. If they do, the justification for the choice of the framework
has to go beyond the argument of parsimony.
4.5 Application: the Swiss gains from trade
Based on (4.4.1) we can compute the gains from trade for each country by raising the
calibrated home share, λnn, to the power of − (1− γ) / (βθ) . In this section I investigate
the gains from trade for Switzerland. The calibrated home share for Switzerland is 0.09,
so that the implied welfare gain (measured as the compensating variation) is 46%.
Where do these gains originate from? A simple first approximation is to note that
the home share is defined as λnn = 1 −
￿
i ￿=n λni. Thus, simply ordering the supplier
countries by their bilateral shares yields a ranking of the importance of these countries
for the importer’s welfare. Column 2 of Table 4.7 provides the respective ranking for
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Switzerland’s 15 most important trading partners.
Table 4.7: Decomposing Switzerland’s gains from trade - top 15
Ranking Change in welfare
Trading partner model-based data-based Experment I Experiment II
Germany 1 1 -6.4% -5.0%
Italy 2 2 -3.9% -3.3%
France 3 3 -3.4% -2.4%
UK 4 7 -0.4% 0.1%
Belgium + Lux 5 9 -1.7% -1.0%
Austria 6 5 -0.6% -0.4%
Spain 7 11 -0.3% 0.0%
USA 8 4 -1.4% 0.6%
Holland 9 6 -0.5% -0.1%
China 10 10 -0.0% 0.3%
Sweden 11 13 -0.1% 0.0%
Japan 12 12 -0.1% 0.7%
Denmark 13 15 -0.1% 0.0%
Irland 14 8 -0.2% 0.0%
Finland 15 19 -0.1% 0.0%
The set of the top15 trading partners for Switzerland in the model overlaps with the
corresponding set in the data for all but one country (Finland is the 15th most important
trading partner in the model, whereas the corresponding country in the data is Thailand).
Column 3 presents the ranking based on the actual data. In order to quantify the gains
I perform two counterfactual experiments. In the first experiment I set the bilateral
trade costs between Switzerland and a particular trading partner i, dCH,i, to infinity and
compare the associated compensating variation to the overall gains from trade. Note
that whereas in this experiments direct trade between Switzerland and country i does
not emerge13, indirectly Switzerland still benefits from the presence of country i, because
country i supplies other countries with intermediate varieties and therewith lowers their
unit costs, which indirectly also aﬀects the price level in Switzerland. Column 4 of Table
13Trade in which a third country merely acts as a transit point is ruled out by assumption.
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4.7 reports the corresponding welfare contributions. The second experiment fully removes
a county from the global trading system, i.e. I set the trade costs between a country i
and all other countries to infinity. Column 5 of Table 4.7 reports the associated welfare
changes. In contrast to the first experiment, where all welfare changes are negative,
there are 45 countries whose disappearance from the global trade system would actually
benefit Switzerland. The reason for this surprising result is that the disappearance of these
countries increases the demand for Swiss factors. This raises the wage rate in Switzerland.
At the same time the disappearance of a country implies that the intermediate price index
is rising since this country’s varieties disappear. From (4.2.1) one sees that if the increase
in the wage rate dominates the increase in the price index Switzerland’s real income can
actually rise.
I conclude by noting that Switzerland’s gains from trade are mostly due to its neighbors
as can be seen from the columns 2 and 3. However, columns 4 and 5 show that the losses
from stoping to trade with a particular neighbors would be surprisingly small. The reason
for this result is that I consider long-run eﬀects, i.e. I allow the global industrial structure
to fully adjust and only then I compare the resulting welfare levels. It is, of course, highly
likely that this adjustment would be very painful and the associated welfare losses may be
large compared to the long-run eﬀect. In this sense this Section highlights the limitations
of a static trade model for welfare analysis and puts for example the small gains from
variety found in Broda and Weinstein (2006) in perspective.
4.6 Sensitivity: alternative parameters values
In this section I investigate the sensitivity of my main results with respect to the calibrated
values of the elasticity of substitution, σ, factor shares, α, β, and γ, and the Pareto
parameter θ. The elasticity of substitution governs the gains from variety. The lower the
elasticity of substitution the higher the gains, i.e. the variance in income in the model is
likely to increase with a lower σ. To get a lower bound for the elasticity of substitution I
choose the lowest country specific median elasticity from Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein
(2006), which corresponds to the United Kingdom’s median elasticity of 2.4. For an upper
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Table 4.8: Sensitivity analysis: calibration results for alternative parameter values
changing % of the data’s change in var (log (U)) when...
parameter var (log (U)) fn = min {fn} dni = mean (dni)i ￿=n
α 0.25 93% -16% -13%
0.50 137% -8% -11%
β 0.25 105% -13% -26%
0.50 107% -10% 3%
γ 0.70 126% -14% -14%
0.85 74% -9% -10%
θ 3.60 103% -8% -7%
8.28 109% -16% -21%
σ 2.40 119% -20% -23%
5.80 96% -0% -1%
bound note that the elasticity of substitution is bounded from above by θ−σ+1 > 0, which
must hold for the integral representing the price index to converge. For the baseline value
of θ this yields an upper bound for σ of 5.8. Concerning the labor share most studies find
shares of roughly two thirds. To check for the sensitivity of my model with respect to α I
chose 0.5 as a lower bound and 0.75 as the upper bound. For β governing the intermediate
share in the intermediate industry I take 0.5 from Alvarez and Lucas (2007) as an upper
bound and choose 0.25 as the lower bound. For γ, which governs the intermediate share
in final goods production I follow the deliberations by Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and use
0.7 as the lower bound and 0.85 as the upper bound. The Pareto parameter θ governs the
elasticity of trade volumes with respect to trade costs. There is a relatively wide range
of estimated values for the trade elasticity, which is discussed in Simonovska and Waugh
(2010) in detail. I adapt the preferred estimate (8.28) from Eaton and Kortum (2002) as
the high value and their low estimate of 3.6 as a lower bound.
Table 4.8 reports the corresponding calibration results. Column 3 reports the ratio of
the models variance in log-real incomes relative to the variance in the data. The ratio
varies between 74% and 137%. It is particularly sensitive to the capital share, α, and
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the elasticity of substitution, σ. Both parameters have eﬀects that are reminiscent of the
channel described in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Columns 4 and 5 report how
the results of two counterfactual experiments change with alternative parameters. The
eﬀect of giving all countries symmetric entry factor requirements is relatively stable across
parameter values except for the high elasticity of substitution, whereas the eﬀect of giving
all country-pairs the same trade costs varies more. From these sensitivity results I take
that the (modest) relevance of asymmetries in trade related elements for understanding
inequality is mostly confirmed, but that the model outlined in this chapter would be too
general for actual policy experiments.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter developed a quantitative trade model that is adapted as a development
accounting tool. The key ingredient of the trade model is an endogenous set of monopo-
listically competitive firms with heterogeneous productivities. The advantage of this setup
compared to a Ricardian world of perfectly competitive firms is the possibility of allowing
for fixed market entry costs. I estimated the trade costs by using data on the extensive
margin and the aggregate value of trade flows and found that the fixed market entry costs
are indeed negatively correlated with the observed real per capita incomes. In order to
assess if this asymmetry across countries is an important contributor to between-country
inequality I fully calibrate the model. The resulting quantitative model of the world econ-
omy captures the between-country inequality in income remarkably well. Using this model
I perform a number of counterfactual experiments that demonstrate that asymmetries in
the factor requirements associated with entering a market explain a modest amount of
between country inequality - giving all countries the lowest estimated entry requirement
reduces between-country inequality by 13%. Giving all country-pairs additionally the
same trade costs leads to a total reduction of 23% of inequality. These eﬀects are small
compared to the reductions associated with equal capital endowments. However, they
may be of interest to policy makers nevertheless since arguably entry regulations and
tariﬀs are more straight forward to implement compared to measures targeting capital
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stock formation. In Section 4.5 I applied the model to locate the sources of Switzerland’s
gains from trade. The gains come mostly from close-by countries. It is remarkable that
the compensating variation of Swiss consumers with respect to being allowed to trade
with particular countries is surprisingly small due to reallocation eﬀects that dampen the
utility losses that emerge when a country disappears from the global trading network. A
dynamic model of industry adjustment would help to investigate how much higher the
welfare losses would be when explicitly considering the path of adjustment associated with
the though experiments proposed in this chapter.
The equations that describe the equilibrium of the model developed in this chapter
look very similar to the corresponding equilibrium conditions in a Ricardian model such
as the one developed by Waugh (2010). I found that the two classes of models can
deliver diﬀering quantitative predictions even when changing common elements such as
variable trade costs. The Ricardian framework is generally viewed as the less complicated
model and thus often chosen for the sake of simplicity. The findings presented in Section
4.4.3 suggest that the more weight is given to the quantitative prediction of a model
the more important it is to check the robustness of these predictions with respect to the
market structure. In the light of these deliberations and the results of the sensitivity
analysis a fruitful avenue for future research would be the development of hybrid models
of international trade. Such a model could feature an elasticity of substitution within
product categories that is diﬀerent from the elasticity of substitution across products.
Industries with high elasticities of substitution and low market entry costs then would
resemble Ricardian industries, whereas other industries with low elasticities of substitution
and high market entry costs would look more like the intermediate industry described in
this chapter.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Deriving and characterizing the equilibrium
4.A.1.1 Bilateral cut-oﬀs, z∗ni
A country i firm with productivity z faces the following demand in country n
pni (z) xni (z) = Xn
￿
pni (z)
Pn
￿1−σ
,
where Xn is total intermediate absorption in country n and Pn represents the CES price
index. It will be helpful later on to write the price index as a sum of supplying country-
specific sub-indices,
Pn =
￿
N￿
i=1
P 1−σni
￿1/(1−σ)
,
where the sub-indices Pni are defined by
P 1−σni =
ˆ
Ωni
p (j)1−σ dj.
Given the isoelastic demand the optimal markup is constant and the optimal price that
a country i producer with productivity z charges in market n is given by pni (z) =
(σ/ (σ − 1)) cidni/z. The corresponding operating profits are a constant fraction of rev-
enue πni (z) = pni (z) xni (z) /σ. The cut-oﬀ firm has a zero contribution margin from
entering market n, πni (z∗ni) = En. Using the demand function and optimal pricing I can
solve for the cutoﬀ costs of serving country n, c∗n, above which firms find it optimal not
to enter market n
c∗n =
σ − 1
σ
Pn
￿
σ
En
Xn
￿ 1
1−σ
.
Note that the cutoﬀ-costs depend only on country n-variables, i.e. all exporters have the
same cutoﬀ-costs of entering market n. The cutoﬀ-productivities
z∗ni = cidni/c
∗
n
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however diﬀer across supplier countries due to diﬀering trade and unit costs.
4.A.1.2 The price index, Pn, and its components, Pni
Integrating the demand function over all productivities higher than the cutoﬀ-productivity
z∗ni and divide by Xn reveals that the trade shares are proportional to the supplier coun-
try’s relative contribution to the price index
λni =
￿
Pni
Pn
￿1−σ
.
The more favorable an exporting country’s prices are relative to all other prices in the
destination market the higher the bilateral trade share λni.
In order advance I write the bilateral component of the price index, P 1−σni , as an average
price of the varieties supplied by i in n weighted with the extensive margin of the trade
flow from i to n
P 1−σni = mni
ˆ ∞
z∗ni
pni (z)
1−σ µni (z) dz,
where µni (z) is the pdf of the productivities of the producers in i conditional on entering
n. I change variables from productivities to costs c = cidni/z which yields
P 1−σni = mni
ˆ cn
0
pni (c)
1−σ µni (c) dz.
To derive the specific expression for µni (c) note first that the probability that a country
i supplier is able to deliver to n at costs below c is given by
Pr [Cni < c] = Pr [cidni/Zi ≤ c] = Pr [cidni/c ≤ Zi] = Ti (cidni/c)−θ .
The cdf conditional on a producer actually entering, i.e. having a productivity that implies
costs of supplying market i that are below the cutoﬀ costs, c∗n, is
Pr [C < c|C ≤ c∗n] = (c∗n/c)−θ .
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The associated pdf is µni (c). Therewith I can write the bilateral component of the price
index as a function of the destination market cutoﬀ c∗n and the extensive margin of bilateral
trade
P 1−σni = (σ/ (σ − 1) c∗n)1−σ θ/ (θ − σ + 1)mni.
Adding up the bilateral components yield the actual price index in country n
Pn =
σ
σ − 1c
∗
n
￿
θ
θ − σ + 1Mn
￿ 1
1−σ
.
4.A.1.3 Another expression for the trade share and total market entry costs
I plug the just derived bilateral component and the actual price index into above expres-
sion for the trade share to get
λni =
mni
Mn
.
Moreover, substituting for the price index in the cut-oﬀ condition allows me to express
the total costs that accrue from firms entering market n
EnMn = Xn
θ − σ + 1
σθ
. (4.A.1)
Using this expression and the cut-oﬀ costs in above expression for the price index yields
(4.2.2) of the main text.
4.A.1.4 Intermediate absorption
To derive a useful expression for a country’s total intermediate absorption I start by
noting that labor income in the competitive final goods sector is wilF,i = γ (1− α) pF,iyF,i.
Market-clearing implies that all income of a country’s agents is spent on (locally produced)
final goods, pF,iyF,i = wihiPi + riKi. Due to the Cobb-Douglas technology I can write
pF,iyF,i = wihiPi/ (1− α). Combing these deliberations yields the share of labor and
capital that is employed in the final goods sector, γ = lF,i/ (hiPi) = kF,i/Ki. Since final
goods production is perfectly competitive γ percent of total revenue in the final goods
sector is paid to pay labor and capital and the remaining (1− γ) percent of revenue is
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used to buy intermediate inputs
QF,i = (1− γ) wihiPi
1− α .
To derive the value of intermediate inputs used in intermediate production I write a
firm’s variable cost, cost(z), as a constant fraction of revenue r (z), cost(z) = r (z) (σ − 1) /σ.
(1− β) percent of the cost are used to cover intermediate expenses. Thus, a country
i firm with productivity zi’s total intermediate demand (in value terms) is given by
Piq (zi) = (1− β) r (zi) (σ − 1) /σ. Integrating over all active producers yields QI,i =
(1− β) (σ − 1) /σRi, where Ri is total revenue in country i’s the intermediate sector.
Balanced trade implies Ri = Xi,14 so that we can write
QI,i = (1− β) σ − 1
σ
Xi.
Since intermediates are only used in production market clearing requires Xn = QI,i+QF,i.
Substituting for QF,i and QI,i allows me to solve for country i’s intermediate absorption
Xn =
σ (1− γ)
(1 + β (σ − 1)) (1− α)wnhnPn. (4.A.2)
A country’s total intermediate absorption is thus a constant fraction of its total labor
income.
4.A.1.5 Number of entrants
In the following I derive an expression for the measure of entrants in country i, Ni, i.e.
the measure of firms that pay the setup costs. For that I define Πn as the total profits
that accrue from sales in market n. They equal operating profits Xn/σ minus aggregate
market entry costs EnMn, i.e.
Πn = Xn/σ − EnMn = Xn (σ − 1) / (σθ) .
14Country i’s trade balance is
￿
n ￿=iXni =
￿
k ￿=iXik. Adding the value of the home supply, Xii, on
both sides yields Ri =
￿N
n=1Xni =
￿N
k=1Xik = Xi.
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Given the Pareto distribution the level of costs (and therefore prices) do not bear any
information about the source country. Therefore the profits are split among the supplier
countries in proportion to the trade shares λni. Free entry thus requires that total set-up
costs in i equal total profits made by active firms
￿N
n=1 λniΠn. Note that by imposing
balanced trade the total profits can be written as (σ − 1) / (σθ)Xi. The total setup costs
in country i are given by Nif ei w1−αi rαi = Nif ei wi (α/ (1− α))α (h/k)α, where the second
expression follows from market clearing in the non-tradable factors. Equating total setup
costs and with total profits made by active firms allows me to solve for the measure of
entrants Ni as a function of exogenous variables
Ni = (σ − 1) (1− γ)
θ (1 + β (σ − 1))
1
f ei
Pikαi h1−αi . (4.A.3)
4.A.1.6 Real per capita incomes
Country n’s real per capita income is
Un =
yF,n
Pn =
rnkn + wnhn
pF,n
=
wnhn/ (1− α)
pF,n
.
The unit costs in the final goods sector are (ignoring constants)
pF,n =
￿
rαnw
1−α
n
￿γ
P 1−γn .
Using this together with rαw1−α = (α/ (1− α))α (hn/kn)αwn allows me to write the real
income (ignoring an irrelevant multiplicative constants) as
Un =
￿
wn
Pn
￿1−γ
kαγn h
1−αγ
n .
To derive (4.4.1) note that a country n’s home share is
λnn =
￿Tn ￿wβnP 1−βn ￿−θ￿N
k=1
￿Tk ￿wβkP 1−k dnk￿−θ .
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Using equation (4.2.2) we can substitute for the sum in the denominator
λnn =
￿
fn
(Kn)
α (hnPn)1−α
￿− 1−σ+θ(σ−1) ￿Tn￿wn
Pn
￿−βθ
.
Rearranging and substituting for ￿Tn then yields
wn
Pn
= (λnn)
− 1βθ (fn)
− 1−σ+θ(σ−1)βθ ￿(Kn)α (hnPn)1−α￿ θβ(σ−1) ￿Tn
f en
￿ 1
βθ
(hn/kn)
−α .
Inserting this into (4.2.1) and then into the expression for real income we get (4.4.1) .
4.A.2 An alternative approach to calibrating the technologies
Instead of imposing market clearing to recover the technologies one can follow Waugh
(2010) and use the country eﬀects Si = log
￿￿Ti ￿wβi P 1−βi ￿−θ￿ estimated in the gravity
equation, ￿Si. Based on these I then compute the implied price indices
￿Pn = (Mn) 1θ+ 11−σ ￿ N￿
k=1
exp
￿￿Sk￿ d−θnk
￿− 1θ
.
The correlation between the thus obtained price indices and the equilibrium price indices
that follow from the approach in the main text is very high with 0.93. Using these price
indices, the estimated country, and the wage rates I can then solve for the implied reduced
form technologies, ￿Ti = ￿wβi ￿P 1−βi ￿θ exp￿￿Si￿ .
The correlation between these technologies and the one obtained in the main text is high
as well with 0.91.
4.A.3 The Ricardian analogue (Waugh, 2010)
In this appendix I outline the Ricardian model proposed by Waugh (2010) and highlight
some of the diﬀerences and commonalities. Similar to the model in the main text the
world consists of N countries. Country i is inhabited by a measure Pi homogeneous
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agents, each endowed with hi eﬃciency units of labor (human capital) and ki units of
capital. Labor and capital are internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile within
countries. There are two industries. The final goods industry produces a homogeneous
non-tradable consumption good using a CRS technology
yF =
￿
kαF l
1−α
F
￿γ
q1−γF ,
whereas the competitive intermediate goods industry produces tradable, diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods using the following production function
y (z (j)) = z
￿
k (z)α l (z)1−α
￿β
q (z)1−β .
z (j) is a country-variety specific and modeled as a draw from a country-specific Fréchet
distribution
Fn (z) = Pr [Zn (j) ≤ z] = exp
￿−Tiz−θ￿ .
Trade is costly in the sense of bilateral iceberg trade costs, dni. However, there are no
fixed market entry costs.
Given these assumptions the equilibrium is characterized by a market clearing condi-
tion
wi =
N￿
n=1
λni
hnPn
hiPi wn,
where the bilateral trade shares are
λni =
￿Ti ￿wβi P 1−βi dni￿−θ￿N
k=1
￿Tk ￿wβkP 1−βk dnk￿−θ .
In the Ricardian setup ￿Ti has a diﬀerent interpretation
￿Ti = (hi/ki)−αβθ Ti
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and the price index does not depend on market entry costs
Pn =
￿
N￿
i=1
￿Ti ￿wβi P 1−βi dni￿−θ
￿− 1θ
.
In the main text I investigate how these diﬀerences aﬀect the quantitative behavior of the
models. It is straight forward to adapt the quantification strategy outlined in the main
text to this model.
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